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Chapter 1
Introduction
Throughout the last decades new theories of decision making under uncertainty have
increasingly found their way into economic models and applications. One of the main
objectives of this thesis is to investigate which additional insights one gains by intro-
ducing ”Knightian uncertainty”, or ”ambiguity”, into well-established economic models.
By now, there is a large number of scientific articles from different areas of economics
and related sciences discussing the implications of ambiguity for their respective field. In
a sense, ambiguity has become highly topical and an interesting object of research for
economists around the world.
In this spirit, I consider ambiguity related to a variety of applications ranging from In-
dustrial Organization, Health Economics to Information Economics. Even though these
applications stem from different areas of economics, it turns out that there is a common
theme and methodology connecting them. Moreover, ambiguity might provide an addi-
tional source of explanation for a variety of observed deviations from standard expected
utility theory, in cases where reliable information is absent, incomplete, or when decision-
makers base decisions on unverifiable and contradictory information.
In the introductory chapter, I provide a brief overview on models of decision making
under uncertainty relevant for this thesis. In this respect, my primary concern is to pro-
vide the basic background knowledge needed to understand the term ”ambiguity” and
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its significance for economics. The main focus is thereby to sketch briefly the historical
development of decision theory and resulting models by means of simple and manageable
examples. The introduction is divided into two parts. The first part deals with static
models of decision making and the second part considers extensions of the classical static
models to dynamic settings. Readers, who dispose of sound knowledge of decision theory,
might skip chapter 1 and proceed with chapter 2 right from the start.
The first field of application for ambiguity treated in this thesis is spatial competition
between firms. This is done in chapter 2, which is based on the article Kauffeldt and
Wiesenfarth [2014]. In this study, we analyze the impact of ambiguity and ambiguity
attitude on product differentiation in a Hotelling duopoly game. The main contribution
of this article is to investigate how partial probabilistic information on consumer demand
shapes equilibrium product designs. Therefore, we suggest a general and tractable for-
mal framework assuming that firms exhibit Choquet-expected utility preferences. More
specifically, we assume that firm managers’ beliefs are represented by neo-additive capac-
ities. In this context, we highlight the importance of partial probabilistic information for
observed product design behavior by shedding new light on a variety of real-world ap-
plications of Hotelling models under uncertainty treated in the literature. We find that,
in many cases, their interpretations are not robust with respect to this novel aspect of
uncertainty.
Chapter 3 of this thesis is based on the article Wiesenfarth [2015] and contemplates ambi-
guity in the context of preventive health care. Using a theoretical framework, I investigate
how information on the efficacy of a preventive measure affects patients’ preventive ac-
tivities under Knightian uncertainty. Information is modeled by means of an imprecise
signal, and patients’ preferences are assumed to be of the Choquet-type with beliefs in
the form of neo-additive capacities. It turns out that Knightian uncertainty can, depend-
ing on the underlying updating rule, provide an explanation for poor patient compliance
as well as excessive preventive behavior. Moreover, I can demonstrate that information
might reinforce extreme behavior under Knightian uncertainty, even if information is cor-
rectly communicated.
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Chapter 4 is based on a note published in the Journal of Mathematical Economics by
Heyen and Wiesenfarth [2015] and relates to a recent article by C¸elen [2012]. The author
generalizes the well-known Blackwell’s theorem to MEU-preferences. We show that the
notion of the value of information used in C¸elen [2012] generates dynamically inconsis-
tent behavior. The reason for this observation is that C¸elen’sdefinition of the value of
information is in conflict with the principle recursively defined utility. As a consequence
of this finding, we propose an alternative, recursively defined value of information under
Knightian uncertainty.
In chapter 5, I contemplate the approach and results of this thesis from a meta-perspec-
tive. The connecting element between the different chapters of this thesis can be found in
the fact that I consider a variety of well-established economic models and investigate how
the introduction of ambiguity alters the conclusions drawn from these models. Inherent
to such research assignment is an underlying process of model selection and adjustment.
As it turns out, this process follows clear rules and procedures, which I present by means
of a very simple and tractable baseline model, the monopoly market with demand ambi-
guity. First, I treat the question of how to assess whether it is admissible and reasonable
to introduce ambiguity into a particular economic model or not. Next, I assume that the
first question can be answered positively. Due to the availability of a growing number of
competing models of decision making under uncertainty, it is not easy for practitioners
to see, which of these models is appropriate for a specific baseline model. For this reason,
I investigate the monopoly problem under demand ambiguity for a variety of preference
specifications and compare the conclusions drawn from each specification.
Chapter 6 provides a short conclusion of the main findings of this thesis.
1.1 Models of Decision Making Under Uncertainty
In contrast to a decision problem under certainty where one or several decision-makers
have to make a decision knowing which out of several consequences will be triggered
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off given a certain action, a decision problem under uncertainty is characterized by a
situation where this mechanism remains unclear. In order to illustrate this, contemplate
the following abstract example. There is a farmer selling his organic vegetables on a local
market. The farmer disposes of two different choices of action, he can sell his products
in city a or in city b. Due to his long-lasting experience over the last twenty years, the
farmer knows that organic food is more popular in city b than in city a. More precisely,
he knows that if he sells his vegetables in city a, he will get 100 e, if he sells his products
in city b, he will obtain 150 e. If the farmer prefers more money to less money, he will
decide to sell his products in city b. This problem is a decision problem under certainty,
the decision-maker knows how a certain action affects his future payoffs. The subsequent
example is an illustration for a decision problem under uncertainty. An ice-cream seller
with an ice cream cart can sell her ice-cream at two different locations c and d. Location
c is inside a shopping mall, location d is in the center of the city’s historical marketplace,
where many tourists pass by if the weather is nice. Due to her experience, the ice-cream
seller knows that if she decides to sell in the shopping mall, she will get 100 e if the
weather is nice, let me denote this event with ω1; and she will get 150 e if it rains, let
me denote this event with ω2. If she decides to sell her ice cream in the center of the
historical marketplace, she will get 150 e if the weather is nice, and 100 e if it rains.
This example can be illustrated in a simple diagram.
action no rain rain
mall 100 e 150 e
marketplace 150 e 100 e
Table 1.1: Decision Problem of the Ice-Cream Seller
In contrast to the farmer, the ice-cream seller’s decision problem is more intricate. Which
decision should she take? The answer depends on her information and assessment of the
events ”it rains” and ”it doesn’t rain”. If she knew on the one hand with certainty that it
was going to rain today, she would sell her ice-cream in the mall. On the other hand, if she
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knew with certainty that the weather was going to be fine, she would like to sell her ice-
cream at the marketplace. Thus, the ice-cream seller’s optimal answer depends on which
of the two states of the world ”rain” and ”no rain” is going to materialize. Evidently, it
is unrealistic to assume that the ice-cream seller knows every day with certainty which of
these events is going to occur. Assume, for example, that she heard in the local weather
forecast that the probability of rain is 20% today, and assume furthermore that she fully
trusts this weather forecast. In this case, her expected value or expectation given the
lottery1 L1 = (100e, 0.8; 150e, 0.2) is EV1 = 0.8 · 100 e+ 0.2 · 150 e= 110 e if she
goes to the mall. Given the lottery L2 = (150e, 0.8; 100e, 0.2), one obtains the expected
value EV2 = 0.8 · 150 e+0.2 · 100 e= 140 e if she goes to the marketplace. Thus, given
this calculation of expected values based on her ”belief” in the weather forecast, and the
assumption that the ice-cream seller prefers more money to less money, she would decide
to sell her ice cream at the local marketplace.
A closer look at the seller’s decision problem shows that her choice of different actions is
equivalent to a choice between two different lotteries L1 and L2, each one them defined
on a common set of possible consequences X = {100, 150} = {x1, x2}. In fact, both
levels of decision making are connected in a general way via the expected utility model
(henceforth EU model) axiomatized by Von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944].
The authors show that a decision-maker’s preference on the set of (finite) lotteries L
satisfies the axioms of completeness, transitivity, continuity, and independence if and
only if there exists a utility function U : L → R defined on the set of lotteries L and a
Bernoulli utility function u : X → R defined on the set of consequences such that
U(L) =
n∑
i=1
piu(xi) (1.1)
where pi = L(xi) the probability of the outcome xi. Thus, the above stated decision
1A (finite) lottery is a probability distribution defined on a (finite) state space Ω. The state space is
a set comprising all possible states of the world. In this example, we have Ω = {ω1, ω2}. Furthermore,
I introduce the notation Li = (x1, p1; ..., xn, pn) where xi denotes the outcome of the lottery in state ωi
and pi denotes the probability of state ωi for i = 1, ..., n.
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problem of the ice-cream seller implicitly assumes that her Bernoulli utility function is
given by the identity function u(x) = x.
One of the major challenges of the ice-cream decision problem is that the seller heavily
depends on the ”objectively” given rainfall probability provided by the local weather
forecast. Assume for example that due to some reason, the seller has no access to the
information provided by the weather forecast. Still, she has to make a decision. But on
which probability should her decision be based on? The underlying problem is extensively
discussed in the literature and dates back to Knight [1921], who differentiates between
”calculable” and ”incalculable risk”. Another term for incalculable risk is ”ambiguity”.
In the stylized ice-cream seller example, the risk calculation of the rainfall probability
has already been performed by the meteorological service. In absence of this crucial
information, the seller needs to rely on her individual observations and judgments to
form a purely subjective belief. What is the difference between objective and subjective
probabilities? A subjective probability is tied to a single individual and arises in situations
of scarce information on the underlying randomization process. An objective probability
is a probability that is based on reliable and and plausible data or background information
on the randomization device. Imagine, for instance, that we observe the outcome of a
pseudorandom number generator or of a coin toss with a fair coin. In both cases, we
know the underlying probability distribution that generates the outcomes. If, in one of
these cases, the ice-cream seller met another ice-cream seller disposing of the same reliable
information on the randomization process and acting rational2 like her, then both would
agree on the same objective probability.
At this particular point, the problem of subjective probabilities is that we do not know
whether they exist or not. A certain progress regarding this question has been achieved
by Ramsey [1931], who suggests a procedure of subjective belief elicitation by observing
an individual’s willingness to pay for certain bets. By showing preference for certain bets,
the decision-maker reveals which events he judges more likely than other events given his
2A decision-maker is considered rational when she consistently conforms to a certain set of laws or
axioms.
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or her current state of knowledge. Thus, the task associated to demonstrating whether
a subjective belief exists or not is to derive a probability distribution directly from an
individual’s preference. Given Ramsey’s result, it remains questionable which properties a
preference relation needs to satisfy in order to allow for belief elicitation. De Finetti [1937]
addresses this problem by providing a set of axioms on the decision-maker’s preference
such that a subjective probability exists. Moreover, the decision-maker selects an action
by comparing expectations based on this subjective belief. The problem of De Finetti’s
approach is that the agent compares bundles by comparing expectations with respect
to the implicitly given subjective belief, in contrast to Von Neumann and Morgenstern
[1944] who obtain a utility function and represent preferences over a set of objective
lotteries. Savage [1954] reconciles the advantages of Von Neumann and Morgenstern
[1944] and De Finetti [1937] by axiomatizing the so-called subjective expected utility
model (henceforth SEU-model). If a decision-maker’s preference conforms to Savage’s set
of axioms, we can infer that a subjective belief as well as a representing utility function
exist, and that the latter selects an action such that she maximizes her subjective expected
utility. Instead of selecting between different actions from a choice set, a decision-maker
in Savage’s world selects among different (Savage-)acts, which are functions g : Ω → X
mapping from states to consequences. For each state ω ∈ Ω, the value g(ω) denotes the
outcome the decision-maker obtains if ω materializes under the assumption that g was
selected. Translated into the example of the ice-cream seller, Savage’s concept of acts
would imply that the seller goes for one of the functions g and h, where g(ω1) = h(ω2) =
100 and g(ω2) = h(ω1) = 150, instead of simply selecting between going to the ”mall” or
to the historical ”marketplace”.
Even today, Savage’s subjective expected utility model is still considered as a benchmark
model of decision making under uncertainty. Its sound axiomatic foundation and intuitive
calculus made it popular for applications in all areas of economics. In the light of Savage’s
result, Knight’s problem seems solved since the seller can determine her optimal action
according to the SEU calculus. The problem with this approach is that the ice-cream seller
might not conform to the axioms postulated in Savage’s theory. Ellsberg [1961] shows
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with the famous Ellsberg paradox, that a subjective belief might not always exist, since
decision-makers might display a preference for bets with purely objective probabilities.
In the following, I illustrate the Ellsberg paradox within the scope of the example of the
ice-cream seller. Assume that, after a few years, the ice-cream seller has learned to further
differentiate how the weather conditions affect her payoffs. She knows that in the event
of rain, she obtains 150 e if she goes to the mall, and 100 e if she sells at the historical
market. In the event of a partly cloudy or cloudless skies, she obtains 100 e if she sells
at the mall, and 180 e if she sells outside. In the event of a cloudy sky without rain, she
obtains 120 e in the mall and in the historical market. Furthermore, she agreed with two
different intermediaries on a weather-dependent contract providing her with the option
to bring the ice-cream to one of them in the morning. Intermediary 1 pays her 100 e for
the ice-cream in the event of sunny or cloudy weather, and 150 e in the event of rain.
Intermediary 2 pays her 150 e in the event of sunny weather, and 100 e else. The new,
extended decision problem of the ice-cream seller is summarized by means of Table 1.2.
action sunny cloudy rainy
mall 100 e 120 e 150 e
marketplace 150 e 120 e 100 e
intermediary 1 100 e 100 e 150 e
intermediary 2 150 e 100 e 100 e
Table 1.2: Decision Problem for the Illustration of Ellsberg’s Paradox
Assume that the seller listens to the local weather forecast and obtains the information
that the probability of rain is 30% today, but she does not get any conclusive information
on the probability of cloudy or sunny skies. I denote with psunny, pcloudy and prainy the
respective subjective probabilities. Assume furthermore that the seller prefers interme-
diary 1 towards intermediary 2 and that, if she had to select between the marketplace
and the mall, she would prefer to sell at the marketplace. If the seller exhibits such a
preference, she displays behavior that is inconsistent with Savage’s SEU-theory. This can
be demonstrated by means of the following calculations. Preferring intermediary 1 to
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intermediary 2 implies
psunnyu(100e) + pcloudyu(100e) + prainyu(150e)
>psunnyu(150e) + pcloudyu(100e) + prainyu(100e)
Simplifying this inequality yields the statement
psunny < prainy
Similarly, preference for the marketplace implies
psunnyu(180e) + pcloudyu(120e) + prainyu(100e)
>psunnyu(100e) + pcloudyu(120e) + prainyu(150e),
which is equivalent to the statement
psunny > prainy
This contradicts the existence of a subjective probability for sunny weather.
The Ellsberg paradox has paved the way for a multitude of new theories of decision
making under uncertainty. Schmeidler [1989] provides an axiomatic foundation of the
Choquet-expected utility theory (henceforth CEU-theory). Instead of probabilities that
satisfy the properties of σ-additivity and finite additivity, the Choquet model implies that
a decision-maker’s belief is non-additive and represented by a more general mathematical
structure called ”capacity” or ”charge”. In the following, I give a definition of the term
capacity (charge).
Definition 1.1 (Cf. Chateauneuf et al. [2007], p. 540). Consider the measurable space
(Ω,Σ).3 A capacity (charge) is a set function ν : Σ→ Ω mapping events from the algebra
Σ to real numbers with two additional properties. The function is normalized, implying
3A measurable space is a pair (Ω,Σ) where Ω is the sample space or state space, and Σ is a σ-algebra
of events defined on Ω.
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ν(∅) = 0, ν(Ω) = 1 and monotonic with respect to the set inclusion relation ⊂, implying
A ⊂ B ⇔ ν(A) ≤ ν(B).
The definition of a capacity is rather abstract. Nevertheless, there are certain classes
of capacities which entail insightful behavioral interpretations for economic models. In
order to illustrate the term capacity and its properties, I relate this notion to the ice-cream
seller. To begin with, I denote with R the event of rainfall, S denotes the event of sunny
weather, and C denotes the event of cloudy skies. Furthermore, I denote with RS the
event that rainfall or sunny skies occur, RC denotes the event of rainfall or cloudy skies,
and SC denotes the event of sunny skies or cloudy skies. I define a capacity by ν(∅) = 0,
ν(Ω) = 1, and ν(A) = α for all other events where α ∈ [0, 1]. This is an example for a
Hurzwicz-capacity.4. The aforementioned capacity does not fulfill the property of finite
additivity; the probability, as measured by the capacity ν, of the union of two disjoint
events is not equal to the sum of the probabilities of the single events. For example R
and S are disjoint events, formally R ∪ S = ∅, but ν(RS) = α 6= ν(R) + ν(S). Another
example for a capacity is the so-called neo-additive or non-extreme outcome capacity that
I define in the following.
Definition 1.2 (Cf. Eichberger et al. [2009], p. 359). Let q be a probability measure on
Ω. Then, for real numbers α and δ, one can define a neo-additive capacity ν by ν(∅) = 0,
ν(Ω) = 1, ν(A) = δα + (1− δ)q(A) where A ∈ Σ\{∅,Ω} is a nonempty and strict subset
from the σ-algebra Σ.
In order to illustrate the notion of a neo-additive capacity, I relate this definition to the
ice-cream seller. Assume for example that the ice-cream seller listens every day to the
same weather forecast from the same provider. Due to the large amount of past obser-
vations, she considers this weather forecast as a very reliable source of information, and
she is confident that the probabilities of rainy, cloudy, or sunny weather reaped from this
forecast are very accurate. Suppose now that there is an alternative weather forecast from
4For the general definition of a Hurwicz-capacity see e.g. Chateauneuf et al. [2007], page 541.
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a new provider available. The ice-cream seller disposes of no evidence proving the reli-
ability of this forecast. One day, she listens to this alternative weather forecast because
she missed out on the weather prediction she usually resorts to. Assume furthermore
that the alternative weather prediction is detailed enough to provide her with probabil-
ities of sunny, cloudy, and rainy weather. A natural question in this context is whether
the ice-cream seller would trust the alternative weather forecast in the same way as her
usual weather forecast. Neo-additive capacities capture the ice-cream seller’s reliability
concerns with the confidence parameter δ. If δ is equal to zero, the ice-cream seller fully
trusts the probability distribution arising from the weather forecast. If δ is equal to zero,
the seller dismisses this underlying probability completely. For intermediate values of δ
the probability of an event A ∈ Σ\{∅,Ω} is given by a convex combination of the fixed
probability α and q(A). Suppose that both weather forecasts post the same probabil-
ities for rainfall, sunny, and cloudy weather inducing the same ”objective” probability
distribution q, then the seller’s concern with respect to the reliability of the alternative
weather forecast may be expressed by assuming that δ1 is smaller than δ2 where δi for
i = 1, 2 corresponds to the confidence parameter δ in the event of the usual weather
forecast (i = 1) and the alternative forecast (i = 2). The parameter α captures the ice-
cream seller’s attitude towards ambiguity. Assume for example that the seller dismisses
completely the alternative weather forecast. In this case, her belief is, by construction,
represented by a Hurzwicz-capacity, namely the same Hurwicz-capacity which has been
introduced as an illustration of Definition 1.1. The Hurwicz-capacity assigns to all events
A ∈ Σ\{∅,Ω} the same probability α. Thus, the ice-cream seller would assign the same
probability α to the event rain R, to the event sunshine S, and to the event rain or
sunshine RS. The smaller α, the more likely it is that the ice-cream seller underestimates
the probability of very likely events and overestimates the likelihood of events with very
small probabilities. A general behavior like that might be labeled ”pessimistic”, since
the ice-cream seller worries more about unlikely, small events and considers likely events
not as likely as they might seem. If, on the other hand, the ice-cream seller assigned a
probability α close to one to all events A ∈ Σ\{∅,Ω}, this would imply that the seller
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consistently underestimates small events and overestimates a larger number of very likely
events. With a similar reasoning, one can argue that such a behavior might be labeled
”optimistic”.
The Choquet-model presumes a different notion of acts than the SEU-model. In the same
way as in the framework developed by Anscombe and Aumann [1963], an act is defined
as a mapping f : Ω → L from the state space Ω to the set L of finite lotteries on X.
Henceforth, the set of possible acts is defined as
F = {f |f : Ω→ L}.
How does this novel definition of acts fit into the example of the ice-cream seller? Again,
as in the Savage case, we can identify each of the seller’s actions with a specific act. Con-
sider, for example, the action ”going to the mall”. For each weather condition, or state
of the world, Table 1.2 indicates the seller’s payoffs. The previous definition of an act as-
sumes that the entries of Table 1.2 specify lotteries. Instead of receiving a fixed outcome,
the seller obtains for each action a lottery. An act is thus a complete plan, specifying for
each state of the world, which lottery the seller is going to play. In the end, nature plays
out this lottery and determines the seller’s payoff. Of course, this is not an explanation
yet of how we can fit the ice-cream seller’s decision problem into this framework. This
task can be accomplished by identifying each fixed monetary outcome with a lottery that
pays out exactly the same amount of money with probability one. Now, everything is
in place to specify an act f associated with the action ”going to the mall”; f maps the
state ”sunny weather” to a lottery that pays out 100 e with probability one, the state
”cloudy weather” to a lottery that pays out 120 e with probability one, and the state
”rainy weather” to a lottery that pays out 150 e with probability one.
In the expected utility model, a decision-maker’s utility over the lottery space L is rep-
resented by an expectation5. In the Choquet model, this expectation is replaced by a
”generalized expectation” the Choquet integral, which is based on a broader notion of
5Cf. equation (1.1).
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integration than the ”usual” expectation. More specifically, a Choquet integral allows for
integration with respect to non-additive probabilities.
Definition 1.3 (Cf. Denneberg [1994], p. 62). Let (Ω,Σ) be a measurable space, ν :
Σ → R+ a monotonic set function and h : Ω → R a Σ-measurable function.6 Then the
Choquet integral of h with respect ν is defined as
∫
Ω
hdν :=
0∫
−∞
ν({ω|h(ω) > x})− ν(Ω)dx+
∞∫
0
ν({ω|h(ω) > x})dx (1.2)
where the integrals on the right-hand side of (1.2) are improper Riemann integrals.
Remark 1.1. If ν is a capacity, it satisfies the normalization ν(Ω) = 1.
Remark 1.2 (Cf. Denneberg [1994], page 62 et seq.). In many applications and decision
problems in economics, one deals with situations where the function h takes only finitely
many values on a partition of the state space Ω. Such functions are called step functions.
Let h be a step function where h takes the values d1 > d2 > ... > dn, dn+1 := 0 and let
(Ai)
n
i=1 be a partition of Ω with Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for all i 6= j, ∪ni=1Ai = Ω and h(ω) = di if
ω ∈ Ai. The Choquet integral of a step function is given by
∫
Ω
hdν =
n∑
i=1
(di − di+1)ν
(
i⋃
j=1
Aj
)
.
Remark 1.3. For more details on integration with respect to non-additive measures see
Denneberg [1994].
In the following, I condense the notation slightly by assuming that for an act f the ex-
pression f(ω)[xi] denotes the probability of outcome xi given the lottery f(ω). Schmeidler
[1989] proposes a set of axioms on F that entail the following representation of CEU-
preferences:
6Measurability implies that the event {ω|h(ω) > x} is contained in the σ-algebra Σ for all x ∈ R.
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f % g iff
∫
Ω
∑
xi
f(ω)[xi]u(xi)dν ≥
∫
Ω
∑
xi
g(ω)[xi]u(xi)dν (1.3)
This representation involves double integration. The integrands are expected utilities with
respect to the lotteries f(ω) and g(ω) respectively. Thus, for each state, the decision-
maker is confronted with different lotteries and forms expected utilities given these lotter-
ies. The probability of a state ω ∈ Ω, however, is condensed in the capacity ν. What the
CEU decision-maker does, is forming an expectation or ”average”, based on non-additive
probabilities with respect to all expected utilities that might occur for different realiza-
tions of a given act. In the end, the agent ranks all acts according to the ranking induced
by these ”averaged expectations”.
The Choquet integral formed with respect to neo-additive capacities has a specific and in-
tuitive representation. In the following, I introduce the concept of null events and simple
functions, which are technical prerequisites for the aforementioned representation.
Definition 1.4 (Cf. Chateauneuf et al. [2007], p. 540 et seq.). A set A ∈ Σ is called null
or a null-event with respect to the capacity ν if ν(A) = 0.
Thus, a null-event is an event which carries zero probability where the term ”probability”
is generalized to capacities. For a given capacity, the set of null-events is henceforth
denoted with N . In the ice-cream seller example, the only null-event is the empty set ∅.
Definition 1.5 (Cf. Chateauneuf et al. [2007], p. 540-541). A function f : Ω → R is
called simple if it is Σ-measurable and finitely valued.
In cases where the underlying capacity is neo-additive, the Choquet integral has the
following representation:
Lemma 1.6 (Lemma 3.1 from Chateauneuf et al. [2007], page 541). The Choquet-expected
value of a simple function f with respect to a neo-additive capacity ν is given by
∫
Ω
fdν : = δ
(
αmax{x : f−1(x) 6∈ N}+ (1− α) min{y : f−1(y) 6∈ N}
)
+ (1− δ)Epi[f ]
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Proof. Cf. Chateauneuf et al. [2007], page 542.
Assume that the ice-cream seller’s belief is represented by a neo-additive capacity. How
does she determine her optimal action? As pointed out, she selects among four different
acts f1, f2, f3, f4 ∈ F , each act arising from one of her four actions available.
act action
f1 sell at the mall
f2 sell at the marketplace
f3 instruct intermediary 1
f4 instruct intermediary 2
For each act, she contemplates the Choquet integral
∫
Ω
fidν
and selects the action that entails the highest Choquet expected value. The parameter
δ captures the seller’s confidence into the prior pi arising from the weather forecast. If
δ = 0, the seller gives full weight to the expectation with respect to this pi. In this case,
the seller fully trusts the posted probabilities and acts as an expected utility maximizer.
If δ = 0, she gives full weight to a convex combination of extreme outcomes that occur
with non-zero probability. What are these extreme outcomes? Since each act maps to
lotteries that select an outcome with probability one, she considers for each act the best
and worst-case monetary outcome associated with this act. In cases where the seller
selects ”selling at the mall”, the best-case outcome is 150e, and the worst-case outcome
is 100e; the seller considers the value α150e + (1 − α)100e. In cases where α equals
zero, the seller gives full weight to the worst case and no weight to the best case. In cases
where α equals one, the agent gives full weight to the best case and no weight to the
worst case. For intermediate values of δ the seller assigns an overall weight of δ to the
convex combination of extreme outcomes and of 1− δ to the expectation with respect to
Introduction 16
pi.
The MMEU model and the Choquet model are interrelated. More specifically, there is a
certain class of capacities, called convex capacities, that allow for a representation of any
Choquet expected utility as a MMEU with a specific set of priors, the so-called core of
the capacity. In the following, I define the terms convexity and core.
Definition 1.7. A capacity ν is called convex, if for all events A,B ⊂ Ω the following
inequality holds:
ν(A) + ν(B) ≤ ν(A ∪B) + ν(A ∩B)
In the literature, cf. Schmeidler [1989], a convex capacity is frequently associated with
agents that display uncertainty averse behavior.7 A decision-maker whose belief is repre-
sented by a convex capacity underestimates the occurrence of smaller, single events.
Definition 1.8. Let ν be a capacity and Ω a finite state space. Then the core of the
capacity is defined as
core(ν) =
{
q : q(A) ≥ ν(A), q probability, q(Ω) = ν(Ω), A ∈ Σ
}
.
Schmeidler [1986] shows that for a convex capacity with nonempty core and any real-
valued Bernoulli utility u : X → R one has
∫
Ω
u dν = min
p∈core(ν)
∫
Ω
u dp
Another prominent model of decision making under uncertainty is the Multiple prior
model or MaxMin-expected utility model (henceforth MMEU-model) axiomatized by
Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989]. Similar to the Choquet model, acts are defined as map-
pings f : Ω→ L, and preferences are defined on the set of acts F . Gilboa and Schmeidler
[1989] provide the subsequent representation for MMEU preferences:
7This view is criticized by Epstein [1999].
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f % g iff min
p∈Q
∫
Ω
∑
xi
f(ω)[xi]u(xi)dp ≥ min
p∈Q
∫
Ω
∑
xi
g(ω)[xi]u(xi)dp (1.4)
Q is a nonempty and closed set of priors defined on the state space Ω, and u : X → R
is a utility function.8 Again, as in the case of the Choquet model, the decision-maker
compares averages of expected utilities. One major difference to the Choquet model
is that the averaging occurs with respect to additive probabilities. For each additive
prior in the set Q, the agent forms an averaged expected utility. When evaluating an
act, the decision-maker considers the lowest of all these expected utilities. In short, the
agent compares worst-case averaged expected utilities. A decision-maker displaying such
behavior is highly pessimistic. Among all probabilistic scenarios, the latter bases his
comparison of acts solely on the worst case. A model making use of multiple priors and
allowing for optimistic and pessimistic attitudes towards ambiguity is the so-called α-
MEU model developed by Ghirardato et al. [2004]. In their framework, a decision-maker
with a prior set Q considers for a given act f ∈ F a convex combination of best- and
worst-case expected utilities.
αmin
p∈Q
∫
Ω
∑
xi
f(ω)[xi]u(xi)dp+ (1− α) max
p∈Q
∫
Ω
∑
xi
f(ω)[xi]u(xi)dp (1.5)
Until now, the α-MEU model lacks a complete axiomatization. Ghirardato et al. [2004]
argue that the α-MEU model provides a clear separation between ambiguity and a
decision-maker’s attitude towards ambiguity. The α-MEU model is criticized by Eich-
berger et al. [2011]. The authors show that a decision-maker that conforms to the axioms
suggested in Ghirardato et al. [2004] can only display extreme attitudes towards ambigu-
ity characterized by extreme optimism α = 0, or extreme pessimism α = 1.
A generalization of the MMEU model is given by the variational representation of pref-
erences axiomatized by Maccheroni et al. [2006]. Given their set of axioms, Maccheroni
8Bewley [2002] proposes a model of decision making under uncertainty which allows for a similar
representation as the MMEU model. In contrast to Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989], Bewley’s model is
based on the assumption of incomplete preferences.
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et al. [2006] obtain the subsequent representation of preferences on F :
f % g ⇔ min
p∈Q
{∑
xi
f(ω)[xi]u(xi) + c(p)
}
≥ min
p∈Q
{∑
xi
g(ω)[xi]u(xi) + c(p)
}
(1.6)
The function c : ∆→ [0,∞] is a grounded9, convex, and lower semicontinuous function. If
the function c equals zero, the model reduces to the MMEU model. The rationale speaking
for the introduction of variational preferences is again the objective to separate ambiguity
and a decision-maker’s attitude towards ambiguity.10 A special case of the variational
model are the so-called multiplier preferences introduced by Hansen and Sargent [2001].
In their model, the authors specify c as a multiple of the so-called relative entropy,
which is a mathematical concept established by Kullback and Leibler [1951]. Given
two probability distributions p and p∗, the relative entropy R(p, p∗), or Kullback-Leibler
divergence, constitutes a distance measure between p and p∗ where q is usually referred
to as reference probability.
Definition 1.9. If p and p∗ can be represented by densities f and f ∗, then the Kullback-
Leibler divergence is defined as
R(p, p∗) =
∫ ∞
−∞
log
f(x)
f∗(x)
dx.
Multiplier preferences are based on the following functional form
UMUPR(f) = min
p∈Q
{∑
xi
f(ω)[xi]u(xi) + γR(p, p
∗)
}
(1.7)
where f ∈ F is a simple act, and γ ≥ 0 is a parameter measuring the impact of the relative
entropy. If γ equals zero, the objective reduces to the objective of the MMEU model. For
large values of γ, the agent gives large weight to the Kullback-Leibler divergence. In this
case, the agent bases her decision on a prior in the prior set Q that (nearly) minimizes the
distance to the reference probability p∗. An axiomatic foundation of multiplier preferences
9Grounded means that the infimum value of c is zero, cf. Maccheroni et al. [2006], p. 1456.
10Maccheroni et al. [2006] state that attitude towards ambiguity is condensed in the function c.
Introduction 19
is provided by Strzalecki [2011].
Another model of decision making under uncertainty is the Smooth ambiguity or KMM
model introduced by Klibanoff et al. [2005]. Again, as in previous models of decision
making under uncertainty, there is a state space Ω and a σ-algebra Σ(Ω) of possible
events. Furthermore, the KMM model operates with second-order probabilities. In this
respect, I denote with ∆ the set of all probability distributions on Ω and Σ(∆) is a σ-
algebra of events defined on ∆. An event A ∈ Σ(∆) consists thus of a set of probability
distributions, each probability defined on the state space Ω. Let µ : Σ(∆) → [0, 1] be a
second-order probability distribution on ∆. Then, the value µ(A) for an event A ∈ Σ(∆)
denotes the probability that one of the probability distributions in A is the true underlying
probability. Given the set of axioms in Klibanoff et al. [2005] a decision-maker’s utility
U on the set of simple acts F takes the subsequent functional form:
UKMM(f) :=
∫
∆
Φ
(∫
Ω
∑
xi
f(ω)[xi]u(xi)dp
)
dµ(p). (1.8)
The function u : X → R is a Bernoulli utility, and Φ : u(X)→ R is a strictly increasing
function. The KMM functional can be interpreted in the following way: the inner integral
corresponds to an expected utility with respect to the additive subjective belief p. Similar
to previously introduced models of decision making under uncertainty, the decision-maker
forms an average of multiple expected utilities. In the context of the KMM model, this
averaging occurs with respect to the second-order probability µ. In the general case,
the function Φ distorts the inner expected utilities, unless Φ equals the identity. In this
special case, the model reduces to the model of Anscombe and Aumann [1963]. A special
feature of the KMM model is that the reduction of compound lotteries to simple lotteries
is in general not possible.
The KMM model is criticized by Epstein [2010]. The author argues by means of thought
experiments that the KMM’s axiomatic foundation is problematic from a normative point
of view and that separation between ambiguity and ambiguity attitude cannot be achieved
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by KMM. Furthermore, Epstein [2010] states that the benefits of the KMM model as com-
pared to the MMEU model remain unclear.
To conclude, I want to mention briefly that there are more models of decision making
under uncertainty, which I am not going to discuss hereafter, since they are not essential
for the understanding of this thesis. Among these models is the vector expected utility
model axiomatized by Siniscalchi [2009], a model using so-called source functions devel-
oped by Abdellaoui et al. [2011], the issue-preference model introduced by Ergin and
Gul [2009], the confidence function model developed by Chateauneuf and Faro [2009],
the model of uncertainty averse preferences introduced by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. [2011],
and the expected uncertain utility model axiomatized by Gul and Pesendorfer [2014].
For a discussion of all of these models, except the model by Abdellaoui et al. [2011], I
recommend the survey article by Machina and Siniscalchi [2014].
1.2 Dynamic Models of Decision Making Under Un-
certainty
By now, there is a variety of articles extending the static models of decision making under
uncertainty treated in the previous section to intertemporal settings. A major challenge
in this context is the problem that these extensions might induce decision-makers to
violate dynamic consistency. In the literature, one can find, depending on its context,
different notions and definitions of dynamic consistency. Roughly speaking, the idea of
dynamic consistency is tied to the view that any intertemporal decision problem can
be represented by an event or decision tree. Ex-ante the decision-maker determines an
optimal plan indicating which action he or she takes once arriving at a specific node of
the tree. Now, dynamic consistency requires the decision-maker to stick to the original
plan once a specific node at the tree is reached.11 This means that, even though the
decision-maker obtains the information that she arrived at a certain node she will not
11Cf. Machina [1989], page 1636 et seq.
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revise her plan, she still finds her ex-ante plan optimal. Ghiradato [2002] provides a formal
definition of dynamic consistency in a Savage framework. In order to further clarify the
definition in Ghiradato [2002], I introduce the subsequent notation.
Notation 1.1. For two acts f, g ∈ F and an event A ∈ Σ the act fAg denotes the act that
equals g on the complement Ac of A and equals f on the event A. The preference relation
%A denotes the so-called conditional preference relation. It refers to the decision-maker’s
preference after he or she obtained the information that the event A has occurred.
Furthermore, Ghiradato [2002] introduces Savage’s definition of null events, cf. Savage
[1954].
Definition 1.10 (Null event). An event A is called Savage-null with respect to % if and
only if for all acts f, g, h, h′ ∈ F
fA
c
h % gAch′ if and only if f % g
Definition 1.10 says that no matter how we change the acts f and g on the event A, the
original preference relation remains unaffected. In the following, I denote with Σ′ the set
of all Savage non-null events.
Definition 1.11 (Dynamic consistency, cf. Ghiradato [2002], page 87). For all events
A ∈ Σ′ and acts f, g ∈ F , both the following conditions hold:
1. If f %A g then fAg % g
2. If fAg % g then f %A g
The first condition says that, if the decision-maker knows that A has occurred and he
prefers f over g given this information, then he should also prefer the act fAg, which is
just a modification of f on the complement Ac, from an ex-ante perspective. The second
condition implies the reverse logical direction. If the decision-maker prefers the modified
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act fAg from an ex-ante perspective, then he should prefer f over g when he knows that
A has occurred.
Dynamic consistency is a prerequisite for the applicability of the backward induction
principle. In the following, I give an example for an event tree and illustrate dynamic
consistency as well as the backward induction principle under risk. Assume that there
are three time points t = 0, 1, 2 and a decision-maker and that has two actions available
A and B at time t = 0. Furthermore, there are two states of the world ω1 and ω2 that
materialize at time t = 1. The agent knows the probability pi of each state ωi occurring.
At time t = 2 the agent selects among two different actions C and D and obtains her
payoffs immediately afterwards. The following event tree illustrates this decision problem
where pi ∈ R denote the decision-maker’s payoffs.
Figure 1.1: Decision Tree Under Risk
A complete plan for the decision-maker specifies what she does at each decision node, for
instance (A,C) stands for selecting action A at time t = 0 and action C at time t = 2.
The agent’s optimal plan can be determined with the backward induction principle. As-
sume for the sake of simplicity that the decision-maker is a risk neutral expected utility
maximizer, and thus that her utility function equals the identity. First, she determines
the optimal action at time t = 2. Therefore, she compares the expected utilities induced
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by the plan (A,C) with the expected utility induced by the plan (A,D). Similarly, she
compares the expected utility induced by the plan (B,C) with the expected utility in-
duced by the plan (B,D). In each of these cases, she selects the action yielding the
highest expected utility value. As a last step, she compares the highest expected utility
values induced by action A and B and selects the plan that induces the highest overall
expected utility value.
There is a variety of articles demonstrating the conflict of dynamic consistency with
non-expected utility models. Machina [1989] provides examples under which decision-
makers display dynamically inconsistent behavior when deviating from expected utility
theory. Karni and Schmeidler [1991] find that dynamic consistency12 and the indepen-
dence axiom of the EU-theory by Von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944] are equivalent if
decision-makers satisfy the reduction of compound lotteries axioms and consequentialism.
Furthermore, the article by Epstein and Le Breton [1993] demonstrates that if preferences
are based on beliefs13 and beliefs are updated by Bayes’ rule, the decision-maker holds a
single Bayesian belief. This finding is problematic for non-expected utility models since
it implies that one of the conditions postulated in Epstein and Le Breton [1993] need
to be relaxed in order to justify beliefs implied by the models of decision making under
uncertainty presented in the previous section. Ghiradato [2002] provides an axiomatiza-
tion of a dynamic version of Savage’s SEU model incorporating dynamic consistency and
another prominent axiom of dynamic models of decision making under uncertainty, called
consequentialism.
Definition 1.12 (Consequentialism, cf. Ghiradato [2002], page 88). For any A ∈ A′ and
all f, g ∈ F , f(ω) = g(ω) for each ω ∈ A implies f ∼A g.
Consequentialism requires that if two acts coincide on a non-null event A and the agent
obtains the information that A has occurred then she must be indifferent between both
12The terms dynamic consistency and consequentialism are defined in the space of compound lotteries.
13The preference relation % is based on beliefs if and only if there exists a relation %l defined on the
algebra Σ of events such that for all events A,B ∈ Σ the DM prefers to bet on event A if and only if
A %l B, cf. Epstein and Le Breton [1993], page 2.
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acts.
In the following, I give a short summary on dynamic extensions of decision-theoretic
models featuring ambiguity. Epstein and Schneider [2003] provide a dynamic extension
of the MEU model using a recursive structure. The authors maintain dynamic consistency
by restricting the set of priors to so-called rectangular prior sets and assuming that each
prior is updated by Bayes’ rule individually. The definition of rectangularity is thereby
tied to the agent’s underlying information structure, the so called filtration. In the
following, I discuss the terms filtration and rectangularity.
Definition 1.13. A filtration F = {Ft} is a sequence of sub-σ algebras of Ω where
Fs ⊂ Fl for s ≤ l.
Remark 1.4. The σ-algebra Ft represents the agent’s information on the decision prob-
lem at time t. In most relevant intertemporal decision problems it is assumed that the
state space Ω is finite. In these cases, there exists a finite partition of the state space
Ω and that this partition generates the σ-algebra Ft.14 In this case, one can identify
each sub-σ-algebra Ft with its generating partition. Moreover, denote with Ft(ω) the
component of the generating partition that contains ω. At time t, the decision-maker
cannot differentiate between states in the same component Ft(ω).
In order to define the term rectangularity, I introduce the following notation from Epstein
and Schneider [2003], page 7.
Notation 1.2. Consider the measurable space (Ω,Σ) and a probability p defined on that
space. Consider the sub-σ algebra Ft of the filtration F . By Remark 1.4 there exists a
finite partition of the state space
Ω =
n∑
i=1
Ati
14A collectionM of subsets of Ω generates the σ-algebra Σ if Σ is the smallest σ-algebra that contains
M where the term ”small” refers to set inclusion ⊆.
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such that this partition generates the sub-σ algebra Ft. For each ω ∈ Ω there exists a
unique event Atω in the partition such that ω ∈ Atω. In this context, I define
pt(·) := p(·|Atω)
as the conditional probability with respect to the sub-σ-algebra Ft and
p+1t = pt|Ft+1
is the restriction of pt on the sub-σ algebra Ft+1 called one-step-ahead conditional prob-
ability. The one-step-ahead conditional can be interpreted in the following way: given
the information Ft(ω) at time t, the decision-maker might be able to exclude certain
realizations of the state space. More specifically, she knows that the observed realization
ω lies in the event Atω. At time t+ 1 the decision-maker knows that the realization lies in
the event At+1ω , which is a subset of A
t
ω. This is because, by definition, the filtration at
time t+ 1 is finer than the filtration at time t. More specifically, the partition generating
Ft+1 is finer than the partition generating Ft. Thus, at time t, it is possible to restrict
the partition generating Ft+1 to all events that are subsets of Atω. Now, the one-step-
ahead conditional probability assigns a probability to these events given the information
available at time t. Figure 1.2 illustrates graphically the remarks of this paragraph. The
state space is represented by the ellipse. Given the information structure of the problem,
the decision-maker knows at time t that the true ω lies either in the red part or in the
blue part of the ellipse. At time t + 1 the decision-maker knows that the true ω lies in
one of the events 1 to 7. Assume, for instance, that the decision-maker knows at time
t that the true ω lies in the red part of the ellipse. In this case, the decision-maker can
already exclude events 5 to 7. Given the information at time t the decision-maker forms
a prior defined on the events that constitute the remaining part of the ellipse. What is
for instance the probability that ω lies in event 1. It is the one-step-ahead probability
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Figure 1.2: Example for Filtrations and One-Step-Ahead Conditionals
p+1t (B) where B is the event B = {ω lies in event 1}. Assume now that the decision-
maker’s belief structure at time t = 0 is represented by a set of priors P . In this case,
the decision-maker successively updates each prior by Bayes’ rule and obtains for each t
the so-called set of Bayesian updates
Pt(ω) := {pt(·) : p ∈ P}.
Similarly, the set of one-step-ahead conditionals at time t is defined as
P+1t (ω) :=
{
p+1t (·) : p ∈ P
}
.
In the following, I define the term rectangularity of a prior set.
Definition 1.14 (Rectangularity, cf. Epstein and Schneider [2003], page 8). The prior
set P is called Ft-rectangular if and only if
Pt(ω) =
{∫
Ω
pt+1(ω
′)dm : pt+1(ω′) ∈ Pt+1(ω′) ∀ ω′,m ∈ P+1t (ω)
}
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Subsequently, I give an intuitive interpretation of this definition. Consider a general
probability measure pt. Given the underlying filtration F , we can deduce its Bayesian
update pt+1 as well as its one-step-ahead conditional p
+1
t . Since Epstein and Schneider
[2003] require dynamic consistency in their framework, agents with these preferences can
determine optimal plans by using the previously explained backward induction principle.
Working backwards, the decision-maker needs to reconstruct the probability pt from its
one-step-ahead conditional and its Bayesian update pt+1. Formally,
pt(ω) =
∫
Ω
pt+1dp
+1
t (ω) (1.9)
In a single prior world, this reconstruction is always possible due to the law of iterated
expectations, cf. Epstein and Schneider [2003], page 7. The decision-maker simply inte-
grates the Bayesian-update with respect to the one-step-ahead conditional distribution to
reconstruct the original distribution pt. In a world of multiple priors, the aforementioned
reconstruction process might fail, since the agent ignores which of the multiple one-step
ahead conditionals and Bayesian updates she needs to combine to generate the specific
distribution pt. Therefore, when applying the backward induction principle, the agent
might blend one-step-ahead conditionals with Bayesian updates that were not intended
to be combined together from an ex-ante perspective. This inevitably leads to an en-
larged prior set Pˆt(ω) ⊃ Pt(ω) when working backwards. Now, rectangularity makes sure
that, given the filtration F , the prior set P is ”rich enough”, such that the updated prior
set Pt(·) corresponds to the prior set Pˆt(·), which one would obtain when applying the
backward induction principle.
By now, there are frameworks that go beyond the recursive multiple prior model. Wang
[2003] axiomatizes updating rules for dynamic models of decision making under uncer-
tainty that are non-Bayesian. As a special case, the author obtains the so-called ”general-
ized Bayes rule” which corresponds exactly to the updating rule employed in the multiple
prior framework of Epstein and Schneider [2003]. Hayashi [2005] provides an axiomati-
zation of an intertemporal model of decision making under uncertainty that yields the
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recursive multiple prior framework of Epstein and Schneider [2003] and the model devel-
oped by Kreps and Porteus [1978] as special cases. As a consequence, the author refers to
this model as ”generalized recursive multiple priors utility”. In contrast to Epstein and
Schneider [2003], the model introduced by Hayashi [2005] allows the authors to disentan-
gle ambiguity, risk aversion, and intertemporal substitution.15
An intertemporal version of the Choquet model called iterated Choquet expected utility
is axiomatized by Nishimura and Ozaki [2003]. The question of dynamic consistency in
the Choquet model is addressed by Eichberger et al. [2005], who consider the class of
convex capacities and informational framework with an underlying fixed filtration. In
their framework, dynamic consistency can be implied if beliefs are additive over the final
stage of the underlying filtration.
A dynamically consistent and consequentialist extension of the Smooth ambiguity model
is axiomatized by Klibanoff et al. [2009].
A dynamic version of the vector expected utility model is treated by Siniscalchi [2011].
In the previous sections, I sketched briefly the historical development of decision theory
and introduced a variety of models of decision making under uncertainty. For a more
detailed summary on the development of decision theory and models of decision making
under uncertainty see, for instance, the surveys by Machina and Siniscalchi [2014] or
Etner et al. [2012].
15See the abstract of Hayashi [2005].
Chapter 2
Spatial Competition Under
Ambiguity
2.1 Introduction
Product development is one of the most influential processes for the success of an enter-
prise, see for instance Brown and Eisenhardt [1995]. Firms compete by creating products
with new or different characteristics, amongst others, in order to enter new markets, to
retain current customers or to attract new purchasers.
A well-known and widely studied model of product differentiation is the location-then-
price duopoly game introduced by Hotelling [1929].1 In his original framework, Hotelling
discussed a model with two firms and uniformly distributed consumers along a compact
interval facing linear transportation costs. At the first stage of the game, firms choose
simultaneously their locations on this interval. At the second stage, firms face price com-
petition.
1The ”location” in Hotelling’s game is typically interpreted as a position in a geographical or product
type space. In this paper, we focus in the following on the latter interpretation.
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A vast literature deals with a multitude of extensions of Hotelling’s model.2 In partic-
ular, d’Aspremont et al. [1979] show that, under linear cost functions, the existence of
a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (henceforth SPNE ) is not guaranteed. As a resort
to this complication, d’Aspremont et al. [1979] replaced Hotelling’s original assumption
of linear transportation costs by quadratic ones. In the literature, Hotelling models with
quadratic cost functions are frequently denoted by ”AGT-models”.3
Since in most real-world situations, firms are confronted with uncertain consumer pref-
erences, a part of the more recent literature analyzes the impact of demand uncertainty
on equilibrium product differentiation. Balvers and Szerb [1996] consider a Hotelling
framework incorporating random shocks on the quality of each firm’s product under the
assumption that there is no price competition. Harter [1996] considers a Hotelling model
with demand location uncertainty where firms enter the market sequentially. Similar to
Harter [1996], Casado-Izaga [2000]4, Meagher and Zauner [2004], and Meagher and Zauner
[2005] discuss extensions of Hotelling’s model where demand uncertainty is introduced by
enabling the midpoint of the consumer interval to be probabilistic. Meagher and Zauner
[2005] generalize Casado-Izaga [2000] by parametrizing the length of the support. They
find that equilibrium differentiation increases in the size of the support. Meagher and
Zauner [2004] restrict this support to compact subsets of the interval
[−1
2
, 1
2
]
but allow
for a broad class of density functions. Again, Meagher and Zauner (henceforth MZ) come
to the conclusion that uncertainty constitutes a differentiation force, namely an increase
in the variance of the underlying probability distribution over the midpoint leads to more
pronounced equilibrium product differentiation.
All the contributions mentioned above imply that firms’ beliefs are represented by a
unique and common prior. However, in reality, this assumption may be violated for sev-
eral reasons. First of all, the assumption of a unique common probability distribution
for both firms is more restrictive than it may seem to be at first glance, especially in
2See e.g. Gabszewicz and Thisse [1992] for a survey.
3AGT stands for D’Aspre´mont, Gabszewicz and Thisse
4Casado-Izaga [2000] assume that consumers are uniformly distributed on the interval [Θ,Θ+1] where
Θ is drawn from a uniform distribution [0, 1]. Consequently, the midpoint of the consumer interval follows
implicitly a uniform distribution on [ 12 ,
3
2 ].
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situations where both firms are ex-ante completely uninformed or incapable to rely on
past experiences or observable data. Furthermore, critiques in favor of a unique common
probability distribution may argue that it is possible to apply the ”principle of insufficient
reason”5 in case of missing information. However, Ellsberg [1961] indicates in his famous
mind experiment that in situations of ”ambiguity” where probabilities are unknown, or
imperfectly known, a considerable share of individuals displays preferences which are
incompatible with probabilistic beliefs. By now, several decision theoretic models of am-
biguity have been developed. Prominent examples are the multiple prior model of Gilboa
and Schmeidler [1989], the Choquet expected utility (henceforth CEU ) model of Schmei-
dler [1989], and the smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoff et al. [2005].
Although ambiguity is prevalent in many real-world situations, there are almost no
Hotelling models incorporating this type of uncertainty. To our knowledge, Kro´l’s [2012]
article is the sole contribution on this topic. Kro´l [2012] introduces complete ambigu-
ity6 into the framework of Meagher and Zauner [2004] and examines, amongst others,
the influence of ambiguity attitude on firms’ decisions if firms use the Arrow/Hurwicz
α-maxmin criterion7. Kro´l [2012] finds that uncertainty can be an agglomeration force if
firms are sufficiently pessimistic.
The present paper studies the impact of confidence and pessimism on product differen-
tiation. Inspired by the contributions of MZ and Kro´l [2012], we develop a Hotelling
model with demand location uncertainty by using the framework of Meagher and Zauner
[2004] and Schmeidler’s concept of CEU. More specifically, we assume that firms’ beliefs
are represented by a neo-additive capacity introduced by Chateauneuf et al. [2007]. Our
framework provides additional analytical tools for understanding product differentiation
under demand uncertainty. Besides firms’ ambiguity attitude, we distinguish four differ-
ent sources of ambiguity and determine their influence on firms’ product design choices:
5The ”principle of insufficient reason” or ”principle of indifference”, enunciated in the works of
Pierre-Simon Laplace, see e.g. Laplace [1812], states that if decision-makers have no information about
the frequency of occurrence of elementary events, and therefore no reason to believe that one elementary
event will occur preferentially compared to another, they might consider them as equally likely.
6Complete ambiguity or ignorance refers to a situation where probabilistic information is absent.
7See Hurwicz [1951] and Arrow and Hurwicz [1972].
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(i) the variance of firms’ prior beliefs, (ii) the degree of ambiguity, (iii) the size of the sup-
port of the uncertainty and (iv) the magnitude of the parameter of consumers’ quadratic
cost functions. In particular, (ii) offers plausible possible explanations for real-life phe-
nomena. In fact, the models of Meagher and Zauner [2004]8 and Kro´l [2012] are special
cases of the capacity model.
Our paper is organized as follows: In the following section, we give a detailed description
of our model. As a second step, we derive firms’ pure strategy subgame-perfect prod-
uct design choices for the Hotelling game under ambiguity. Thereby, we assume that
firms’ beliefs are represented by neo-additive capacities. In section 4, we carry out a
comparative static analysis with respect to all model parameters and study implications
for equilibrium product characteristics and Choquet expected profits. Section 5 presents
implications for possible applications of the Hotelling model under demand location un-
certainty. In particular, we reexamine the examples mentioned in Kro´l [2012]. Finally,
section 6 concludes with a summary and a discussion of our findings.
8With a technical restriction. For more details see section 3, especially Remarks 3.1 and 2.3.
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2.2 Basic Framework
Our framework is inspired by the modified AGT-model of Meagher and Zauner [2004].
There are two firms, i = 1, 2, interacting in a two-stage Hotelling duopoly game. Each
firm produces a homogeneous commodity at constant marginal production costs which
are normalized to zero. At the first stage of the game, firms select simultaneously their
product characteristics xi from the real line under the assumption that x1 ≤ x2. At the
second stage, firms face price competition setting prices pi ∈ R+ simultaneously as well.
Furthermore, there is a unit mass of consumers, each consumer being uniquely charac-
terized by a specific taste, s ∈ R, representing her ideal commodity. Consumer tastes are
assumed to be uniformly distributed on an interval of the form [M − 1
2
,M + 1
2
] where
M ∈ R. A customer whose taste is located at s and consumes product i, faces a disutility
from not consuming her ideal product. Consumers’ utility losses depend on the squared
distance between s and the selected product design xi, formally t(s−xi)2 where t ∈ R++.9
In addition, customers need to pay the price pi of product i. As a consequence, total costs
are given by pi+ t(s−xi)2. Moreover, we assume that customers purchase one unit of the
homogeneous good from the firm that brings about the lowest total costs. Implicitly, this
guarantees that consumers’ outside option is non-binding, or in other words, that there
is no reservation price.
In the certainty model M and t are a fixed and exogenously given parameters known to
both firms throughout the game. In the risk model of Meagher and Zauner [2004] M
is unknown to both firms whereas the scaling parameter t is normalized to 1. In the
model of Kro´l [2012] firms face ambiguity with respect to (t,M) resolving ambiguity with
the Arrow/Hurwicz α-maxmin criterion. Similar to these models, we presume that the
realization (tˆ, Mˆ) of (t,M) is revealed to both firms before the price competition.
Assumption 1. Uncertainty is resolved at the second stage of the game.
9The parameter t allows for an up- or downward distortion of this quadratic disutility.
Chapter 2. Spatial Competition Under Ambiguity 34
As postulated in Assumption 1, the realization (tˆ, Mˆ) is revealed to both firms after
the product design competition but before the price game. The rationale behind this
assumption lies in the fact that most firms are able to adjust prices more easily than
product designs, see e.g. Meagher and Zauner [2004]. If for instance actual sales volumes
differ from estimated sales volumes, firm managers are usually in the position to readjust
retail prices accordingly.
In addition, we assume that firms dispose of some probabilistic information condensed
in a common prior q. We refer to q as ”reference probability distribution” or ”reference
prior”. Similar to the risk case, one needs to make several assumptions concerning the
reference probability q which are summarized in Assumption 2.
Assumption 2. The reference prior q on (t,M) satisfies the subsequent requirements:
(R1) The variance of M exist: Eq|M2| <∞.
(R2) The expectation of M is normalized to zero: Eq[M ] = 0.
(R3) The distribution of M has no atoms.
(R4) The support of M is given by the symmetric interval [−L,L] ⊆ [−1
2
, 1
2
]
.
(R5) The support of t is given by the interval [t, t] where t ∈ (0, 1] and t ≥ 1.
(R6) The expectation of t is normalized to 1: Eq[t] = 1.
(R7) The random variables t and M are uncorrelated.
Eq denotes the expectation formed with respect to the prior q.
At the first stage of the game, the random variable M enters quadratically into each
firm’s objective function.10 This observation provides a justification why firms’ product
design choices solely depend on the first and second moment of M . On these grounds,
Assumption (R1) guarantees the existence of best response functions. Moreover, taking
10See equation (2.1) and Lemma 2.5.
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(R1) and (R4) together, we can formulate the following lemma which proves to be very
useful for the mathematical considerations in the comparative statics section.
Lemma 2.1. The Requirements (R1) and (R4) imply
Eq[M ] ∈ [−L,L] and V arq(M) ∈
[
0, L2
]
Proof. The proof of this lemma is contained in the appendix.
The Requirements (R2) and (R6) are introduced for reasons of symmetry and tractability.
Requirement (R3) is purely technical in nature and can be replaced in order to allow for
discrete distributions or mixtures of continuous and discrete distributions. (R4) makes
sure that the support of M is a compact subset of the interval [−1
2
, 1
2
] restricting the size
of uncertainty to be relatively small. In addition, it assures that the extreme intervals
for possible realizations of the consumer distribution [−L− 1
2
,−L+ 1
2
] and [L− 1
2
, L+ 1
2
]
always have a non-empty intersection. This is a necessary assumption due to the following
reason: If the size of uncertainty is large enough, one encounters three possible cases.11
(1) The firm located left becomes a monopolist.
(2) Both firms share the market.
(3) The firm located to the right becomes a monopolist.
When the size of uncertainty is small, only the second case applies. In this paper, we
intend to restrict the analysis to the duopoly case. Furthermore, (R4) and (R5) imply
that the support of q is a subset of [t, t] × [−L,L]. Lastly, (R7) ensures that we can
disentangle the effects of t and M .
11See Meagher and Zauner [2005] for a detailed investigation of these additional cases for the risk
case.
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2.3 Introducing Ambiguity into the Game
We introduce ambiguity by assuming that firms’ beliefs are represented by non-additive
probabilities or capacities. A capacity is a normalized and monotonic set function.
Definition 2.1 (Compare Schmeidler [1989], page 578). Let Ω be a finite or infinite
non-empty set of states of the world and let Σ be an algebra of events defined on it. A
capacity is a real-valued function ν : Σ→ R such that
(1) ν(∅) = 0 and ν(Ω) = 1 (normalization)
(2) E,F ∈ Σ and E ⊆ F implies ν(E) ≤ ν(F ) (monotonicity).
A capacity can be seen as a generalized probability measure that does not necessarily
retain σ-additivity. The expectation with respect to a non-additive measure is formed by
using a Choquet integral12. In the present paper our analysis relies on a distinct class of
capacities, named neo-additive capacities, axiomatized by Chateauneuf et al. [2007].
Definition 2.2 (Compare Eichberger et al. [2009], page 359). Let q be a probability
distribution on Ω = [t, t] × [−L,L] satisfying Assumption 2. Then, for real numbers α
and δ, a neo-additive capacity ν is defined by ν(∅) = 0, ν(Ω) = 1, ν(A) = δα+(1−δ)q(A)
where A ∈ Σ is a nonempty and strict subset of Ω.
From our point of view, neo-additive capacities display several nice features. The param-
eter δ can be interpreted as a measure of ambiguity or of firms’ confidence in the common
reference prior q. Thus, one can contemplate our model as a setting where firms exhibit
uncertainty with respect to their prior beliefs due to imprecise or unreliable information.
Moreover, the parameter α describes firms’ attitude towards ambiguity. The higher α, the
more pessimistic firm managers are. As a result, neo-additive capacities allow for a clear
separation between the degree of ambiguity and firms’ ambiguity attitude which is, as we
12See Choquet [1955].
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want to argue in this paper, essential for many economic applications. Consequently, we
assume that the neo-additive capacity represents firms’ ex-ante uncertainty.
Assumption 3. Each firm’s belief on (t,M) is represented by a neo-additive capacity ν.
The rationale speaking for the introduction of neo-additive capacities lies in in the fact
that firms might not completely trust the information available at the time of making
their product choice. There are multiple reasons why this might be the case, e.g. firms
introducing newly innovated products into the market might dispose of data on similar
products that are already established in the market but have no data on the new good. It
seems plausible that firms use this data to predict the market outcome, still firms cannot
account for short-term trends in consumer tastes. Furthermore, data reliability is closely
tied to the comparability of the reference product with the newly innovated product. The
more heterogeneous both products are, the less plausible it seems to rely on available data
on the reference product. Neo-additive capacities allow for a model of partial information
where firms have a certain stock of data available whose reliability might be questionable
up to a certain degree. Interpreted in this way, the model developed by Kro´l [2012] refers
to a situation where firms have ex-ante no information about the distribution of consumer
tastes or completely distrust information available at the time of making their product
design choices. Moreover, neo-additive capacities allow for an additional interpretative
component with respect to a multitude of possible real-world applications of Hotelling
models under uncertainty by adding an additional explanatory source for increasing or
decreasing product differentiation under ambiguity.
2.4 Solving the Game
In this section, we determine equilibrium product differentiation under ambiguity by
backward induction. In a first step, we solve the price subgame at the second stage where
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the midpoint M of the consumer distribution and the cost parameter t are fixed and
known to both firms.
2.5 Price Subgame
According to Assumption 1, the realization (tˆ, Mˆ) is known to both firms at the second
stage. Equilibrium prices are zero if firms do not differentiate their products. Otherwise,
firms’ equilibrium prices depend on the distance between firms’ averaged product design
x¯ := x1+x2
2
and the realized midpoint Mˆ . There is an interior equilibrium where each firm
charges a positive price:
Lemma 2.2. If x1 ≤ x2 and (Mˆ − x¯) ∈ [−32 , 32 ], firms charge the subsequent equilibrium
prices:
p∗1 =
2
3
tˆ∆x
(
x¯− Mˆ + 3
2
)
and p∗2 =
2
3
tˆ∆x
(
−x¯+ Mˆ + 3
2
)
Proof. See Anderson et al. [1997], page 107 and Meagher and Zauner [2004], page 203.
Apart from the interior equilibrium, there are two more boundary equilibria where one
of the two firms becomes a monopolist:
Lemma 2.3 (Boundary price equilibria). If x1 ≤ x2 and (Mˆ − x¯) /∈ [−32 , 32 ], firms charge
the subsequent equilibrium prices:
p∗1 = 2tˆ∆x
(
x¯− Mˆ − 1
2
)
and p∗2 = 0 if (Mˆ − x¯) < −32
or
p∗2 = 2tˆ∆x
(
Mˆ − x¯− 1
2
)
and p∗1 = 0 if (Mˆ − x¯) > 32 .
Proof. See Anderson et al. [1997], page 107 and Meagher and Zauner [2004], page 203.
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2.6 Product Design Competition
As shown in the previous section, one obtains for a fixed pair (x1, x2) of product charac-
teristics a unique equilibrium for the price subgame. By making use of the equilibrium
prices from Lemma 2.2 and 2.3, we obtain firms’ second stage profits for the realization
(tˆ, Mˆ) depending on firms’ product characteristics:
Πi(xi, xj, tˆ, Mˆ) =

tˆ∆x
[
1 + 2 (−1)i(Mˆ − x¯)
]
for (−1)i (Mˆ − x¯) > 3
2
tˆ∆x
[
3(−1)i + 2(Mˆ − x¯)
]2
/18 for (Mˆ − x¯) ∈ [−3
2
, 3
2
]
0 otherwise
(2.1)
where x¯ := x1+x2
2
, ∆x := x2 − x1 and j := 3− i.
In the following, we elaborate on each firm’s objective function at the first stage of the
game. In order to do so, we rely on the fact that the second piece of (2.1) is monotonic
in (tˆ, Mˆ) as specified in Lemma 2.4 below.
Lemma 2.4. If the condition (Mˆ − x¯) ∈ [−3
2
, 3
2
] is met, firm i’s profit function
Πi(x1, x2, tˆ, Mˆ) is strictly increasing in tˆ, strictly decreasing in Mˆ for firm 1, and strictly
increasing for firm 2, provided that x1 < x2.
Proof. The proof of the lemma is contained in the appendix.
At the first stage of the game, the distribution of (t,M) is unknown. In accordance
with Assumption 3 and Definition 2.2, firms consider the Choquet expected value of their
first stage profits. We denote firms’ objectives as CEU[Πi(xi, xj, tˆ, Mˆ)]. Note that the
Choquet-expected value is formed with respect to a neo-additive capacity. Following
Lemma 3.1 in Chateauneuf et al. [2007], page 541, we obtain the representation (2.2) of
firm i’s Choquet expected profit at the first stage of the game.
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CEU[Πi(x1, x2, t,M)] =
∫
Πi(xi, xj, tˆ, Mˆ)dν = (1− δ)Eq[Πi(xi, xj, t,M)]
+ δ[(1− α) max{Πi(xi, xj, tˆ, Mˆ) : (tˆ, Mˆ) ∈ supp(t,M)}
+ αmin{Πi(xi, xj, tˆ, Mˆ) : (tˆ, Mˆ) ∈ supp(t,M)}]
(2.2)
Remark 2.1. These Choquet expected profits allow for a nice interpretation, namely
that they generalize Hotelling models treated in the literature before. For δ = 0 and a
constant scaling factor t = 1, we obtain the model of Meagher and Zauner [2004] with
a normalized mean of M . In case of δ = 1 and t = 1, the framework boils down to the
model of Kro´l [2012]. Thus, we can consider these specifications as extreme cases of the
capacity model.
As a next step, we consider the second part of equation (2.2). Making use of Lemma 2.4,
we obtain for (Mˆ − x¯) ∈ [−3
2
, 3
2
] the following explicit functional relationships:
max{Π1(xi, xj, tˆ, Mˆ) : (tˆ, Mˆ) ∈ supp(t,M)} = Π1(x1, x2, t,−L)
min{Π1(xi, xj, tˆ, Mˆ) : (tˆ, Mˆ) ∈ supp(t,M)}] = Π1(x1, x2, t, L)
max{Π2(xi, xj, tˆ, Mˆ) : (tˆ, Mˆ) ∈ supp(t,M)} = Π2(x1, x2, t, L)
min{Π2(xi, xj, tˆ, Mˆ) : (tˆ, Mˆ) ∈ supp(t,M)}] = Π2(x1, x2, t,−L)
(2.3)
Remark 2.2. One can interpret these results as follows. Firm 1’s best-case scenario
occurs when the realized midpoint Mˆ of the consumer interval equals the lower support
boundary −L. This is true, since we assume, w.l.o.g., that firm 1 is the firm whose
product characteristic is located left of firm 2’s product characteristic. Therefore, it is
more convenient for firm 1 if the consumer distribution is located closer to its own product
design. Similarly, firm 1’s worst-case scenario occurs when the midpoint of the consumer
interval takes as realization the upper support boundary L. For firm 2 the reverse result
holds.
The first term of firm i’s Choquet expected profit equals the ”usual” expectation of
its profit function with respect to the reference prior Eq[Πi(x1, x1, t,M)]. In order to
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elaborate on this part, we need the following Lemma which can be considered as an
analogue to the global competition lemma in Meagher and Zauner [2004].13
Lemma 2.5 (Global competition). Under Assumptions 1,2, and 3, one has at any pure
strategy SPNE for the Hotelling game with ambiguous demand location uncertainty that
the support [−L,L] of M is contained in [x¯− 3
2
, x¯+ 3
2
], formally [−L,L] ⊂ [x¯− 3
2
, x¯+ 3
2
]
.
Proof. The proof of the lemma is contained in the appendix.
Lemma 2.5 proves very useful when it comes to determining firms’ subgame-perfect prod-
uct design choices. In fact, due to Lemma 2.3, one could expect that there are equilibria
where, for some realizations of uncertainty, one or the other firm can monopolize the
market. However, according to Lemma 2.5, firm i’s objective function at the first stage
of the game is given by the Choquet expected value of the second piece of (2.1).
The global competition lemma implies that Eq[Πi(xi, xj, t,M)] depends solely on the the
mean vector Eq[(t,M)] = (µt, µM) and the variance-covariance matrix
Covq(t,M) =
 σ2t 0
0 σ2M
 .
The following lemma provides an explicit mathematical form for Eq[Πi(xi, xj, t,M)].
Lemma 2.6. If x1 ≤ x2 w.l.o.g., then, under Assumptions 1,2, and 3, at any pure strategy
SPNE for the Hotelling game under uncertainty, firms choose product characteristics,
13For the Hotelling model under certainty, Anderson et al. [1997] point out a similar property in
footnote 8.
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(x∗1, x
∗
2), such that firm i’s expected profit w.r.t. the reference prior q is
Eq[Πi(x∗i , x∗j , t,M)] = µt
L∫
−L
(−1)j 2
9
(x∗j − x∗i )
(
x¯∗ −
(
M +
3
2
(−1)i
))2
fq(M)dM
=
(−1)j
18
µt (x
∗
j − x∗i )
{
(2x¯∗ − 3(−1)i)2
− 4µM(2x¯∗ − 3(−1)i) + 4(µM + σ2M)
}
(2.4)
where x¯∗ = x∗i + x
∗
j .
Proof. The proof of the lemma is contained in the appendix.
Next, after specifying firms’ first-stage objective functions, we derive subgame-perfect
product designs. Firm i’s best reply, R∗i (xˆj), given the product characteristic choice of
firm j, xˆj, is
R∗i (xˆj) := arg max
xi∈R
{
(1− δ)Eq[Πi(xi, xˆj , t,M)] + δ
[
(1− α)Πi(xi, xˆj , t,−L) + αΠi(xi, xˆj , t, L)
]}
Solving for firms’ mutual best replies, one obtain firms’ subgame-perfect equilibrium
differentiation as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 (Equilibrium under ambiguity). Under Assumptions 1,2, and 3, there is
a unique pure strategy SPNE for the Hotelling game under ambiguity. Firms’ equilibrium
locations are given by
x∗1 =
δ
(−(α− 1)(2L+ 3)2t+ α(3− 2L)2t− 4σ2 − 9)+ 4σ2 + 9
4(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)
x∗2 =
δ
(
(α− 1)(2L+ 3)2t− α(3− 2L)2t+ 4σ2 + 9)− 4σ2 − 9
4(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)
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The equilibrium differentiation, ∆∗x := x
∗
2 − x∗1, is
∆∗x =
δ
(
(α− 1)(2L+ 3)2t− α(3− 2L)2t+ 4σ2 + 9)− 4σ2 − 9
2(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3) ,
and firms’ Choquet expected equilibrium profits are given by
CEU[Πi] = −
(
δ
(−(α− 1)(2L+ 3)2t+ α(3− 2L)2t− 4σ2 − 9)+ 4σ2 + 9)2
36(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)
where Π∗i := Πi(x
∗
1, x
∗
2, t,M).
Proof. Firms’ equilibrium product designs and the proof of this proposition are contained
in the appendix.
Remark 2.3. It is worthwhile to highlight and discuss some special cases of this equi-
librium. Setting δ = 1 and t = 1, which corresponds to a situation under complete
ambiguity, or without any confidence into the reference prior q, one obtains the equi-
librium of Kro´l [2012] in its full generality. Setting δ = 0 and t = t = 1, we obtain
the equilibrium in Meagher and Zauner [2004] with the slight difference that we impose
a probability with zero mean. The normalization Eq[M ] = 0 ensures symmetry and is,
in our view, not a strong restriction. We can interpret this assumption in the following
way: Both firms determine the expected midpoint of the consumer interval and align
all possible product designs symmetrically around this mean. If the mean is nonzero,
firms can transform the set of all product characteristics to be centered around zero. Af-
ter determining their product characteristic choices in the normalized setting, firms may
retransform their product characteristic decision into the non-normalized product space
and obtain the optimal product design. For consumer distributions with nonzero mean
there are no solutions in closed-form for firms’ subgame-perfect product characteristic
choices. Nevertheless, it is plausible to argue that both firms shift their subgame-perfect
locations into the direction of this mean.
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2.7 Comparative Statics
The aforementioned Hotelling model under ambiguity yields interesting comparative
static results. In this section, we discuss and interpret basic properties of firms’ product
design choices with respect to changes in the underlying model parameters. Similar to
Kro´l [2012], the following proposition examines ceteris paribus (henceforth c.p.) varia-
tions in the global ambiguity attitude α.
Proposition 2.2 (Variation in firms’ ambiguity attitude α). Under the Assumptions
1,2, and 3, one can observe at any SPNE of the Hotelling game under ambiguity the
subsequent effects on optimal product designs:
∂x∗1
∂α
≥ 0 and ∂x
∗
2
∂α
≤ 0
Proof. The proof of the proposition is contained in the appendix.
The results of Proposition 2.2 are related to the findings in Kro´l [2012] stating that a
higher degree of pessimism leads to lower product differentiation. This finding extends
to our model, with the difference that the magnitude of the effect is weakened the more
confidence firms have in the reference prior q. In case of full confidence, or absence of
ambiguity, firms’ attitude towards ambiguity becomes irrelevant for their product differ-
entiation choices. To give some intuition: For a high degree of pessimism α, each firm
gives a larger weight on the maxmin criterion than on the maxmax criterion. Therefore,
the worst-case scenario becomes increasingly important. The worst-case of firm 1 is that
the expectation of M equals L. As the expectation moves to the right and firm 1 consid-
ers this expectation as relevant, firm 1 has an incentive to select a product characteristic
located on the right hand side of its initial characteristics. Similarly, for firm 2, the
worst-case scenario corresponds to left boundary of the support −L. Since firm 2 gives
increasingly more weight to this worst-case, there is an incentive for the latter to relocate
to the left. All in all, equilibrium differentiation decreases.
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To sum up these findings, we conclude that, contrary to the risk models of MZ, ambiguity
is not per se a differentiation force. What matters is ambiguity attitude of both firms. We
call this attitude the degree of global optimism or pessimism, since we consider a market
where both firms exhibit the same ambiguity attitude. Hence, attitude towards ambi-
guity becomes a global characteristic of the market and could be interpreted as ’market
sentiment’.
As a next step, we examine c.p. variations in the variance of the reference prior σ2.
Proposition 2.3 (Variation in the variance σ2). If 0 ≤ δ < 1 and the Assumptions 1, 2,
and 3 hold, one has at any SPNE for the Hotelling game under ambiguity that optimal
product designs react in the following way to an increase in σ2:
∂x∗1
∂σ2
< 0 and
∂x∗2
∂σ2
> 0
Proof. The proof of the proposition is contained in the appendix.
Uncertainty, as measured by the variance of the underlying distribution, constitutes a dif-
ferentiation force. The intuition here14 is that, in the Hotelling game, firms are confronted
with two countervailing effects. If a firm selects, at given prices, a product characteris-
tic that is more far away from the realized midpoint Mˆ than the characteristic selected
by its competitor, it looses market share (demand effect). At the same time, however,
one can observe that increasing product differentiation weakens price competition and
leads to higher equilibrium prices (price effect). Due to the assumption of quadratic cost
functions, the price effect dominates the demand effect. If a firm faces demand location
uncertainty, the negative effect of loosing market shares in some realizations of uncer-
tainty is not so dramatic as in the certainty case since there are other realizations of
M where the latter’s product design is better located than before. Consequently, an in-
creasing variance of the underlying probability distribution strengthens the dominance of
the price effect. Therefore, equilibrium differentiation is even more excessive than under
14Compare Meagher and Zauner [2004].
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certainty. Of course, the same interpretation applies for the capacity model as long as
0 ≤ δ < 1 with the sole difference that the effect of a c.p. increase in σ2 is weaker the
less confident firms are in the reference prior q.
The following proposition examines c.p. variations in the lower and upper support bound-
ary of the transportation cost parameter.
Proposition 2.4 (Variations in the magnitude of the upper and lower support boundaries
of t). If 0 < α ≤ 1 and 0 < δ ≤ 1, then, under the Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, one has at
any SPNE for the Hotelling game under ambiguity that
∂x∗1
∂t
> 0 and
∂x∗2
∂t
< 0.
Similarly, for 0 ≤ α < 1 and 0 < δ ≤ 1, one obtains
∂x∗1
∂t
< 0 and
∂x∗2
∂t
> 0.
Proof. The proof of the proposition is contained in the appendix.
The first part of Proposition 2.4 is quite similar to the respective statement in Kro´l [2012].
Variations in the support of the transportation cost parameter can be interpreted as
fluctuations in the magnitude of uncertainty around t. As t approaches one, the overall
size of uncertainty with respect to t decreases. A ceteris paribus increase in t solely
affects the pessimistic part of firms’ first-stage profit functions. This deceases firms’
equilibrium product differentiation. The following considerations explain why this is the
case. Comparing the Hotelling model with a standard symmetric Bertrand competition,
we observe the following important difference. In the standard Bertrand scenario, firms
offer homogeneous products. The only Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is that firms set
prices equal to marginal costs, implying zero profits for both firms. In a Bertrand world
with heterogeneous products this finding is no longer true. By introducing transportation
costs, the Hotelling framework adds an additional distinctive feature to a homogeneous
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and symmetric Bertrand competition rendering products per se more heterogeneous. It is
therefore intuitive that a higher transportation cost weakens competition between firms.
In the Hotelling model there are two countervailing incentives at work that determine
firms’ product design choices. One is that firms want to locate in the center of the
Hotelling interval in order to obtain a higher market share. This is because firms’ market
share depends on the so-called indifferent consumer ξ.15 All consumers located left of
ξ strictly prefer to purchase the good from the firm located left. On the other hand,
consumers located right of ξ strictly prefer to purchase the good from the other firm. If
the firm located left c.p. relocates to the right, then the indifferent consumer also shifts
to the right. In this case, the market share of this firm increases and, as a consequence,
also its profits. A similar argument holds for the rival firm. If the firm located at the
right c.p. relocates to the left, then its market share increases, and hence also its profit.
To sum up, the firm located left has an incentive to relocate to the right and the firm
located to the right has an incentive to relocate to the left.
The second incentive is that firms want to differentiate their products more in order
to weaken price competition. If product differentiation gets lower, price competition
gets stronger since both product become increasingly homogeneous. Therefore, in the
limit, the only distinguishing feature of a product boils down to its price. Now, if price
competition is weakened by a higher transportation cost, it is plausible that firms have
an incentive to reduce product differentiation in order to obtain a higher market share.
To summarize the results. Increasing uncertainty with respect to the transportation cost
parameter t entail a higher degree of product differentiation.
The following proposition explores a c.p. increase in firms’ confidence level δ.
15The indifferent consumer ξ can be obtained by equating total costs p1− t(ξ−x1)2 = p2− t(ξ−x2)2
and solving this expression for ξ.
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Proposition 2.5 (Variation in the confidence level δ). Under the Assumptions 1, 2, and
3, one has at any SPNE for the Hotelling game under ambiguity that
∂x∗1
∂δ
= −∂x
∗
2
∂δ
=

< 0 for 0 ≤ α < α∗
= 0 for α = α∗
> 0 for 1 ≥ α > α∗
where α∗ = α∗(δ, t, t, σ2, L) is a cutoff-value defined by
α∗ =
(2L+ 3)(3L− 2σ2)
(2L+ 3)t(3L− 2σ2)− (2L− 3)t(3L+ 2σ2) .
Taking these results together we obtain for ∆∗
∂∆∗
∂δ
=

> 0 for 0 ≤ α < α∗
= 0 for α = α∗
< 0 for 1 ≥ α > α∗.
Proof. The proof of the proposition is contained in the appendix.
The findings of Proposition 2.5 can be summarized in the following way: If firms’ attitude
to ambiguity exhibits sufficiently strong optimism, one can conclude that a lower confi-
dence into the reference prior increases equilibrium differentiation. Adverse results hold
for sufficiently pessimistic firms. Furthermore, there is an intermediate value of global
pessimism α∗ such that firms’ equilibrium differentiation remains unchanged no matter
which global confidence level firms might assign to the reference probability distribution
of the midpoint M .
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Proposition 2.6 (Variation in the size of the support L). If 0 < δ ≤ 1 and Assumptions
1, 2, and 3 hold, on has at any SPNE for the Hotelling game under ambiguity that
∂x∗1
∂L
= −∂x
∗
2
∂L
=

< 0 for 0 ≤ α < αˆ
= 0 for α = αˆ
> 0 for 1 ≥ α > αˆ
where αˆ ∈ [0, 1] is a cutoff-value with αˆ = αˆ(δ, t, t, σ2). Taking these results together we
obtain for ∆∗
∂∆∗
∂L
=

> 0 for 0 ≤ α < αˆ
= 0 for α = αˆ
< 0 for 1 ≥ α > αˆ.
Proof. The proof of the proposition is contained in the appendix.
An increase in the support fosters decreasing product differentiation if firms are suffi-
ciently pessimistic. For an intermediate value of pessimism firms do not relocate. If firms
are sufficiently optimistic, an increase in L yields higher equilibrium differentiation.
Size of the Support and Degree of Ambiguity
The degree of ambiguity, or of firms’ confidence in the reference prior, plays a central role
in this paper. For this reason, we discuss in the following its meaning in conjunction with
the support of the uncertainty. As Proposition 2.6 shows, our model replicates similar
comparative static results as in Kro´l [2012] by varying the length L of the support of the
midpoint M . Even though similar product differentiation choices might be generated by
variations in the size of the support L, as compared to variations in the confidence level
δ, it indispensable to notice meaningful differences between the two sources of ambiguity.
First of all, variations in L and δ might go in similar directions, but the magnitude of
both effects is different. In fact, both effects are interrelated. An increase in the support
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has a stronger impact on equilibrium differentiation if firms’ confidence in the reference
prior is low. In case of full confidence, changes in the support do not affect firms’ product
design decisions. Secondly, there is a clear difference between both sources of uncertainty
concerning economic applications. The support of M consists of all possible midpoint
realizations of the consumer interval. Before firms perform their design choices, they
anticipate all possible demand realizations and summarize them in the support interval
[−L,L]. An increase in the support interval would imply that firms allow ex-ante for a
larger variety of feasible demand realizations. In our view, it is plausible to argue that, in
many economic applications, the size of the support L is an exogenously fixed variable.
What would it actually mean if L was an endogenous variable? It would mean that firms
adjust their views on possible demand realizations in the light of higher or lower uncer-
tainties by including or excluding certain market demand scenarios. Furthermore, this
would imply that firms were ex-ante wrongly informed or had not precise information
about lower and upper bounds of market demand in face of uncertainty. We do not want
to argue that such a scenario is completely implausible, our point is that the interpreta-
tion of support variations is closely tied to firms’ wrong perception of possible demand
realizations.
In contrast to the previous interpretation, c.p. variations in the confidence level δ depart
on the assumption of an exogenously fixed support length. Firms know possible upper
and lower bounds of demand and consider demand uncertainty defined on a fixed support.
The reference prior q might reflect firms’ ex-ante information about the market environ-
ment, e.g. firms might have observable data or can pursue market research to estimate
an underlying probability distribution for market demand. Under the assumption that
firm managers are sufficiently pessimistic, increasing product differentiation might have
different reasons. One explanation could be that firms become more optimistic, meaning
that due to a change in the market environment firms adjust their ambiguity attitudes to
account for this new situation. On the other hand, it might be the case that firms obtain
more reliable data on market outcomes, therefore increasing their confidence in the data
available but do not readjust their attitude towards ambiguity. In such a scenario, a
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higher confidence into the reference prior weakens the impact of pessimism on product
differentiation choices.
2.8 Examples and Applications
In this section, we apply our model to a variety of real-life examples. At first, we discuss
sports betting regarding horse racing and football games. The second application refers
to financial markets, or to be more precise to the mutual funds market. Furthermore, we
want to mention that similar cases were already discussed in Kro´l [2012]. The purpose
of this section consists of providing the reader with additional insight into the mechanics
of the capacity approach. In particular, we want discuss implications of confidence and
pessimism for the interpretation of these examples. One reason why the aforementioned
applications are so apt to be discussed in a Hotelling framework, is given by the fact that
in these markets exists a relatively clear measure of firms’ product differentiation. We
will discuss these measures in the respective subsections. Moreover, consumer preferences
are often fluctuating depending on partially unobserved factors, e.g. individual subjective
evaluations. Due to firms’ imperfect probabilistic information regarding market demand,
it is plausible that ambiguity is prevalent in those markets.
Sports Betting
In case of sports betting, the odd of a bookmaker represents product characteristic. Fur-
thermore, the preferences of a bettor over odds are determined by subjective probability
estimations of the particular sporting event. Since bookmakers usually want to make a
profit regardless of the result of the sporting event, one can assume that they are worst-
case-oriented.16 If bookmakers were rather optimistic, they would constantly offer odds
16For more details see Kro´l [2012].
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exceeding the expectation of the underlying distribution and eventually run the risk of
bankruptcy.
Horse racing
Smith et al. [2009] examine horse racing data from the UK. The authors provide evidence
for an increased fluctuation and divergence of betting exchange prices shortly before the
race. This can be interpreted as a higher degree of ambiguity with respect to bettors’
preferences. At the same time, bookmakers’ odds are getting increasingly similar.17 Sup-
posing that horse racing bookmakers exhibit a sufficiently high degree of pessimism, our
model provides a possible explanation for this observation. Recall that, given that firms
are sufficiently pessimistic, an increase of ambiguity leads to decreasing product differ-
entiation. The intuition here lies in the fact that pessimistic firms place more weight
on worst-case scenarios. Moreover, the worst-case scenario for the firm whose product
characteristic is located on the left hand side corresponds to the realization M = L.
Similarly, the worst-case scenario for the firm on the right hand side corresponds to the
realization M = −L. If firms become more pessimistic, the firm whose product design
is located left selects a product characteristic right from its initial characteristic. Hence,
the higher firms’ pessimism, the lower equilibrium product differentiation. The strength
of this effect increases with increasing ambiguity, δ, since firms’ confidence in their prior
belief determines the influence of the worst-case scenario on their decision process.
Football games
Bookmakers’ odds on football games exhibit an interesting feature. Typically, whenever
a rather strong team plays against a rather weak team there is little divergence between
bookmakers’ odds in favor of a victory of the strong team. In contrast, the odds for
a victory of the weak team are more volatile. In fact, odds become less volatile when
17As pointed out by Kro´l [2012], one can verify that the differences between bookmakers’ odds are
decreasing in the corresponding time period by using price comparison websites.
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the perceived relative strength of both teams is fairly similar. This observation can be
verified by comparing bookmakers’ match day odds. In the examples below, we analyzed
the odds of ten bookmakers.
Remark 2.4. Both examples are games from match day 22 on February 23, 2014 of the
German Bundesliga.18 The first example refers to a game of Bayern Munich, representing
the strong team, versus Hannover 96 representing the weaker team. Stated odds are to
be considered as multiplication factors of the placed bet in case of winning the bet. For
instance, suppose one puts a bet of e1 in favor of a victory of Hannover 96 at bet365. In
case Hannover 96 wins, the bettor receives e10. The second game, SC Freiburg versus
FC Augsburg, is more balanced in terms of relative strength. Estimators used in our
examples are
x¯ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi for the mean and s
2 =
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)2 for the variance.
Bookmaker Odd Hannover 96 Odd Bayern Munich
bet365 10 1.25
Sportingbet 11 1.222
Tipico 13 1.25
bwin 9.5 1.22
Interwetten 9 1.27
Bet-at-home 11.5 1.24
Betsson 12.5 1.19
mybet 14 1.22
Betvictor 10.5 1.25
Unibet 12 1.25
Estimated
Variances
2.5667 0.0005
Table 2.1: Example for the Constellation of a Strong Team Versus a Weak Team
If bookmakers agreed on a unique prior over the outcome of the game, this phenomenon
would be inexplicable. Again, the explanation might lie in bookmakers’ confidence in
their prior beliefs. Assume bookmakers’ choose their odds such that a bettor will always
18Data was collected online on February 19th, 2014 at 3:30 pm from the respective websites of the
bookmakers.
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Bookmaker Odd SC Freiburg Odd FC Augsburg
bet365 3.1 2.25
Sportingbet 3 2.3
Tipico 3.1 2.35
bwin 2.85 2.3
Interwetten 2.75 2.4
Bet-at-home 3 2.3
Betsson 3.1 2.27
mybet 3.2 2.3
Betvictor 3.125 2.3
Unibet 2.95 2.35
Estimated
Variances
0.0189 0.017
Table 2.2: Example for the Constellation of Two Balanced Teams
loose a fraction of his money if she bets on both teams, then odds on one team become a
function of the odds of the other team.19 In the situation described above, it is obviously
very likely that the strong team wins. Hence, bookmakers’ can be confident that the bulk
of bettors will bet on the very strong team. This leads to two effects. Firstly, in order to
avoid bankruptcy, bookmakers’ need to choose odds close to one for a win of the strong
team. Secondly, since bookmakers’ face little ambiguity over bettors’ preferences, they
can differentiate their odds for the weak team. This result is in line with Proposition 2.5.
Mutual Funds
Kro´l [2012] provides the example of the managed mutual funds’ market. In this context,
one can interpret a position in the product space as a portfolio’s position ranging from
safe investments to risky portfolios. Kro´l [2012] shows, based on data about the daily
returns of the fifteen most popular actively managed US mutual funds, that, after the
financial crisis 2008, fund managers tend to differentiate their products less. Kro´l [2012]
argues that, before the crisis, financial firms’ did not consider the post-crisis range of
investor behavior as possible.20 For this reason, the crisis forced firms to revise their
19See Kro´l [2012].
20In particular, the shift of consumer preferences toward safe investments due to decreasing stock
prices during the crisis.
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beliefs. Furthermore, the author interprets conservative stress test simulations following
the crisis as a signal sent out to the competitors that a firm uses a worst-case-based
approach for decision making. This is exactly the point where we want to add to the
debate. For instance, consider government-imposed stress tests after the crisis. If one
interprets such stress tests as signals, then the strategy of a firm is independent of its
type. Since each type sends the same signal, no new information is revealed to the other
firms. In our view, it is debatable whether stress test simulations induced a shift in
fund managers’ ambiguity attitude towards a more pessimistic preference approach, or
whether exactly those fund managers knew more clearly that investors would prefer more
secure assets after the crisis. If so, a possible explanation for lower post-crisis product
differentiation is that firms were less uncertain about investor preferences. In our view,
it is not implausible that fund managers’ ambiguity attitudes remained relatively stable
even though government stress tests were imposed. Furthermore, due to market research
and historical data21 it is likely that fund managers know the whole range of possible
individual investor behaviors.22 However, investor preferences are highly fluctuating since
they depend on investors’ subjective evaluations of the fund’s performance which itself is
based on numerous observed and unobserved factors as recent stock market developments
or individual future expectations. At the end and shortly after the financial crisis, firms’
were highly confident in terms of investor preferences since it was self-evident that, post-
crisis, the majority of investors would prefer assets which were rather safe. Again, this
finding is in line with our model.
21Financial firms’ can rely on past data of various historical economic crises including stock market
crashes (e.g. the Great Depression in the 1930s), bubbles (e.g. dot-com bubble in 2000), and financial
crises (e.g. Asian financial crisis in 1997).
22This would induce that variations in the support of the midpoint of the consumer distribution cannot
account for the observation of decreasing product differentiation.
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2.9 Conclusion
We present an extension of Hotelling’s model incorporating ambiguity in the form of
demand location uncertainty as well as uncertainty with respect to the intensity of trans-
portation costs. Ambiguity is introduced by representing firms’ beliefs with neo-additive
capacities. We analyze firms’ optimal product characteristic choices and find a unique
SPNE in pure strategies for the Hotelling game under ambiguity.
Our model incorporates a variety of different sources of uncertainty. First of all, there is
the variance σ2 of the reference probability q. As in the standard risk case of Meagher
and Zauner [2004], a higher variance implies that firms increase product differentiation.
Thus, if the measure of uncertainty is given by the variance of the underlying reference
probability, it can be considered as differentiation force.
Secondly, there is the length of the support interval of M . The larger the support of M ,
the larger the number of demand realizations that firms consider as possible market out-
comes. Hence, the length of the support interval might be interpreted as an additional
measure of uncertainty. As our results show, the effects on an increasing support are
strongly related to firms’ ambiguity attitude α and the degree of ambiguity δ. If firms are
rather pessimistic, a larger support results in lower equilibrium differentiation, if firms
are rather optimistic, a larger support engenders opposite results. All in all, uncertainty
as measured by the support length can be - depending on parameters - a differentiation
or agglomeration force.
A third measure of uncertainty is given by the confidence parameter δ reflecting firms
uncertainty on observables. Interpreted in this way, rising uncertainty is tied to lower
data reliability yielding lower confidence levels in the reference probability q. Again, sim-
ilar to the case of support variations, this can trigger off opposing effects. When firms
are pessimistic enough, equilibrium differentiation is going down, when firms a rather
optimistic product differentiation is going to increase. One can also argue the other way
round. For a given confidence level, increasing pessimism yields lower equilibrium differ-
entiation, whereas an increase in optimism increases equilibrium differentiation.
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Finally the last source of uncertainty lies in the support [t, t] of the transportation cost
parameter t. As the lower support boundary t decreases, firms’ equilibrium differentiation
remains the same in case of full optimism and full confidence and increases in all other
cases. Similarly, as the upper support boundary t increases, firm’ equilibrium differenti-
ation remains the same in case of full pessimism and full confidence and increases in all
other cases. Thus, excluding these boundary cases, we can say that the size of uncertainty
with respect to the transportation cost parameter constitutes an differentiation force.
As we can see from the preceding line of arguments, one should be very cautious when
it comes to drawing conclusions from real-world applications of Hotelling models under
uncertainty. In our view, it is indispensable to clearly identify the driving factors of
an observed increase or decrease in product differentiation since the interpretation and
conclusions from observed firm behavior might change in the light of different sources of
uncertainty. In particular, it seems worthwhile for policymakers to disentangle the effect
of confidence and ambiguity attitude on product differentiation, since it might really mat-
ter for official regulatory procedures whether observed product differentiation choices are
to be attributed to perceived changes in data-reliability or whether firms feature more or
less optimistic behavioral patterns.
2.10 Mathematical Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1. The support of M is restricted to the interval [−L,L] ⊂ [−1
2
, 1
2
]
.
The mean and the variance of M exists. For the mean we can perform the following line
of estimates:
Eq[M ] =
∫
R
MdP ≤
∫
R
LdP = L
∫
R
1dP = L
and
Eq[M ] =
∫
R
MdP ≥
∫
R
−LdP = −L
∫
R
1dP = −L
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Similarly, for the second moment of M we obtain
E[M2] =
∫
R
M2dP ≤
∫
R
L2dP = L2 and Eq[M2] =
∫
R
M2dP ≥ 0
and for the variance σ2 we conclude
σ2M = Eq[M2]− Eq[M ]2 ≤ Eq[M ]2 ≤ L2 and σ2M ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.4. Lemma 2.5 implies that firms’ second-stage profits at the realization
(tˆ, Mˆ) equal the second piece of (2.1):
Π1 =
1
18
tˆ(x2 − x1)[−3 + 2(Mˆ − x¯)]2
Π2 =
1
18
tˆ(x2 − x1)[3 + 2(Mˆ − x¯)]2
Both profit functions are continuously differentiable with respect to tˆ and Mˆ . Differenti-
ation with respect to tˆ yields
∂Π1
∂tˆ
=
2
9
(x2 − x1)
[
x1 + x2
2
− Mˆ + 3
2
]2
> 0
∂Π2
∂tˆ
= −2
9
(x1 − x2)
[
x1 + x2
2
− Mˆ − 3
2
]2
> 0.
Differentiation with respect to Mˆ yields
∂Π∗1
∂Mˆ
= −4
9
tˆ(x2 − x1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
[
x1 + x2
2
− Mˆ + 3
2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0
∂Π∗2
∂Mˆ
=
4
9
tˆ(x1 − x2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
[
x1 + x2
2
− Mˆ − 3
2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0.
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Proof of Lemma 2.5. The proof of the lemma follows exactly the same line of arguments
as in the proof of Lemma 3.1 in Kro´l [2012], page 602 with a slight modification in case
3. There are three different cases to be considered.
1. Case 1 refers to a situation where either firm 1 or firm 2 can monopolize the market
for certain realizations of the midpoint M . If firm 1 can monopolize the market for
certain realizations of M , we can conclude that firm 1 will monopolize the market
if Mˆ = −L, since w.lo.g. firm 1 is the firm left of firm 2. Similarly, we can conclude
that firm 2 can monopolize the market for Mˆ = L. This is finding is impossible. If
firm 1 monopolizes the market for the realization Mˆ = −L, we have by Lemma 3.1,
equation (2.3) that x1+x2
2
− 3
2
> −L. If firm 2 monopolizes the market, we have by
(2.3) that x1+x2
2
+ 3
2
< L. Thus, we must have that L+ x1+x2
2
> 3
2
and L− x1+x2
2
> 3
2
holds at the same time implying
∣∣x1+x2
2
∣∣ < L− 3
2
. This is a contradiction since L is
assumed to be smaller than 1
2
.
2. Case 2 describes a scenario where one of the two firms can monopolize the market
for each realization Mˆ of uncertainty. If firm j is a monopolist, the other firm
can deviate from its original location in order to obtain a positive market share and
therefore make strictly positive profits. Kro´l [2012] suggests the location x−j = −xj.
3. Case 3 refers to a situation where, w.l.o.g., firm 1 can monopolize the market for
some realizations of uncertainty, in particular the realization Mˆ = −L and for
the remaining realizations, in particular the realization Mˆ = L, there exists a
competitive equilibrium. Consider now the profit function of firm 2 in case of a
competitive equilibrium23 :
∂Π2
∂x2
(x1, x2, L, t) =
t (2L− 3x2 + x1 + 3) (2L− x2 − x1 + 3)
18
We want to show that
∂Π2
∂x2
(x1, x2, L, t) < 0.
23We consider the profit function of firm 2, Kro´l [2012] considers the profit function of firm 1.
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We determine the sign of both brackets. Consider the expression in within the
second bracket first. We have
2L+ 3− x1 − x2 > 0 ⇔ 2L+ 3 > x1 + x2 ⇔ L+ 3
2
> x¯
The last condition corresponds to the requirement for a competitive solution in
cases where the midpoint M = L realizes. Therefore it must be, by assumption,
positive. The second bracket is negative. The monopolistic outcome for the mid-
point realization M = −L requires L + x¯ > 3
2
. Solving this inequality for x2, we
obtain x2 > 3 − 2L − x1. By using this inequality, we can conduct an estimation
for the expression in the first bracket:
3 + 2L+ x1 − 3x2 < 8L− 6 + 4x1 < 8L− 8 < 0
The last inequality follows from the fact that L < 1
2
and x1 < 0. Thus, we proved
that
∂Π2
∂x2
(x1, x2, L, t) < 0.
This finding shows that firm 2 has an incentive to move leftwards in order to reduce
both firms’ product differentiation and that a strict competitive solution does not
exist under the above stated parameter restrictions. Since we consider a symmetric
scenario, a similar argument holds for a scenario where firm 2 becomes a monopolist.
For the remaining cases Mˆ = L and Mˆ = −L there is a competitive solution.
Proof of Lemma 2.6. The first part of firms’ Choquet expected profit is
Eq[Πi(x1, x2, t,M)] =
L∫
−L
(−1)j 2
9
t (xj − xi)
(
xi + xj
2
−
(
M +
3
2
(−1)i
))2
f(M)dM.
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This expectation is of the form
Eq[gi(t)hi(M)]
with real-valued Borel-measurable functions gi and hi for i = 1, 2. We define
gi(t) = t and hi(M) = (−1)j 2
9
t (xj − xi)
(
xi + xj
2
−
(
M +
3
2
(−1)i
))2
.
By (R7), t and M are uncorrelated. By Lemma 5.20 in Meintrup and Scha¨ﬄer [2006],
page 131, we obtain that gi(t) and hi(M) are uncorrelated as well. Thus, we can conclude
Eq[Π∗i (x1, x2, t,M)] = Eq[gi(t)hi(M)] = Eq[gi(t)]Eq[hi(M)] = µt Eq[hi(M)].
In the following, we can rely on the results in Meagher and Zauner [2004], page 205, since
Eq[hi(M)] is equal to firm i’s expected profit function in the risk case. Thus,
Eq[Πi(x1, x2, t,M)] = tµ
L∫
−L
(−1)j 2
9
(xj − xi)
(
xi + xj
2
−
(
M +
3
2
(−1)i
))2
f(M)dM
=
(−1)j
18
tµ (xj − xi){(xi + xj − 3(−1)i)2
− 4µM(xi + xj − 3(−1)i) + 4(µM + σ2M)}
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Proof of Proposition 2.1. We derive expected CEU profits at the first stage of the game.
We obtain for firm 1:
CEU[Π1(x1, x2, α, δ, t, t, σ2, L)]
:= δ
(
2 (1− α) t (x2 − x1)
(
L+ x2+x1
2
+ 3
2
)2
9
+
2α t (x2 − x1)
(−L+ x2+x1
2
+ 3
2
)2
9
)
+
(1− δ) (x2 − x1)
(
(x2 + x1 + 3)
2 + 4σ2
)
18
.
(A.1)
Similarly, we obtain for firm 2
CEU[Π2(x1, x2, α, δ, t, t, σ2, L)]
:= δ
(
2α t (x2 − x1)
(
L+ x2+x1
2
− 3
2
)2
9
+
2 (1− α) t (x2 − x1)
(−L+ x2+x1
2
− 3
2
)2
9
)
+
(1− δ) (x2 − x1)
(
(x2 + x1 − 3)2 + 4σ
)
18
.
(A.2)
Taking the derivative of (A.1) with respect to x1 yields
∂CEU[Π1(x1, x2, α, δ, t, t, σ2, L)]
∂x1
:=
− 2δ (1− α) t
(
L+ x2+x1
2
+ 3
2
)2
9
+
2δ (1− α) t (x2 − x1)
(
L+ x2+x1
2
+ 3
2
)
9
+
2δ α t (x2 − x1)
(−L+ x2+x1
2
+ 3
2
)
9
− 2δ α t
(−L+ x2+x1
2
+ 3
2
)2
9
− (1− δ)
(
(x2 + x1 + 3)
2 + 4σ
)
18
+
(1− δ) (x2 − x1) (x2 + x1 + 3)
9
.
(A.3)
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Similarly, we take the derivative of (A.2) with respect to x2
∂CEU[Π2(x1, x2, α, δ, t, t, σ2, L)]
∂x2
:=
2δ α t
(
L+ x2+x1
2
− 3
2
)2
9
+
2δ α t (x2 − x1)
(
L+ x2+x1
2
− 3
2
)
9
+
2δ (1− α) t (x2 − x1)
(−L+ x2+x1
2
− 3
2
)
9
+
2δ (1− α) t (−L+ x2+x1
2
− 3
2
)2
9
+
(1− δ) ((x2 + x1 − 3)2 + 4σ)
18
+
(1− δ) (x2 − x1) (x2 + x1 − 3)
9
(A.4)
Now, we solve the following system of equations:
∂CEU[Π1(x1, x2, α, δ, t, t, σ2, L)]
∂x2
= 0
∂CEU[Π2(x1, x2, α, δ, t, t, σ2, L)]
∂x2
= 0
(A.5)
and obtain three solution pairs. The first solution pair (x∗1, x
∗
2) is given by:
x∗1 =
δ
(−(α− 1)(2L+ 3)2t+ α(3− 2L)2t− 4σ2 − 9)+ 4σ2 + 9
4(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)
x∗2 =
δ
(
(α− 1)(2L+ 3)2t− α(3− 2L)2t+ 4σ2 + 9)− 4σ2 − 9
4(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)
The second pair of solutions (x∗∗1 , x
∗∗
2 ) is given by:
x∗∗1 =
(
−
(
δ(δ((α− 1)2(2L+ 3)2t2 + 2(α− 1)t(2L(6αLt− L+ 3)− 9αt+ 9)
+ αt(4L(α(L− 3)t+ L+ 3) + 9(αt− 2)) + 4σ2(−αt+ αt+ t− 1) + 9)
+ 4(α− 1)t((L− 3)L+ σ2)− 2αt(2L(L+ 3)
+ 2σ2 − 9) + 2(−9(α− 1)t+ 4σ2 − 9))− 4σ2 + 9
) 1
2
+ δ(−(α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(3− 2L)t− 3) + 3
)
·
(
2(δ((α− 1)t− αt+ 1)− 1)
)−1
and
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x∗∗2 = −
((
δ(δ((α− 1)2(2L+ 3)2t2 + 2(α− 1)t(2L(6αLt− L+ 3)− 9αt+ 9)
+ αt(4L(α(L− 3)t+ L+ 3) + 9(αt− 2)) + 4σ2(−αt+ αt+ t− 1) + 9)
+ 4(α− 1)t((L− 3)L+ σ2)− 2αt(2L(L+ 3) + 2σ2 − 9)
+ 2(−9(α− 1)t+ 4σ2 − 9))− 4σ2 + 9
) 1
2
− δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3) + 3
)
·
(
2(δ((α− 1)t− αt+ 1)− 1)
)−1
Finally, the last pair of solutions (x∗∗∗1 , x
∗∗∗
2 ) is given by:
x∗∗∗1 =
((
δ(δ((α− 1)2(2L+ 3)2t2 + 2(α− 1)t(2L(6αLt− L+ 3)− 9αt+ 9)
+ αt(4L(α(L− 3)t+ L+ 3) + 9(αt− 2)) + 4σ2(−αt+ αt
+ t− 1) + 9) + 4(α− 1)t((L− 3)L+ σ2)− 2αt(2L(L+ 3) + 2σ2 − 9)
+ 2(−9(α− 1)t+ 4σ2 − 9))− 4σ2 + 9
) 1
2
+ δ(−(α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(3− 2L)t− 3) + 3
)
·
(
2(δ((α− 1)t− αt+ 1)− 1)
)−1
Chapter 2. Spatial Competition Under Ambiguity 65
and
x∗∗∗2 =
((
δ(δ((α− 1)2(2L+ 3)2t2 + 2(α− 1)t(2L(6αLt− L+ 3)
− 9αt+ 9) + αt(4L(α(L− 3)t+ L+ 3) + 9(αt− 2)) + 4σ2(−αt+ αt
+ t− 1) + 9) + 4(α− 1)t((L− 3)L+ σ2)− 2αt(2L(L+ 3) + 2σ2 − 9)
+ 2(−9(α− 1)t+ 4σ2 − 9))− 4σ2 + 9
) 1
2
+ δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3
)
·
(
2(δ((α− 1)t− αt+ 1)− 1)
)−1
The first pair of solutions (x∗1, x
∗
2) satisfies the global competition condition according to
Lemma 2.5. We demonstrate this by using Wolfram Mathematica version 10.0.0.0. You
can find the code at the end of the proof section. The problem is analyzed in sections 5
to 7 of the code. Mathematica returns the value ”true” for the first pair of solutions.
The solution pairs (x∗∗1 , x
∗∗
2 ) and (x
∗∗∗
1 , x
∗∗∗
2 ) do not fulfill the global competition condition
L− 3
2
< x¯ < −L+ 3
2
.
This is examined in sections 8 and 9 of our code. Therefore, we define, in a first step, the
means
x2 =
x∗∗1 + x
∗∗
2
2
and x3 =
x∗∗∗1 + x
∗∗∗
2
2
.
Using numerical optimization techniques, we obtain that the range of x2 is given by [1, 2].
Similarly, the range of x3 is given by [−2,−1]. Moreover, x2 attains its minimum value
1 for L = 1
2
. This implies that x2 ≥ 1. However, the global competition condition would
require that x2 < −12 + 32 = 1. This is a contradiction. Similarly, x3 attains its maximum
value −1 for L = 1
2
. As a consequence, we can infer that x3 ≤ −1. In order to meet the
requirements of Lemma 2.5, x3 also needs to satisfy x3 >
1
2
− 3
2
= −1. This excludes
(x∗∗∗1 , x
∗∗∗
2 ) as a feasible solution.
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As a next step, we show that the first pair of solutions is indeed a maximizer for both
firms. The second order derivative of evaluated at (x∗1, x
∗
2) yields
∂2CEU[Πi(x∗1, x∗2, ·)]
∂x2i
: =
(
δ(δ(3(α− 1)2(2L+ 3)2t2
+ 2(α− 1)t(2L(10αLt− L+ 9)− 27αt+ 27)
+ αt(3α(3− 2L)2t+ 4L(L+ 9)− 54)
+ 4σ2(−αt+ αt+ t− 1) + 27) + 4(α− 1)t((L− 9)L
+ σ2)− 2αt(2L(L+ 9) + 2σ2 − 27)− 54((α− 1)t+ 1)
+ 8σ2)− 4σ2 + 27
)
·
(
18(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)
)−1
for both firms. First, I examine the sign of the denominator. It is
18(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)
= 36αδLt+ 36αδLt+ 54αδt− 54αδt− 36δLt− 54δt+ 54δ − 54
≤ 36δLt+ 18αδt+ 54δt− 54αδt− 36δLt− 54δt+ 54− 54
= −36αδt
≤ 0
Hence, the denominator is negative. Subsequently, we show that the numerator is non-
negative. Taking the derivative of the numerator with respect to t yields
− 2(1− α)δ(δ(3(α− 1)(2L+ 3)2t+ 2L(L(10αt− 1) + 9)
− 27αt− 2σ2 + 27) + 2((L− 9)L+ σ2)− 27)
Given the parameter restrictions of the model, this expression is non-negative. We verify
this in sections 13 and 14 of the Mathematica code. Hence, the numerator becomes
smaller as we insert the minimum value 1 for t. Doing so, we obtain after several steps
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of algebra
h =
(
α2δ2
(
4L2(t+ 3)(3t+ 1)− 36L
(
t2 − 1
)
+ 27(t− 1)2
)
− 2αδ
(
2L2(9δt+ 7δ + t− 1)
+ 18L(δ(−t) + δ + t+ 1)− (t− 1)(2(δ − 1)σ2 + 27)
)
+ 4δ(L((4δ − 1)L+ 9) + σ2)− 4σ2 + 27
)
What remains to be demonstrated is that this expression is non-negative. Using Mathe-
matica, we check whether h can be negative under the restrictions 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1,
0 ≤ t ≤ 1, 0 ≤ L ≤ 1
2
and 0 ≤ σ2 ≤ 1
4
, see sections 15 and 16 of the code. Mathematica
returns the value ”false”.
We obtain the equilibrium profits by inserting the equilibrium locations x∗i for i = 1, 2
into (A.1) and (A.2). After several steps of algebra, we obtain
CEU[Πi] = −
(
δ
(−(α− 1)(2L+ 3)2t+ α(3− 2L)2t− 4σ2 − 9)+ 4σ2 + 9)2
36(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3) .
The competitive differentiation is given by
∆∗x = x
∗
2 − x∗1 = 2x∗2
=
δ
(
(α− 1)(2L+ 3)2t− α(3− 2L)2t+ 4σ2 + 9)− 4σ2 − 9
2(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3) .
Before starting with the proofs of the comparative static analysis, we want to point out
that for many of the estimations performed in the subsequent five proofs, we make use
of the following intrinsic parameter restrictions:
• upper and lower support boundaries for M : 0 < L ≤ 1
2
• upper and lower bound of the confidence parameter: 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
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• upper and lower bound of ambiguity attitude: 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
• upper and lower bound of the variance of M : 0 ≤ σ2 ≤ L2 ≤ 1
4
• upper and lower bound of the transportation cost parameter: 0 < t ≤ 1 ≤ t
Proof of Proposition 2.2. The derivative of x∗1 with respect to α is given by
∂x∗1
∂α
= −δ(2L− 3)t(2δL(2L+ 3)t− (δ − 1)(3L+ 2σ
2)) + (δ − 1)δ(2L+ 3)t(3L− 2σ2)
2(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)2
The denominator is positive. Therefore, the sign of the derivative is determined by its
numerator. We analyze the sign of this expression in two steps. The first part of the
numerator is
g1 := −δ(2L− 3)t(2δL(2L+ 3)t+ (1− δ)(3L+ 2σ2))
Due to the fact that L < 1
2
, one can infer that 2L − 3 < 0. Hence, one obtains g1 > 0.
The second part of the numerator is
g2 := (1− δ)δ(2L+ 3)t(3L− 2σ2)
Since σ2 < L2 < L, one can infer that
3L− 2σ2 > 3L− 2L = L > 0.
Therefore, one has g2 > 0 as well. This proves that
∂x∗1
∂α
> 0 and
∂x∗2
∂α
= −∂x∗1
∂α
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. The derivative of x∗1 with respect to σ
2 is given by
∂x∗1
∂σ2
=
1− δ
δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3
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The numerator is non-negative since 1−δ ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ δ ≥ 1. It is strictly positive for 0 ≤
δ < 1. For the denominator, observe that δ(α−1)(2L+3)t ≤ 0 and δ(α(2L−3)t+3) ≤ 0,
since L < 1
2
. Hence, the denominator is smaller or equal −3 and therefore negative. Thus,
∂x∗1
∂σ2
≤ 0 and ∂x∗2
∂σ2
= −∂x∗1
∂σ2
≥ 0. For δ = 1 both x∗1 and x∗2 are independent of σ2. Therefore
∂x∗2
∂σ2
=
∂x∗1
∂σ2
= 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. We have
∂x∗1
∂t
=
αδ
(
2(α− 1)δL (4L2 − 9) t+ (δ − 1)(2L− 3)(3L+ 2σ2))
2(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)2
It is obvious that the denominator is positive. Turning to the numerator, we can see that
4L2 − 9 ≤ 0 since L < 1
2
. Therefore, we can conclude that
2αδ(α− 1)δL (4L2 − 9) t ≥ 0.
Similarly, since 2L− 3 < 0 and α− 1 ≤ 0, one can infer that
αδ(δ − 1)(2L− 3)(3L+ 2σ2) ≥ 0.
Consequently, the numerator is positive and
∂x∗1
∂t
> 0. Since x∗2 = −x∗1, it follows that
∂x∗2
∂t
= −∂x∗1
∂t
< 0. The derivative of x∗1 with respect to t is given by
∂x∗1
∂t
= −(α− 1)δ(2L+ 3)(2αδL(2L− 3)t+ (δ − 1)(3L− 2σ
2))
2(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)2
Clearly, the denominator is positive. Turning to the numerator, observe that the factor
−(α− 1)δ(2L+ 3) is positive. Moreover, since L < 1
2
, one can infer
2αδL(2L− 3)t ≤ 0.
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As a next step, we can show that
3L− 2σ2 ≥ 3L− 2L2 > 3L− 2L = L > 0.
This implies (δ − 1)(3L− 2σ2)) ≤ 0. In total, the numerator is negative. Therefore, one
has
∂x∗1
∂t
< 0 and
∂x∗2
∂t
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.5. The derivative of x∗1 with respect to δ is given by
∂x∗1
∂δ
=
(α− 1)(2L+ 3)t(3L− 2σ2)− α(2L− 3)t(3L+ 2σ2)
2(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)2
It is straightforward to see that the denominator is positive. The first part of the numer-
ator is given by
g3 := (α− 1)(2L+ 3)t(3L− 2σ2).
Since
3L− 2σ2 ≥ 3L− 2L = L > 0,
one can infer that g3 ≤ 0. Defining
g4 := −α(2L− 3)t(3L+ 2σ2),
one obtains by 2L − 3 < 0 that g4 ≥ 0. As a consequence, one can infer that ∂x
∗
1
∂δ
> 0 if
g3 + g4 > 0 and
∂x∗1
∂δ
< 0 if g3 + g4 < 0. Moreover, one has
∂x∗1
∂δ
= 0 if g3 + g4 = 0. Solving
the equation −g3 = g4 for α, one obtains the unique solution
α∗ :=
(2L+ 3)(3L− 2σ2)
(2L+ 3)t(3L− 2σ2)− (2L− 3)t(3L+ 2σ2)
Besides, one can see that g3 + g4 > 0 whenever α > α
∗ and g3 + g4 < 0 whenever α < α∗.
This establishes that the numerator has, for every parameter constellation, a unique zero
α∗ where ∂x
∗
1
∂δ
< 0 for all 0 ≤ α < α∗, ∂x∗1
∂δ
= 0 for α = α∗ and ∂x
∗
1
∂δ
> 0 for all 1 ≥ α > α∗.
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Since x∗2 = −x∗1, we obtain the postulated result for x∗2 without reexamining the respective
derivative.
Proof of Proposition 2.6. The derivative of x1
∗ with respect to L is given by
∂x∗1
∂L
=− δ((α− 1)t((δ − 1)(12L− 4σ2 + 9)− 24αδLt)
+ αt(−αδ(3− 2L)2t− (δ − 1)(12L+ 4σ2 − 9)) + (α− 1)2δ(2L+ 3)2t2)
· (2(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)2)−1
As we can see, the denominator is positive. Therefore the sign of the derivative solely
depends on the numerator. Since δ ≥ 0 it is sufficient to consider the sign of numerator
divided by δ. We denote this expression with (∗). Inserting α = 0 into expression (∗)
yields
t
(
(δ − 1)(12L− 4σ2 + 9)− δ(2L+ 3)2t)
≤ δ[−12L+ 4σ2 − 9]
≤ δ[−12L− 8]
= −4δ(3L+ 2)
< 0
This shows that the derivative is strictly negative for α = 0. Similarly, inserting α = 1
into (∗), we obtain
t
(
(δ − 1)(12L+ 4σ2 − 9) + δ(3− 2L)2t) (A.9)
We establish that expression (A.9) is strictly positive. It is
12L+ 4σ2 − 9 ≤ 6 + 1− 9 = −2 < 0.
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As a consequence, we obtain
(δ − 1)(12L+ 4σ2 − 9) ≥ 0.
This shows that the numerator is positive. Now, we demonstrated that
∂x∗1
∂L
< 0 for α = 0,
and
∂x∗1
∂L
> 0 for α = 1. The derivative is continuous. By the intermediate value theorem
for continuous functions, we obtain that there is αˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that ∂x∗1
∂L
= 0 for α = αˆ.
What remains to be shown is that αˆ is unique. In this case, we know that x∗1 is strictly
decreasing in L for values of α smaller that αˆ, constant for α = αˆ, and increasing for
1 ≥ α > αˆ. Solving expression (∗) for α, we know that we find at least one zero, the
zero αˆ in the interval [0, 1]. Since (∗) is a quadratic function in α, we can conclude that
it has one more root ˆˆα. This root cannot be located in the interval [0, 1] as well. This
we show by making use of a proof by contradiction. Assume, w.l.o.g., that ˆˆα was in the
interval [0, 1] as well and that αˆ < ˆˆα. We can distinguish two cases. Case 1 is that the
quadratic function has a global maximum, and case 2 is that the quadratic function has a
global minimum. Since we can find both roots in the interval [0, 1], the global maximum,
or alternatively the global minimum, are also located in this interval. Assume now that
we have a quadratic function with a global maximum. In this case, we have that (∗) is
smaller zero for α < αˆ, equal to zero for α ∈ {αˆ, ˆˆα}, and smaller zero for α ∈ ( ˆˆα, 1].
The last statement contradicts that (∗) is larger zero for α = 1 what we already showed
above. For a global minimum a similar line of arguments holds. Since both roots are
located in the interval [0, 1], we can deduce that the minimum is located in this interval
as well. In this case we can conclude that (∗) is larger than zero for α < αˆ, equal to zero
for α ∈ {αˆ, ˆˆα}, and again larger zero for α ∈ ( ˆˆα, 1]. The first statement contradicts that
(∗) is smaller zero for α = 0. To sum up, we have only one root in [0, 1].
"1. Define Objectives for Firm 1 and Firm 2";
f1[x1_, x2_, alpha_, delta_, tlow_, thigh_, sigma_, L_] :=
delta * ((2 * thigh * (1 - alpha) * (x2 - x1) * (L + (x2 + x1) / 2 + 3 / 2)^2) / 9 +(2 * alpha * tlow * (x2 - x1) * (-L + (x2 + x1) / 2 + 3 / 2)^2) / 9) +((1 - delta) * (x2 - x1) * ((x2 + x1 + 3)^2 + 4 * sigma)) / 18;
f2[x1_, x2_, alpha_, delta_, tlow_, thigh_, sigma_, L_] :=
delta * ((2 * alpha * tlow * (x2 - x1) * (L + (x2 + x1) / 2 - 3 / 2)^2) / 9 +(2 * (1 - alpha) * thigh * (x2 - x1) * (-L + (x2 + x1) / 2 - 3 / 2)^2) / 9) +((1 - delta) * (x2 - x1) * ((x2 + x1 - 3)^2 + 4 * sigma)) / 18;
"2. Introduce Parameter Restrictions";
assumptions = And[L ⩵ 1 / 2, 0 ≤ alpha ≤ 1,
0 < tlow <= 1, 0 <= delta ≤ 1, 0 <= sigma ≤ L^2, thigh ≥ 1];
"3. Define the Midpoint Between Both Firms";
mean = (x1 + x2) / 2;
"4. Solving for Mutual Best Responses";
solutions =
FullSimplify[Solve[{D[f1[x1, x2, alpha, delta, tlow, thigh, sigma, L], x1] ⩵ 0,
D[f2[x1, x2, alpha, delta, tlow, thigh, sigma, L], x2] ⩵ 0}, {x1, x2}]];
"5. Store Solutions in a Table";
TableForm[Table[{solutions[[i, 1, 2]], solutions[[i, 2, 2]]},{i, Length[solutions]}], TableHeadings → {{"1", "2", "3"}, {"x1", "x2"}},
TableAlignments → Center, TableSpacing → {3, 4}];
"6. Verify Whether Solution
Satisfies the Global Competition Condition";
Printed by Wolfram Mathematica Student Edition
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Table[{i, FullSimplify[(And[-3 / 2 < -L - mean, L - mean < 3 / 2] /. solutions[[i]]),
assumptions]}, {i, Length[solutions]}]{1, True}, 2, 2 + 2 delta (-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) >√9 - 4 sigma + delta -18 - 23 (-1 + alpha) thigh + 11 alpha tlow +
4 sigma (2 + (-1 + alpha) thigh - alpha tlow) + delta 9 + 16 (-1 + alpha)2
thigh2 + 4 sigma (-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) + alpha tlow(-11 + 4 alpha tlow) - (-1 + alpha) thigh (-23 + 12 alpha tlow) &&
2 delta (1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh - alpha tlow) <
2 +√9 - 4 sigma + delta -18 - 23 (-1 + alpha) thigh + 11 alpha tlow +
4 sigma (2 + (-1 + alpha) thigh - alpha tlow) + delta 9 + 16 (-1 + alpha)2
thigh2 + 4 sigma (-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) + alpha tlow(-11 + 4 alpha tlow) - (-1 + alpha) thigh (-23 + 12 alpha tlow),3, 2 delta (1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh - alpha tlow) <
2 +√9 - 4 sigma + delta -18 - 23 (-1 + alpha) thigh + 11 alpha tlow +
4 sigma (2 + (-1 + alpha) thigh - alpha tlow) + delta 9 + 16 (-1 + alpha)2
thigh2 + 4 sigma (-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) + alpha tlow(-11 + 4 alpha tlow) - (-1 + alpha) thigh (-23 + 12 alpha tlow) &&
2 delta (1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh - alpha tlow) +√9 - 4 sigma +
delta -18 - 23 (-1 + alpha) thigh + 11 alpha tlow + 4 sigma(2 + (-1 + alpha) thigh - alpha tlow) + delta 9 + 16 (-1 + alpha)2 thigh2 +
4 sigma (-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) + alpha tlow (-11 +
4 alpha tlow) - (-1 + alpha) thigh (-23 + 12 alpha tlow) < 2
"7. Verify That the First Pair of Solutions
Satisfies the Global Competition Condition";
x1st = 9 + 4 sigma +
delta -9 - 4 sigma - (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L)2 thigh + alpha (3 - 2 L)2 tlow (4 (-3 + delta (3 + (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L) thigh + alpha (-3 + 2 L) tlow)));
x2st = -x1st;
Simplify[x2st > 3 / 2 - L, assumptions]
3 delta + 4 sigma > 3 + 4 delta (sigma + alpha tlow)
Reduce[{3 delta + 4 sigma > 3 + 4 delta (sigma + alpha tlow), assumptions},{alpha, delta, sigma, tlow}]
False
"8. Define the Mean for the
Second and Third Pair of Solutions";
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mean2 =3 + delta (-3 - (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L) thigh + alpha (3 - 2 L) tlow) -√9 - 4 sigma +
delta 4 (-1 + alpha) ((-3 + L) L + sigma) thigh + 2 (-9 + 4 sigma -
9 (-1 + alpha) thigh) - 2 alpha (-9 + 2 L (3 + L) + 2 sigma) tlow +
delta 9 + (-1 + alpha)2 (3 + 2 L)2 thigh2 + 4 sigma(-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) + alpha tlow(9 (-2 + alpha tlow) + 4 L (3 + L + alpha (-3 + L) tlow)) + 2 (-1 +
alpha) thigh (9 - 9 alpha tlow + 2 L (3 - L + 6 alpha L tlow)) (2 (-1 + delta (1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh - alpha tlow))) -3 - delta (3 + (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L) thigh + alpha (-3 + 2 L) tlow) +√9 - 4 sigma + delta 4 (-1 + alpha) ((-3 + L) L + sigma)
thigh + 2 (-9 + 4 sigma - 9 (-1 + alpha) thigh) - 2 alpha(-9 + 2 L (3 + L) + 2 sigma) tlow + delta 9 + (-1 + alpha)2 (3 + 2 L)2
thigh2 + 4 sigma (-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) + alpha
tlow (9 (-2 + alpha tlow) + 4 L (3 + L + alpha (-3 + L) tlow)) +
2 (-1 + alpha) thigh (9 - 9 alpha tlow + 2 L(3 - L + 6 alpha L tlow)) (2 (-1 + delta (1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh - alpha tlow)))  2;
mean3 =3 + delta (-3 - (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L) thigh + alpha (3 - 2 L) tlow) +√9 - 4 sigma +
delta 4 (-1 + alpha) ((-3 + L) L + sigma) thigh + 2 (-9 + 4 sigma -
9 (-1 + alpha) thigh) - 2 alpha (-9 + 2 L (3 + L) + 2 sigma) tlow +
delta 9 + (-1 + alpha)2 (3 + 2 L)2 thigh2 + 4 sigma(-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) + alpha tlow(9 (-2 + alpha tlow) + 4 L (3 + L + alpha (-3 + L) tlow)) + 2 (-1 +
alpha) thigh (9 - 9 alpha tlow + 2 L (3 - L + 6 alpha L tlow)) (2 (-1 + delta (1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh - alpha tlow))) +-3 + delta (3 + (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L) thigh + alpha (-3 + 2 L) tlow) +√9 - 4 sigma + delta 4 (-1 + alpha) ((-3 + L) L + sigma) thigh +
2 (-9 + 4 sigma - 9 (-1 + alpha) thigh) - 2 alpha (-9 + 2 L (3 + L) +
2 sigma) tlow + delta 9 + (-1 + alpha)2 (3 + 2 L)2 thigh2 +
4 sigma (-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) + alpha tlow(9 (-2 + alpha tlow) + 4 L (3 + L + alpha (-3 + L) tlow)) + 2 (-1 +
alpha) thigh (9 - 9 alpha tlow + 2 L (3 - L + 6 alpha L tlow)) (2 (-1 + delta (1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh - alpha tlow)))  2;
"9. Determine the Mean's Range for
the Second and Third Pair of Solutions";
NMinimize[{mean2, 0 <= L ≤ 1 / 2, 0 ≤ alpha ≤ 1, 0 <= tlow <= 1, 0 <= delta ≤ 1,
0 <= sigma ≤ L^2, thigh ≥ 1}, {alpha, delta, tlow, thigh, sigma, L}]{1., {alpha → 1., delta → 1., tlow → 0.878054, thigh → 1., sigma → 0.139562, L → 0.5}}
NMaximize[{mean2, 0 <= L ≤ 1 / 2, 0 ≤ alpha ≤ 1, 0 <= tlow <= 1, 0 <= delta ≤ 1,
0 <= sigma ≤ L^2, thigh ≥ 1}, {alpha, delta, tlow, thigh, sigma, L}]2., alpha → 2.6438 × 10-9, delta → 1.,
tlow → 0.0272573, thigh → 2.23364, sigma → 0.234253, L → 0.5
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NMinimize[{mean3, 0 <= L ≤ 1 / 2, 0 ≤ alpha ≤ 1, 0 <= tlow <= 1, 0 <= delta ≤ 1,
0 <= sigma ≤ L^2, thigh ≥ 1}, {alpha, delta, tlow, thigh, sigma, L}]-2., alpha → 2.6438 × 10-9, delta → 1.,
tlow → 0.0272573, thigh → 2.23364, sigma → 0.234253, L → 0.5
NMaximize[{mean3, 0 <= L ≤ 1 / 2, 0 ≤ alpha ≤ 1, 0 <= tlow <= 1, 0 <= delta ≤ 1,
0 <= sigma ≤ L^2, thigh ≥ 1}, {alpha, delta, tlow, thigh, sigma, L}]
-1., alpha → 1., delta → 1., tlow → 0.365717,
thigh → 1.79008, sigma → 1.80912 × 10-22, L → 0.5
"10. Second-Order Derivative Firm 1";
FullSimplify[ D[f1[x1, x2, alpha, delta, tlow, thigh, sigma, L], {x1, 2}]]
1
9
(-6 - 3 x1 - x2 + delta (6 + 3 x1 +
alpha tlow (-6 + 4 L - 3 x1 - x2) + x2 + (-1 + alpha) thigh (6 + 4 L + 3 x1 + x2)))
Secondorderderivative1[x1_, x2_, alpha_, delta_, tlow_, thigh_, sigma_, L_] :=
1
9 (-6 - 3 x1 - x2 + delta (6 + 3 x1 + alpha tlow (-6 + 4 L - 3 x1 - x2) +
x2 + (-1 + alpha) thigh (6 + 4 L + 3 x1 + x2)));
"11. Second-Order Derivative Firm 2";
FullSimplify[D[f2[x1, x2, alpha, delta, tlow, thigh, sigma, L], {x2, 2}]]
1
9
(-6 + x1 + 3 x2 + delta (6 - x1 +
(-1 + alpha) thigh (6 + 4 L - x1 - 3 x2) - 3 x2 + alpha tlow (-6 + 4 L + x1 + 3 x2)))
Secondorderderivative2[x1_, x2_, alpha_, delta_, tlow_, thigh_, sigma_, L_] :=
1
9 (-6 + x1 + 3 x2 + delta (6 - x1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh (6 + 4 L - x1 - 3 x2) -
3 x2 + alpha tlow (-6 + 4 L + x1 + 3 x2)))
"12. Second-Order Derivatives
Evaluated at Equilibrium Candidate Positions";
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FullSimplifySecondorderderivative19 + 4 sigma +
delta -9 - 4 sigma - (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L)2 thigh + alpha (3 - 2 L)2 tlow (4 (-3 + delta (3 + (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L) thigh + alpha (-3 + 2 L) tlow))), -9 -
4 sigma + delta 9 + 4 sigma + (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L)2 thigh - alpha (3 - 2 L)2 tlow (4 (-3 + delta (3 + (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L) thigh + alpha (-3 + 2 L) tlow))),
alpha, delta, tlow, thigh, sigma, L27 - 4 sigma + delta8 sigma + 4 (-1 + alpha) ((-9 + L) L + sigma) thigh - 54 (1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh) -
2 alpha (-27 + 2 L (9 + L) + 2 sigma) tlow + delta 27 + 3 (-1 + alpha)2(3 + 2 L)2 thigh2 + 4 sigma (-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) +
alpha tlow -54 + 4 L (9 + L) + 3 alpha (3 - 2 L)2 tlow +
2 (-1 + alpha) thigh (27 - 27 alpha tlow + 2 L (9 - L + 10 alpha L tlow)) (18 (-3 + delta (3 + (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L) thigh + alpha (-3 + 2 L) tlow)))
FullSimplifySecondorderderivative29 + 4 sigma +
delta -9 - 4 sigma - (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L)2 thigh + alpha (3 - 2 L)2 tlow (4 (-3 + delta (3 + (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L) thigh + alpha (-3 + 2 L) tlow))), -9 -
4 sigma + delta 9 + 4 sigma + (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L)2 thigh - alpha (3 - 2 L)2 tlow (4 (-3 + delta (3 + (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L) thigh + alpha (-3 + 2 L) tlow))),
alpha, delta, tlow, thigh, sigma, L27 - 4 sigma + delta8 sigma + 4 (-1 + alpha) ((-9 + L) L + sigma) thigh - 54 (1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh) -
2 alpha (-27 + 2 L (9 + L) + 2 sigma) tlow + delta 27 + 3 (-1 + alpha)2(3 + 2 L)2 thigh2 + 4 sigma (-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) +
alpha tlow -54 + 4 L (9 + L) + 3 alpha (3 - 2 L)2 tlow +
2 (-1 + alpha) thigh (27 - 27 alpha tlow + 2 L (9 - L + 10 alpha L tlow)) (18 (-3 + delta (3 + (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L) thigh + alpha (-3 + 2 L) tlow)))
"13. Take the Derivative of
the Numerator With Respect to Thigh";
FullSimplify
D27 - 4 sigma + delta 8 sigma + 4 (-1 + alpha) ((-9 + L) L + sigma) thigh - 54(1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh) - 2 alpha (-27 + 2 L (9 + L) + 2 sigma) tlow +
delta 27 + 3 (-1 + alpha)2 (3 + 2 L)2 thigh2 +
4 sigma (-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) +
alpha tlow -54 + 4 L (9 + L) + 3 alpha (3 - 2 L)2 tlow + 2 (-1 + alpha)
thigh (27 - 27 alpha tlow + 2 L (9 - L + 10 alpha L tlow)), thigh
2 (-1 + alpha) delta-27 + 2 ((-9 + L) L + sigma) + delta 27 - 2 sigma + 3 (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L)2 thigh -
27 alpha tlow + 2 L (9 + L (-1 + 10 alpha tlow))
"14. Check Whether the Derivative Can be Negative";
assumptions = And[0 <= L ≤ 1 / 2, 0 ≤ alpha ≤ 1,
0 < tlow ≤ 1, 0 <= delta ≤ 1, 0 <= sigma ≤ L^2, thigh >= 1];
mathematica_hotelling.nb    5
Printed by Wolfram Mathematica Student Edition
Chapter 2. Spatial Competition Under Ambiguity 77
Reduce2 (-1 + alpha) delta -27 + 2 ((-9 + L) L + sigma) + delta 27 - 2 sigma + 3 (-1 + alpha)(3 + 2 L)2 thigh - 27 alpha tlow + 2 L (9 + L (-1 + 10 alpha tlow)) < 0,
assumptions, {alpha, delta, sigma, L, tlow, thigh}
False
"15. Evaluate the Numerator of
the Second-Order Derivative at Thigh=1";
Num[alpha_, delta_, tlow_, thigh_, sigma_, L_] :=27 - 4 sigma + delta 8 sigma + 4 (-1 + alpha) ((-9 + L) L + sigma) thigh -
54 (1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh) - 2 alpha (-27 + 2 L (9 + L) + 2 sigma) tlow +
delta 27 + 3 (-1 + alpha)2 (3 + 2 L)2 thigh2 + 4 sigma (-1 + thigh - alpha thigh +
alpha tlow) + alpha tlow -54 + 4 L (9 + L) + 3 alpha (3 - 2 L)2 tlow +
2 (-1 + alpha) thigh (27 - 27 alpha tlow + 2 L (9 - L + 10 alpha L tlow));
FullSimplify[Num[alpha, delta, tlow, 1, sigma, L]]
27 - 4 sigma + delta 4 (L (9 + (-1 + 4 delta) L) + sigma) +
alpha2 delta 27 (-1 + tlow)2 + 4 L2 (3 + tlow) (1 + 3 tlow) - 36 L -1 + tlow2 -
2 alpha -(27 + 2 (-1 + delta) sigma) (-1 + tlow) +
18 L (1 + delta + tlow - delta tlow) + 2 L2 (-1 + tlow + delta (7 + 9 tlow))
27 - 4 sigma + delta 4 (L (9 + (-1 + 4 delta) L) + sigma) +
alpha2 delta 27 (-1 + tlow)2 + 4 L2 (3 + tlow) (1 + 3 tlow) - 36 L -1 + tlow2 -
2 alpha -(27 + 2 (-1 + delta) sigma) (-1 + tlow) +
18 L (1 + delta + tlow - delta tlow) + 2 L2 (-1 + tlow + delta (7 + 9 tlow))
27 - 4 sigma + delta 4 (L (9 + (-1 + 4 delta) L) + sigma) +
alpha2 delta 27 (-1 + tlow)2 + 4 L2 (3 + tlow) (1 + 3 tlow) - 36 L -1 + tlow2 -
2 alpha (-27 - 2 (-1 + delta) sigma) (-1 + tlow) +
18 L (1 + delta + tlow - delta tlow) + 2 L2 (-1 + tlow + delta (7 + 9 tlow))
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"16. Can The Numerator
Evaluated at Thigh=1 Become Negative?";
Reduce27 - 4 sigma + delta 4 (L (9 + (-1 + 4 delta) L) + sigma) +
alpha2 delta 27 (-1 + tlow)2 + 4 L2 (3 + tlow) (1 + 3 tlow) - 36 L -1 + tlow2 -
2 alpha -(27 + 2 (-1 + delta) sigma) (-1 + tlow) +
18 L (1 + delta + tlow - delta tlow) + 2 L2 (-1 + tlow + delta (7 + 9 tlow)) <
0, 0 <= L ≤ 1 / 2, 0 ≤ alpha ≤ 1, 0 <= tlow ≤ 1, 0 <= delta ≤ 1,
0 <= sigma ≤ L^2, {alpha, delta,
tlow,
sigma,
L}
False
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Chapter 3
Primary Prevention Under
Ambiguity
3.1 Introduction
A substantial part of everyday medical decision-making is concerned with preventive care.
The fundamental idea of prevention lies in the assumption that patients’ behavior and
commitments to preventive health care measures may actively influence their prospects
of certain future health states. The literature differentiates between different concepts of
prevention.1 First of all, there is primary prevention, referring to situations before the
incidence of disease. A potentially healthy agent can exert a distinct amount of effort
that itself influences his or her probability of contracting an illness in the future. There
are a multitude of preventive measures that fall into this category. Preventing obesity
by doing regular exercise or following nutritional guidelines from health experts, such as
limiting the daily amount of carbohydrates consumed, may significantly reduce the risk of
acquiring diabetes or cardiovascular diseases.2 Another example for primary preventive
1See for instance Kenkel [2000] or Etner and Jeleva [2013].
2For a detailed survey on the cost-effectiveness of primary preventive programs on diabetes and
cardiovascular diseases read the report by Korczak et al. [2011].
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measures are safety guidelines and schooling for workers exposed to certain health risks
at the workplace; you may think of workers exposed to dangerous substances, machinery,
or surroundings. In contrast to that, secondary and tertiary prevention is confined to
scenarios after the occurrence of disease. Secondary prevention refers to measures such
as cancer screenings where patients are unaware of their current health status. The term
tertiary prevention applies after the disease has been diagnosed. One can think of pre-
ventive measures that facilitate patients’ physical recovery, reduce their risk of relapse,
or ameliorate their general state of health. Throughout this paper, I am going to focus
on primary prevention and primary preventive programs.
An important observation related to primary preventive activities is that patients are
indeed aware that the commitment to a specific preventive measure reduces their risk
of contracting an illness. Imagine, for instance, that patients were asked whether they
believe that regular exercise reduces their risk of contracting cardiovascular diseases; one
would expect a large majority of patients to answer positively. If patients were, on the
other hand, asked to quantify the impact of preventive effort on their individual disease
probabilities, they would probably fail to give an accurate answer. Suppose, for instance,
that patients were asked how strongly their risk of contracting a cardiovascular disease
would decrease if they were engaged in one additional hour of sporting activities every
week. In this case, one would expect that patients are either unable to provide an estima-
tion, or come up with an estimation that they don’t feel very confident with. This absence
of knowledge can be explained by several possible reasons. First of all, patients need to
incorporate and evaluate the impact of imprecisely known factors, such as their genetic
predispositions to certain diseases, or lifestyle related factors3, to form a probabilistic
judgment. Secondly, even in the rather unrealistic situation that patients have direct ac-
cess to recent scientific studies on the matter, the provision of these might be only of little
help, since the findings of each survey are based on aggregate data for a certain sample of
participants. Knowing this, patients might find it difficult to contrast aggregate results
3Examples for lifestyle related factors might be for instance nutrition, exposition to environmental
risks, like pollution or hazardous substances, as well as stress.
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with individual factors. Thirdly, patients might be confronted with a situation where sci-
entific evidence on the respective programs is not available. This is, for instance, the case
when patients participate in newly developed preventive programs where reliable data on
its effectiveness is still absent. And finally, there might be confounding scientific or non-
scientific evidence on the efficacy of a certain preventive regime. As an example for this,
one might think of contradictory dietary recommendations, newly developed ”wonder di-
ets” promoted by some representatives of the pharmaceutical industry, or contradictory
information arising from patients’ eligibility for a second medical opinion. Consequently,
patients ignore the true underlying relationship between preventive effort and disease
probabilities. More importantly, they might consider a multitude of functional relation-
ships between effort and disease probability possible. This is illustrated by means of the
following stylized figure.
Figure 3.1: Preventive Relationships and the True Underlying Relationship
A key objective of any information campaign or health counseling on primary preven-
tion is to ensure that patients are better informed about the effectiveness of a preventive
regime. This objective is based on the premise that better informed agents are more
likely to make better decisions in terms of their preventive activities. In my view, this
assumption is highly problematic, since it is not clearly understood how patients process
additional information in the light of imprecise a priori knowledge. In this paper, im-
precise knowledge is modeled by ”Knightian Uncertainty”, or ”Ambiguity”, see Knight
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[1921]. The idea that ambiguity is relevant for decision making on health matters is sup-
ported by a relatively new strand of empirical literature. Han et al. [2011] highlight the
relevance of uncertainty for health care. The authors point out different sources and vari-
eties of uncertainty in medical care and emphasize that, until now, clinical practice does
not differentiate between different varieties of uncertainty as risk and ambiguity. One
example why ambiguity might arise is confounding information about scientific evidence.
Therefore, ambiguity might matter for communication schemes between physicians and
patients. Han et al. [2007] consider the issue of conflicting information more concretely
by empirically investigating the impact of contradictory mammography recommendations
on women’s behavior. The study finds that a higher degree of ambiguity yields a dimin-
ished uptake of mammography and lowers intentions for future mammography screenings.
Similarly, Han et al. [2006] investigate the importance of ambiguity with respect to can-
cer preventability and cancer prevention recommendations. The authors find a positive
correlation between ambiguity and perceived cancer risk or cancer worry. Furthermore,
the study suggests that perceived ambiguity has a strong negative effect on cancer pre-
ventability. Politi et al. [2007] treat the question of how to communicate uncertainties
about medical interventions to patients and state that further research is needed in order
to fully understand how patients respond to risk and ambiguity.
This paper intends to study, on a theoretical basis, how additional information on a pri-
mary preventive regime impacts on patients’ preventive activities when patients’ prior
knowledge is characterized by ambiguity. Note that the way information is processed
under risk significantly differs from the way information is updated under ambiguity. As
a consequence, it is not clearly understood how additional information on a preventive
regime and patients’ effort levels are interrelated under Knightian Uncertainty.
This paper intends to fill this gap by studying a model of physician counseling where
patients with imprecise prior knowledge seek information from a physician on the rela-
tionship between effort and disease probabilities. Patients’ imprecise a priori knowledge
is thereby modeled by Knightian Uncertainty. More specifically, I assume that patients’
preferences are of the Choquet-expected utility type. Beliefs are defined on a set of
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strictly ordered preventive relationships and represented by a neo-additive capacity, see
Chateauneuf et al. [2007], which is a non-additive probability which allows researchers
to model the magnitude of the imprecision of patients’ beliefs as well as their attitudes
towards ambiguity. The physician provides a random signal to patients. After receiving
the signal, patients update their prior belief and exert effort. The optimal level of preven-
tive activities is thereby determined according to a setting motivated by the self-insurance
and self-protection model developed by Ehrlich and Becker [1972]. The following diagram
illustrates the basic modeling framework.
Figure 3.2: Basic Model Framework
Ehrlich and Becker [1972] consider a model with two states of the world, a ”good” and
a ”bad” state, and a decision-maker that encounters a monetary loss in the bad state.
Furthermore, the decision-maker can, by exerting a certain amount of effort, either reduce
the amount of loss in the bad state (this is called ”self-insurance”), or reduce the under-
lying probability of the bad state (this is called ”self-protection”). To my knowledge, the
following modifications and extensions of Ehrlich and Becker’s model have been discussed
in the health domain, and more specifically in the context of prevention. Eeckhoudt et al.
[1998] relate Ehrlich and Becker’s model to medical prevention. In particular, the au-
thors introduce utilities depending on patients’ health state and find that tertiary and
secondary prevention are , whereas primary and tertiary prevention are complements.
Eeckhoudt et al. [2001] investigate the link between primary and secondary prevention.
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The paper demonstrates that policy-makers might reduce investment in primary preven-
tive measures as soon as diagnostic tests become available. Hence, primary prevention and
secondary prevention can be considered as substitutes. Zweifel et al. [2009] analyze the
relationship between moral hazard, insurance, and prevention. Etner and Jeleva [2013]
study the relationship between risk perception, prevention and diagnostic tests using the
recursive rank-dependent utility model developed by Cohen et al. [2008]. The authors
suggest a comprehensive framework incorporating primary and tertiary preventive ac-
tivities, assuming that patients know the relationship between effort and the objective
probability of disease, but might under- or overestimate this probability.
The idea to introduce Knightian uncertainty into Ehrlich and Becker’s model has already
been addressed by a number of papers. Snow [2011] incorporates ambiguity aversion
by using the so-called KMM or Smooth Ambiguity model developed by Klibanoff et al.
[2005]. The author introduces a model with two states of the world and concludes that,
if decision-makers are risk-averse and ambiguity-averse at the same time, optimal self-
insurance and self-protection increase with greater ambiguity aversion. Furthermore, the
author states that ”higher self-protection and self-insurance levels induce mean-preserving
contractions in the distribution of expected utility that are valuable to ambiguity-averse
decision-makers”, see Snow [2010], page 39. Huang [2012] considers a self-insurance and
self-protection model under ambiguity with KMM-preferences. The novelty of Huang’s
contribution consists in contemplating non-monetary costs of effort, higher order risk-
preferences, and ambiguous target distributions assuming a wealth distribution defined
on a compact support. The author concludes that ambiguity aversion entails higher effort
levels whenever the individual can shift the initial wealth distribution towards a ”pre-
ferred target distribution”. Alary et al. [2013] examine a generalized version of the model
in Snow [2011] with more than two states of the world and, using a willingness to pay
approach, derive conditions under which ambiguity aversion increases the incentive to
insure and self-insure but decreases the incentive to self-protect.4 Robert and Therond
[2014] use a theoretical approach by linking Yaari’s dual approach, compare Yaari [1987],
4See Alary et al. [2013], page 18.
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and ambiguity aversion with optimal prevention. The authors consider the so-called class
of concave distortion risk measures and conclude that the willingness to pay for a risk
reduction is always higher for a more ambiguity-averse decision-maker but not necessarily
for a more risk-averse decision-maker.5 Moreover, ambiguity-averse decision-makers exert
less preventive effort when ambiguity refers to a less risky distribution.5 Berger [2014]
considers a two-period model with a recursive KMM approach,6 where a decision-maker
invests in prevention in the first period in order to improve the final wealth distribution
or to influence the probability of being in an ambiguous state of the world in the second
period.7 The author concludes that the effect of ambiguity on self-protection cannot be
signed. In order to give a sufficient condition for ambiguity to increase the demand for
self-protection, Berger [2014] introduces a concept called ”ambiguity prudence attitude”,
or ”decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion”, linking the problem of self-protection under
ambiguity to the concept of prudence, which was until now only considered in the risk
case.8
In contrast to the existing literature on self-protection, I study preventive behavior in the
health domain, and more specifically in the context of primary prevention. The aim of
this research is to analyze how learning affects self-protection when patients ignore the
relationship between effort and disease probabilities. Until now, there is, to my knowl-
edge, no article combining learning, Ehrlich and Becker’s notion of self-protection, and
primary prevention when decision-makers face Knightian Uncertainty.
This paper is organized as follows: In the next section, I give a detailed description of
the model setup. The third section analyzes the impact of optimism and confidence
on optimal self-protection. Section 4 examines the impact of additional information on
preventive activities. Finally, section 5 describes my conclusions.
5Compare Robert and Therond [2014], page 11.
6See Klibanoff et al. [2009].
7Compare Berger [2014], page 4.
8Eeckhoudt and Gollier [2005] link prevention to prudence and find that prudence tends to reduce
prevention.
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3.2 Model
To begin with, suppose that there are two time points t = 0, 1 and a patient whose
state-contingent Bernoulli utility u : X → R is defined on the set X = R× Ω. The state
space Ω ⊂ R consists of two states of the world, Ω = {h1, h2} where w.l.o.g. h1 ≤ h2.
The state h1 refers to a situation where the patient contracts an illness, while h2 refers
to a situation where the patient remains healthy at t = 1. Each element x ∈ X is a
combination x = (w, hi) where w denotes the patient’s wealth level and hi denotes the
patient’s health status at time t = 1. As a next step, I make the following assumptions
with respect to patients’ utility function.9
Assumption 4. Patients’ Bernoulli utility satisfies the following conditions:
(A1) u is twice continuously differentiable
(A2) u is strictly increasing in wealth, in formal terms uw > 0
(A3) u is concave with respect to w, formally uww ≤ 0
Assumption (A1) is a purely technical assumption. (A2) asserts that patients prefer more
money to less money in both health states. Requirement (A3) is an assumption on risk-
preferences and presumes that patients are either risk-averse or risk-neutral.
Patients’ wealth in the bad state of the world is denoted by W1(V ), and by W2(V ) in the
good state. Wealth is effort-dependent, with the following requirements.
Assumption 5. Patients’ wealth functions satisfy the following conditions:
(W1) Both wealth functions Wi(V ) are twice continuously differentiable in V .
(W2) Wealth is decreasing in effort W
′
i (V ) < 0 for i = 1, 2.
9Please note that uw denotes the partial derivative of u with respect to the wealth level w. Similarly,
uww denotes the second order partial derivative of u with respect to w.
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Requirement (W1) is purely technical. Assumption (W2) reflects the fact that effort is
costly. Imagine for instance the case where a patient follows a regular workout program
to prevent obesity. A higher level of effort can be interpreted as additional time spent
in sporting activities every week. This is costly due to time spent, entry fees for health
centers, additional transportation costs, expenses for sporting equipment, etc.
As a next step, I make the assumption that there is a twice continuously differentiable and
convex function pireal : [0, 1] → [0, 1]. For each effort level V ∈ [0, 1] the value pireal(V )
denotes the objective probability that the patient contracts an illness at time t = 1.
Similarly, 1−pireal(V ) denotes the objective probability that the patient remains healthy
at time t = 1. Hence, pireal describes the true underlying relationship between effort
and disease probabilities. In this framework, pireal is unknown to patients for the reasons
pointed out in the introductory section of this paper. The term ”prevention” implies that
effort alters the likelihood of an event. Therefore, I assume that preventive effort alters the
true underlying patient-specific disease probability. More specifically, I assume that there
is scientific evidence demonstrating that there is a positive relationship between effort
and the probability of the ”bad state”, and that patients know that this relationship is
positive, but cannot exactly quantify the impact of effort on that probability.10 Formally,
patients know that the function pireal is decreasing in V . Patients’ a priori knowledge is
modeled by a set of preventive relationships
Φ ⊂
{
pi| pi : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]
}
with the following requirements:
Assumption 6. Patients’ preventive relationships pii ∈ Φ satisfy the following conditions:
(P1) Φ is finite and contains exactly n elements
(P2) pii is twice continuously differentiable for i = 1, ..., n.
10Without this assumption, the term prevention would not be justified, since it is not clear whether
the true underlying disease probability is positively affected by preventive activities.
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(P3) pii is strictly decreasing pi
′
i(V ) < 0
Requirement (P1) says that patients consider n disease probability possible for a given
effort level V ∈ [0, 1]. These are denoted by pii(V ) for i ∈ {1, ..., n}. Assumption (P2)
is purely technical. (P3) says that patients believe that a higher level of effort translates
into lower disease probabilities.
Remark 3.1. Henceforth, I implicitly assume that Assumptions 1,2, and 3 are satisfied
throughout this paper.
In the introductory section, I argued that patients face Knightian uncertainty with respect
to the true relationship between effort and disease probabilities. Hence, patients consider
each pii ∈ Φ as a possible realization of a random variable with unknown distribution.
This can be illustrated graphically by means of the so-called Machina triangle for a fixed
level of effort V and the special case of three realizations where
Φ(V ) :=
{
pi1(V ), pi2(V ), pi3(V )
}
.
Figure 3.3: Patients’ Beliefs in Case of Three Preventive Relationships
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Each point in the triangle represents a specific belief q(V ). Formally q(V ) is an element
of the simplex
∆(Φ(V )) :=
{
q(V ) = (q1(V ), q2(V ), q3(V ))
∣∣∣ qi(V ) ≥ 0 and 3∑
i=1
qi(V ) = 1
}
where qi(V ) denotes the probability that pii(V ) is the true underlying disease probability.
Under Knightian uncertainty, patients hold a subset of such beliefs. In the general case
with n possible preventive relationships, a belief takes the form q(V ) = (q1(V ), ..., qn(V )).
Throughout this paper, I assume that the belief q(V ) is independent of V . This implies
that there is a belief q = (q1, ..., qn) ∈ ∆(Φ) such that q = q(V ) for all V ∈ [0, 1]. This
assumption is less restrictive than it may seem at first glance. Patients’ effort is a choice
variable. If there were instances such that q(V1) 6= q(V2) for some V1, V2 ∈ [0, 1], one could
infer that patients’ beliefs regarding which of the mechanisms pii ∈ Φ describes the true
relationship between effort and disease probability depend on their choice of effort. Such
behavior seems implausible under the assumption that pireal is mostly based on external
factors which are either fixed, such as patients’ genetics, age, or gender, or not part of
the preventive program, such as patients’ job situation or place of residence.
One could argue that, even under Knightian Uncertainty, patients might still conform
to Savage’s [1954] subjective expected utility model.11 Thus, a prevention model with
purely subjective beliefs would be sufficient to account for the phenomenon of impre-
cise probabilistic knowledge. Contrary to this line of argument, Ellsberg’s [1961] findings
suggest that such an approach is severely problematic since a substantial share of decision-
makers facing ambiguity does indeed display preferences that contradict the existence of
a well-defined subjective belief. A decision-theoretic model which allows for deviations
from SEU and accounts for Ellsberg’s paradox is the so-called Choquet-expected utility
model, pioneered by Schmeidler [1989]. Patients conforming to the Choquet model make
decisions by maximizing a Choquet integral, which can be considered as a generalized
11An additional assumption to be made is that patients are able to reduce compound lotteries to
simple lotteries. See for instance Segal [1990], page 353 for a formal description of the reduction of
compound lotteries axiom.
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expectation for non-additive probability measures. In this paper, patients’ beliefs are
represented by a special class of capacities, termed neo-additive capacities.12 The follow-
ing definition of a neo-additive capacity is adopted from Eichberger et al. [2009], page
359:
Definition 3.1. Let q = (q1, ..., qn) be a probability measure on (Φ,Σ) where Σ denotes
a σ-algebra of events on Φ. Then, for real numbers α and δ one can define a neo-additive
capacity ν by ν(∅) = 0, ν(Φ) = 1, ν(A) = δα + (1− δ)q(A) where A ∈ Σ is a nonempty
and strict subset of Φ.
Subsequently, I presume that patients hold a neo-additive belief ν defined on Φ. In this
case, each patient’s objective function can be specified by evaluating a Choquet-integral13
with respect to a neo-additive capacity. A functional representation14 of such an integral
is given by
∫
Φ
fdν = (1− δ)Eq[f ] + δ
(
αmax{x : f−1(x) /∈ N}+ (1− α) min{x : f−1(x) /∈ N}
)
(3.1)
where f : Φ → R is a simple function,15 N = {A ∈ Σ : ν(A) = 0} denotes the col-
lection of null-events of the capacity ν, Eq[f ] denotes the expectation of f with respect
to the probability distribution q, max{x : f−1(x) /∈ N} is the set of those states of the
world that induce the highest possible value of f , or the best case of f , under the as-
sumption that each one of these states is not the realization of a null-event. Similarly,
min{x : f−1(x) /∈ N} denotes the set of those states of the world that induce the lowest
possible value of f , or the worst case of f , under the assumption that each one of these
states is not the realization of a null-event. This representation of the Choquet integral
has an intuitive interpretation. A decision-maker with a neo-additive belief compares the
expectation Eq[f ] with a combination of extreme outcomes, namely a convex combina-
tion of the best and worst case. The parameter δ is called the confidence parameter, and
12See Chateauneuf et al. [2007] for an axiomatization of neo-additive capacities.
13For more details, see Choquet [1955].
14See Lemma 3.1 by Chateauneuf et al. [2007], page 541.
15A simple function is measurable, real-valued function with a finite range, see Chateauneuf et al.
[2007], page 540.
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measures how strongly the decision-maker incorporates extreme cases into his evaluation.
The parameter α is called the optimism parameter, and captures the magnitude to which
decision-makers incorporate the worst case into the extreme-outcome part of their eval-
uation.
In order to derive a patient’s objective function, one needs to answer the question of how
the simple function f is defined in the context of health prevention. If patients knew the
underlying preventive relationship pireal, the optimization problem would be given by
max
V ∈[0,1]
pireal(V )u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− pireal(V )u(W2(V ), h2).
This is the standard expected utility case with effort-dependent disease probabilities and
wealth functions. Under Knightian uncertainty, pireal is unknown. Hence, patients ignore
whether they maximize an expected utility with respect to the relationship pii ∈ Φ, or
whether they maximize an expected utility with respect to pij ∈ Φ where i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}
and i 6= j. This observation provides information on how the simple function f needs to
be defined. In the general case, f is a mapping from a state space Ω˜ to a finite set of
consequences X ⊂ R. This means f assigns to every possible state of the world a resulting
outcome for the decision-maker. In the context of the prevention model, the states are
given by the preventive relationship pii ∈ Φ. The consequences are effort-dependent
expected utilities
X(V ) :=
{
pii(V )u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− pii(V ))u(W2(V ), h2) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n
}
.
Hence, one obtains for each fixed V ∈ [0, 1] the simple function
f(pii|V ) = pii(V )u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− pii(V ))u(W2(V ), h2).
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Making use of the functional representation (3.1), one obtains the objective function:
U(V |α, δ) :=
∫
Φ
f(pii|V )dν = (1− δ) Eq[f(·|V )] + δ
{
αZmax(V ) + (1−α)Zmin(V )
}
(3.2)
where
Zmax(V ) := max
pii∈Φ
{
pii(V )u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− pii(V ))u(W2(V ), h2)
}
Zmin(V ) := min
pii∈Φ
{
pii(V ) u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− pii(V )) u(W2(V ), h2)
} (3.3)
and Eq[f(·|V )] denotes the expectation
n∑
i=1
qif(pii |V ).
The patient’s optimization problem is given by
max
V ∈[0,1]
U(V |α, δ).
The following corollary gives an alternative representation of the objective function U .
Corollary 3.1. The objective function can be expressed in the form
U(V |α, δ) = piCEU(V |α, δ) u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− piCEU(V |α, δ)) u(W2(V ), h2) (3.4)
where
piCEU(V |α, δ) = (1− δ)piq(V ) + δ(αpimax(V ) + (1− α)pimin(V )) (3.5)
and
piq(V ) :=
n∑
i=1
qipii(V ),
pimax(V ) := arg max
pii∈Φ
{
pii(V )u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− pii(V ))u(W2(V ), h2)
}
,
pimin(V ) := arg min
pii∈Φ
{
pii(V ) u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− pii(V )) u(W2(V ), h2)
}
.
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Proof. The proof is contained in the appendix.
Corollary 3.1 says that patients’ objectives under Knightian uncertainty can be expressed
in expected utility form with respect to the distorted probability piCEU. The distortion
itself is a convex combination of an ”expected probability” and a combination of worst and
best-case probabilities. The following proposition gives an important technical property
of the objective function and the existence of a solution for the patient’s optimization
problem.
Proposition 3.1. The patient’s objective is continuous and the underlying optimization
problem has a solution.
Proof. The proof is contained in the appendix.
The objective is continuous but not necessarily continuously differentiable. This can be
seen by means of Example 3.5, which is contained in the appendix. The reason why the
objective is not differentiable in the previous example lies in the fact that the minimizing
preventive relationship changes from one preventive relationship to another preventive
relationship at a point Vˆ ∈ (0, 1). Such a change of the minimizer (or maximizer) can
occur when there are two preventive relationships pˆi1, pˆi2 ∈ Φ such that pˆi1 crosses pˆi2 from
above, or from below, at some point Vˆ ∈ (0, 1). In this case, one calls Vˆ a crossing point.
Subsequently, I give a formal definition of the term crossing point.
Definition 3.2. Consider two real-valued functions fi : D → R for i = 1, 2 where
D ⊆ Rn. A point xˆ ∈ D is called a crossing point if there is δ > 0 such that f1(xˆ) = f2(xˆ),
f1(x) < f2(x) for x ∈ (xˆ− δ, xˆ) and f1(x) > f2(x) for x ∈ (, xˆ, xˆ+ δ).
So far, I have identified crossing points of functions in Φ as possible sources for points
where the objective is not differentiable. A second source for crossing points can emerge in
the context of the utility functions u(W1(V ), h1) and u(W2(V ), h2). Again, the objective
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is not necessarily differentiable at such crossing points. This is demonstrated by means
of Example 3.6, which is also contained in the appendix.
Examples 3.5 and 3.6 demonstrate that crossing points are a possible source for points
where the objective function is not differentiable. Henceforth, Cprob denotes the set of
crossing points of functions in Φ and Cutility denotes the set of crossing points of the two
utilities u(W1(V ), h1) and u(W2(V ), h2) on [0, 1]. These sets can be defined formally as
follows:
Cprob :=
{
Vˆ ∈ [0, 1] : ∃ i, j ∈ 1, ..., n s.t. Vˆ is a crossing point of pii and pij
}
Cutility :=
{
Vˆ ∈ [0, 1] : Vˆ is a crossing point of u(W1(V ), h1) and u(W2(V ), h2)
}
The following proposition gives conditions under which differential calculus can be used
to analyze the patient’s optimization problem.
Proposition 3.2. The patient’s objective function is twice continuously differentiable
when there are no crossing points, formally Cprob = Cutility = ∅. The objective is at least
piecewise differentiable when both Cprob and Cutility are finite.
Proof. The proof is contained in the appendix.
The condition Cprob = ∅ ensures that the preventive relationships in Φ can be ordered in
a strict sense. This excludes the possibility that a preventive relationship pii ∈ Φ yields a
higher disease probability for a certain effort value V1 ∈ [0, 1] than another relationship
pij, and a lower disease probability than pij for a different effort value V2 ∈ [0, 1]\{V1}.
The condition Cutility = ∅ ensures that for every V ∈ [0, 1] the utility in one state of the
world is always larger than in the other state of the world. Assume for instance the case
u(W1(V ), h1) < u(W2(V ), h2).
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In this scenario, patients prefer to be healthy than to contract the illness irrespective of
the effort level chosen.
Let V ∗ denote the set of solutions of the patient’s optimization problem. If V ∗ is a
singleton, one can differentiate between three different cases:
(1) Corner solution 1: No prevention is optimal.
(2) Corner solution 2: Maximum prevention is optimal.
(3) Interior solution: Partial prevention is optimal.
The following proposition gives conditions under which the objective is strictly concave.
Proposition 3.3 (Strict Concavity). The objective function U is strictly concave if the
following conditions are satisfied:
(SC1) Cprob = Cutility = ∅
(SC2) u(W1(V ), h1) < u(W2(V ), h2) for all V ∈ [0, 1]
(SC3) piCEU is strictly convex
(SC4) Both wealth functions Wi for i = 1, 2 are concave W
′′
i (V ) ≤ 0.
(SC5) The inequality
W ′1(V )u
′(W1(V ), h1)−W ′2(V )u′(W2(V ), h2) ≥ 0 (3.6)
holds for all V ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. The proof is contained in the appendix.
Remark 3.2. Requirement (SC3) is satisfied if every pii ∈ Φ is convex and there is at
least one pij ∈ Φ that is strictly convex.
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Remark 3.3. The statement of Proposition 3.3 remains true if the Assumptions (SC3)
and (SC4) are replaced by the following set of requirements: (S˜C3) piCEU is convex, (S˜C4)
both wealth functions Wi are concave Wi ≤ 0, and at least one wealth function is strictly
concave.
Requirement (SC1) excludes crossing points and ensures therefore that the objective is
twice continuously differentiable. Assumption (SC2) says that, irrespective of the effort
level selected, patients always have a lower utility when they contract a disease than
in a situation where they remain healthy. (SC3) and (SC4) are technical requirements.
Condition (SC5) can be expressed as
∂u1
∂V
∂u2
∂V
≤ 1
where u1(V ) = u(W1(V ), h1) is patients’ utility in the bad health state and u2(V ) =
u(W1(V ), h1) denotes patients’ utility in the good state. This representation has the fol-
lowing interpretation: on the left hand side is the marginal rate of substitution for more
prevention in the bad versus the good health state. Hence, (SC5) implies that patients
would at least weakly prefer to exchange an additional unit of prevention in the bad
health state for an additional unit of prevention in the good health state. The condition
is automatically fulfilled if one of the marginal utilities ∂ui
∂V
is positive and the other neg-
ative.
The assumptions of Proposition 3.3 guarantee that there is either a unique interior maxi-
mizer or no interior maximizer. When there is no interior maximizer, the global optimum
can be found at the boundary of the interval [0, 1]. The following proposition gives addi-
tional conditions under which no prevention or maximum prevention are feasible corner
solutions.
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Proposition 3.4 (Corner Solutions). Let the patient’s objective function U be strictly
concave. Consider the following requirements:
(CS1) limV→0+ ∂∂V U(V |α, δ) < 0
(CS2) limV→1− ∂∂V U(V |α, δ) < 0.
Requirement (CS1) guarantees that V
∗ = 0 is a local maximizer. Condition (CS2) makes
sure that V ∗ = 1 is a local maximizer. If the first order condition has no solution, either
V ∗ = 0 or V ∗ = 1 is the global maximizer. Moreover, there is either no corner solution
or exactly one corner solution but there are never two corner solutions.
Proof. The proof is contained in the appendix.
3.3 Comparative Statics
In this section, I conduct a comparative static analysis for the prevention model presented
in the previous section. This section is divided into two main parts. In the first part,
I address the question of how preventive activities relate to the pessimism parameter α.
It turns out that there is no clear-cut answer to this question, since the overall effect of
pessimism on preventive effort depends on two concurrent effects, which will be explained
in detail by means of simple numerical examples. As a next step, I treat the general case
by looking at the overall effect of an increase in optimism on prevention. Subsequently,
I give some general conditions under which the effect of pessimism can be clearly signed.
In the second part, I relate the confidence parameter δ to preventive activities. It turns
out that the comparative static analysis for the confidence parameter can be conducted
in analogy to the case of the pessimism parameter α. Again, there are two concurrent
effects at work, which entail a variety of different cases to be considered.
For technical reasons, I make the following set of assumptions throughout the rest of the
paper.
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Assumption 7. Patients’ objectives satisfies the following requirements:
(CPS1) The are no crossing points Cutility = Cprob = ∅ .
(CPS2) Patients’ utility in the good state is always higher than in the bad state irre-
spective of the effort level V [0, 1] chosen. In formal terms,
u(W2(V ), h2)− u(W1(V ), h1) > 0.
(CPS3) Patients’ optimization problem has a unique solution.
Remark 3.4. Both the first and the second condition correspond to the Requirements
(SC1) and (SC2) of Proposition 3.3. The last condition is imposed for technical reasons
to simplify the analysis of the problem. Note that (CPS3) becomes devoid of purpose
if one assumes that the objective is strictly concave. Following Proposition 3.3, this
can be achieved by implementing Requirements (SC3) to (SC5). Condition (CPS3) is
less restrictive than the Requirements (SC3) to (SC5) taken together, since a unique
maximizer cannot be ruled out when the strict concavity conditions are violated.
As a direct consequence of Assumption 7, we can use differential calculus; there is either a
unique interior maximizer or a unique corner solution. Henceforth, let V ∗(α, δ) be defined
as the solution of the patient’s optimization problem given the parameter constellation
(α, δ):
V ∗(α, δ) := arg max
V ∈[0,1]
{
piCEU(V |α, δ) u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− piCEU(V |α, δ)) u(W2(V ), h2)
}
.
Notation 3.1. Throughout this section, I condense the notation slightly, writing V ∗
instead of V ∗(α, δ) and U instead of U = U(V ∗) if not otherwise specified.
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Pessimism and Preventive Activities
In this subsection, I analyze the effect of optimism on preventive activities. Assume for
now that V ∗ is a unique interior solution. In this case, one can use the implicit function
theorem to analyze the problem. It is
dV ∗
dα
= −
∂2U
∂α∂V
∂2U
∂V 2
. (3.7)
As the objective is assumed to be strictly concave, one can infer that the denominator of
the α-derivative of V ∗ is negative and that the overall sign of (3.7) is determined by the
sign of
∂2U
∂α∂V
= ∆u
d2
dαdV
piCEU +
(
d
dV
∆u
)
d
dα
piCEU
where
∆u := u(W1(V
∗), h1)− u(W2(V ∗), h2).
Hence, the sign of (3.7) depends on the two determinants, ∆1 and ∆2, which are defined
by
∆1 := ∆u
d2
dα dV
piCEU and ∆2 :=
(
d
dV
∆u
)
d
dα
piCEU.
∆1 is termed perceived efficacy effect, and ∆2 is denoted as expected marginal utility effect.
As a next step, I discuss both influencing factors ∆1 and ∆2 in detail, starting with ∆1.
Perceived Efficacy Effect
Note that ∆1 can be positive, negative or zero. This is demonstrated by means of the
following example, which considers three scenarios where ∆1 is considered in isolation.
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This is done by selecting utilities u(W1(V ), h1) and u(W2(V ), h2) with the same marginals
for every possible effort level V ∈ [0, 1].
Example 3.1. Throughout this example, I specify the utilities by
u(W1(V ), h1) = 8− 2V 2 and u(W2(V ), h2) = 12− 2V 2.
Moreover, the confidence parameter is given by δ = 1
2
, and the prior q = (q1, q2) is
defined by q1 = q2 =
1
2
. I compare three scenarios. In each scenario, a specific set of
belief functions Φi is defined, and patients exhibit either extreme optimism α = 1 or
extreme pessimism α = 0.
Scenario I
The first scenario shows that there are instances where a higher degree of pessimism
yields a higher degree of preventive activities. Let Φ1 = {pi1, pi2} where pi1(V ) = 1− 715V
and pi2(V ) =
1
2
− 2
16
V . Figure 3.4 displays the respective objectives in one diagram.
Evidently, patients exert a higher level of effort in cases of extreme pessimism. Hence,
Figure 3.4: Pessimism Increases Preventive Activities
there are specifications where pessimism increases preventive activities.
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Scenario II
The following scenario provides the opposite statement. Let Φ2 = {pi3, pi4} where pi3(V ) =
1 − 2
15
V and pi4(V ) =
1
2
− 7
15
V .16 Figure 3.5 represents the respective objectives under
extreme pessimism and extreme optimism.
Figure 3.5: Pessimism Decreases Preventive Activities
Clearly, patients exert a lower level of effort in cases of extreme pessimism for this model
specification. Hence, there are instances where pessimism decreases preventive activities.
Scenario III
The last scenario provides a specification where pessimism has no influence on patients’
preventive activities. Let Φ3 = {pi5, pi6} where pi5(V ) = 1 − 715V and pi6(V ) = 12 −
7
15
V . Figure 3.6 displays the objectives for the case of extreme pessimism and extreme
optimism. Obviously, extreme pessimism and extreme optimism yield the same preventive
activities.
In order to provide an explanation for the results of Example 3.1, a more profound analysis
of the problem is required. Note that the Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 of the model framework
are satisfied. Besides, there are no crossing points Cutility = Cprob = ∅. The only difference
lies in the set of preventive relationships Φi for = 1, 2, 3. Since ∆u is strictly negative
16Note that pi3 has the same intercept as pi1, and pi2 has the same intercept as pi4. Besides, the slope
of pi3 corresponds to the slope of pi2, and the slope of pi4 corresponds to the slope of pi1.
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Figure 3.6: Pessimism Does Not Affect Preventive Activities
by Assumption (CPS2), we can infer that pimin is given by pi1 in the first, by pi3 in the
second, and by pi5 in the third part of the example. Similarly, pimax is given by pi2 in the
first part of the example, by pi4 in the second part of the example, and by pi6 in the last
part.
An obvious distinguishing feature between the three model specifications emerges when
comparing the slopes of pimin and pimax on a case-by-case basis. Figure 3.7 gives a graphical
representation for the functions in Φ1, Φ2 and Φ3.
(a) Pessimism Leads to More Prevention (b) Pessimism Leads to Less Prevention
(c) Pessimism has no Effect on Prevention
Figure 3.7: Perceived Efficacy Effect
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In the first part of the example, pimin decreases more sharply than pimax for every effort
level V ∈ [0, 1]. In the second part, this relationship is reversed, whereas in the last
part both pimin and pimax have identical slopes. How can we interpret the fact that pimin
decreases more sharply than pimax? For every marginal increase in effort invested in
the preventive measure, the marginal reduction of patients’ perceived disease probability
is larger in the pessimistic case than in the optimistic one. This observation can be
formalized by means of the following definition.
Definition 3.3. Let pi and pˆi denote two differentiable preventive relationships. The
relationship pi is termed more effective than the relationship pˆi if and only if
∣∣∣pi′(V )| > ∣∣∣pˆi′(V )∣∣∣ for all V ∈ [0, 1].
Remember, ∆2 is zero in Example 3.1 since both utilities u(W1(V ), h1) and u(W2(V ), h2)
have identical slopes. Hence, the overall effect of optimism on preventive activities de-
pends on the sign of
d2
dαdV
piCEU(V0|α, δ) (3.8)
only. The derivative (3.8) describes how patients’ perceived effectiveness of the preventive
measure changes as they become more optimistic. In the first scenario, patients’ perceived
effectiveness of the preventive measure decreases with increasing optimism. As a result,
pessimists deem the preventive measure more effective than optimists irrespective of the
effort level chosen. In the second scenario, this relationship is reversed. Hence, optimists
consider the preventive measure more effective than pessimists. Finally, in the third
scenario, patients’ perceived effectiveness is independent of the pessimism parameter α.
As a consequence, optimists and pessimists consider the preventive measure as equally
effective for all possible effort constellations.
The following proposition illustrates more clearly how patients’ perceived effectiveness
and preventive activities are interrelated.
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Proposition 3.5 (Effectiveness and Prevention). Let pi and pˆi be two differentiable pre-
ventive relationships. Moreover, define
V pi := arg max
V ∈[0,1]
pi(V )u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− pi(V ))u(W2(V ), h2) (3.9)
and
V pˆi := arg max
V ∈[0,1]
pˆi(V )u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− pˆi(V ))u(W2(V ), h2). (3.10)
It is V pˆi ≥ V pi if the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) pˆi is more effective than pi.
(2) pˆi(V ) ≥ pi(V ) for all V ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. The proof is contained in the appendix.
Remark 3.5. Proposition 3.5 examines how preventive activities react when the underly-
ing distorted probability pi is replaced by a more effective distorted probability pˆi. It turns
out that prevention increases weakly if pˆi entails a higher perceived disease probability
for every V ∈ [0, 1].
Expected Marginal Utility Effect
In this section, the expected marginal utility effect ∆2 is analyzed. First of all, note that
∆2 can be rewritten in the following way:
∆2 =
d
dα
EpiCEU
[
d
dV
u
]
(3.11)
where EpiCEU denotes an expectation operator with respect to the distorted probability
piCEU. Thus, ∆2 describes how patients’ expected marginal utility changes α as they
become more optimistic. Like in the case of the perceived efficacy effect, ∆2 can be
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positive, negative or zero. This is proved by means of the following numerical example.
Note that the case where ∆2 equals zero has been implicitly treated in Example 3.1.
Therefore, it is sufficient to cover only cases where ∆2 is either strictly positive or strictly
negative.
Example 3.2. Throughout this example, I define the set of beliefs by Φ4 = {pi7, pi8}
where pi7(V ) = 1 − 615V and pi8(V ) = 12 − 615V . The confidence parameter is given by
δ = 1 and the prior q = (q1, q2) by q1 = q2 =
1
2
. I compare two scenarios. In each scenario,
a pair of utilities u(W1(V ), h1) and u(W2(V ), h2) is defined. Moreover, I contrast extreme
pessimism α = 0 with extreme optimism α = 1 in each scenario.
Scenario I
The first scenario provides a model specification where ∆2 is strictly positive. The utilities
are specified by u(W1(V ), h1) = 10−8V 3 and u(W2(V ), h2) = 20−2V 3. Figure 3.8 displays
the patient’s objective for the case of extreme pessimism α = 0 and extreme optimism
α = 1.
Figure 3.8: Less Prevention Under Pessimism
Figure 3.8 shows that, given the model specification above, patients’ preventive activities
are lower under extreme pessimism than under extreme optimism.
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Scenario II
The following model specification provides the converse result. As a consequence, ∆2 is
strictly negative. Let the utilities be defined by
u(W1(V ), h1) = 10− 2V 3 and u(W2(V ), h2) = 20− 8V 3.
Figure 3.9 represents patients’ objective functions under extreme pessimism and extreme
optimism.
Figure 3.9: More Prevention Under Pessimism
Obviously, patients exert more effort under extreme pessimism than under extreme opti-
mism.
The findings of Example 3.2 can be explained in the following way: Since the set of belief
functions is the same in both scenarios, we can conclude that ∆1 equals zero in both
model specifications. Consequently, pessimists and optimists have the same perceived
effectiveness of the preventive regime for every possible effort level V ∈ [0, 1]. As a
result, the overall effect of α on prevention depends on the sign of ∆2 only. Increasing
optimism leads to decreasing preventive activities when the expected marginal utility
from prevention is lower under optimism than under pessimism. But when is that the
Chapter 3. Primary Prevention Under Ambiguity 108
case? Obviously, the sign of ∆2 is determined by the sign of
−∆′u :=
d
dV
(u(W2(V ), h2)− u(W1(V ), h1))
=W ′2(V )u
′(W2(V ), h2)−W ′1(V )u′(W1(V ), h1)
Note that −∆′u ≤ 0 if and only if Condition (SC5) is satisfied. Remember, (SC5) can be
expressed in a marginal rate of substitution form
∂u1
∂V
∂u2
∂V
≤ 1.
Hence, optimism decreases preventive activities as long as patients prefer to exchange
a marginal unit of prevention in the bad state with a marginal unit of prevention in the
good health state. The converse statement is true when patients prefer an additional
marginal unit of prevention in the bad state. In other words, ∆2 is negative when a
marginal increase in prevention is better in the good health state. To be more precise,
patients’ utility in the good state increases more strongly than in the bad state when
prevention is beneficial, and decreases less strongly than in the bad state when prevention
is detrimental. This is exactly the case in the second part of Example 3.2.
Overall Effect of Pessimism on Prevention
The effect of pessimism on preventive activities is driven by two concurrent effects. The
perceived efficacy effect describes how patients’ perception of the efficacy of the preventive
regime changes as α increases. Three different cases can occur, depending on whether
a pessimistic patient deems a preventive measure more, less, or equally effective than a
more optimistic patient. The expected marginal utility effect comes into being because
an increase in α reduces the impact of patients’ expected marginal utility on preventive
activities. Again, three cases are possible depending on the constellation of patients’
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marginal utilities in the good and the bad health state. The overall effect of pessimism
on prevention can be clearly identified when both ∆1 and ∆2 have the same sign, or
when at least one of the two effects is zero. The effect cannot be clearly signed when
∆1 and ∆2 have opposite signs. This is the case when ∆1 > 0 and ∆2 < 0, or when
∆1 < 0 and ∆2 > 0. In both cases, the overall effect is determined by the magnitude of
each individual effect. As a consequence, three scenarios can materialize: |∆1| > |∆2|,
|∆1| < |∆2| and |∆1| = |∆2|
In the first scenario, the perceived efficacy effect dominates the expected marginal utility
effect. Whether optimism increases or decreases prevention depends on the sign of ∆1. In
the second scenario, the expected marginal utility effect dominates the perceived efficacy
effect. As a result, prevention increases when ∆2 is positive, prevention decreases when
∆2 is negative, and prevention remains stable when ∆2 is zero. Finally, in the third
scenario, both effects have the same magnitude. Consequently, optimism does not affect
preventive activities.
In the following, I give a set of conditions under which an increase in α can be clearly
signed. First of all, remember that under strict concavity, which is ensured by the Con-
ditions (SC1) to (SC5) of Proposition 3.3, we can infer that the expected marginal utility
effect is non-positive.17 As a consequence, we can conclude that the overall effect of
optimism on prevention is negative when the perceived efficacy effect ∆1 is negative or
zero.
Corollary 3.2. The perceived efficacy effect is negative or zero ∆1 ≤ 0 when the worst-
case relationship pimin is more effective than the best-case relationship pimax.
Proof. The proof is contained in the appendix.
Remark 3.6. The slope ordering condition between pimin and pimax says that patients
whose beliefs reflect a higher probability of disease perceive the preventive measure as
more effective than those who base their decision on a lower perceived disease probability.
17This is implied by Condition (SC5).
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Remark 3.7. ∆1 can be zero even if δ > 0 due to the possibility of corner solutions.
The following proposition summarizes how optimism relates to preventive activities when
the strict concavity conditions of Proposition 3.3 are imposed and the best- and worst-case
preventive relationships can be ranked by their effectiveness.
Proposition 3.6 (Optimism). Let V ∗(α, δ) be an interior solution. Under the Assump-
tions (SC1) to (SC5), the following comparative static results hold with respect to α:
(a) In cases of full confidence δ = 0, a marginal increase in α has no effect on prevention.
(b) If patients give a positive weight δ > 0 to extreme outcomes, the sign of the overall
effect depends on the effectiveness ranking between pimin and pimax. When pimin is
more effective than pimax, patients decrease preventive activities. In cases where
pimax is more effective than pimin, the overall effect depends on the magnitude of ∆1
and ∆2. If the perceived efficacy effect ∆1 is stronger than the expected marginal
utility effect ∆2, we can conclude that optimism increases prevention. The converse
is true when the expected marginal utility effect dominates the perceived efficacy
effect. When both effects have the same magnitude, it can be demonstrated that
optimism does not affect preventive activities.
Remark 3.8. Preventive activities decrease in case of an interior solution if pimin is more
effective than pimax. In case of the corner solution V
∗ = 0, there is no effect on optimal
prevention. If V ∗ = 1, preventive activities either remain the same or decrease.
Confidence and Preventive Activities
In this section, I examine the relationship between confidence and preventive activities. It
turns out that the analysis in this paragraph can be performed in analogy to the analysis
of the optimism parameter α. If V ∗ is an interior solution, we obtain
dV ∗
dδ
= −
∂2U
∂δ∂V
∂2U
∂V 2
(3.12)
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where ∂
2U
∂V 2
is strictly negative. Hence, whether confidence increases or decreases preventive
activities depends on the sign of
∂2U
∂δ ∂V
= ∆u
∂2
∂δ ∂V
piCEU +
(
d
dV
∆u
)
∂
∂δ
piCEU.
One can see that the overall effect depends on two concurrent factors, ∆3 and ∆4, which
are defined by
∆3 := ∆u
∂2
∂δ ∂V
piCEU and ∆4 :=
(
d
dV
∆u
)
∂
∂δ
piCEU.
In analogy to the comparative static section on the pessimism parameter α, I denote ∆3
as δ-perceived efficacy effect and ∆4 as δ-expected marginal utility effect. In the following,
both effects are analyzed in detail.
δ-Perceived Efficacy Effect
The δ-perceived efficacy effect describes how patients adjust their perception of the pre-
ventive regime’s effectiveness as they become less confident in the reference probability
piq. An increase in δ leads patients to give a higher weight to extreme outcomes and a
lower weight to the reference belief piq. This means patients become less confident that
the reference function describes the true underlying preventive relationship. Whether ∆1
is positive, negative, or zero depends on the effectiveness ranking between the reference
function piq and the extreme-outcome combination
piα := αpimin + (1− α)pimax.
This is illustrated numerically by means of Example 3.7 in the appendix, where ∆3
is contemplated in isolation. The following corollary more closely examines how the
effectiveness ranking between piq and piα and the sign of ∆3 are interrelated.
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Corollary 3.3. Let V ∗(α, δ) be an interior solution. ∆3 is positive if piα is more effective
than piq. ∆3 is negative if piq is more effective than piα, and zero if piα = piq.
Proof. The proof is contained in the appendix.
Remark 3.9. Corollary 3.3 extends in the following way to the case of corner solutions:
In a case where patients exert zero prevention, we can conclude that ∆3 is non-negative
if piα is more effective than piq. ∆3 is zero if piq is more effective than piα. In cases where
patients exert maximum effort, we can infer that ∆3 is non-positive if piq is more effective
than piα. ∆3 equals zero if piq is less effective than piα.
An increase in δ can be interpreted as lowering confidence in the reference probability piq.
As a consequence, the underlying prevention function piCEU(α, δ) shifts towards another
prevention function pˆiCEU(α, δ
′) that gives larger weight to the extreme-outcome part piα.
This implies that the overall effect on prevention depends on the effectiveness ordering
between piq and piα. If piα is more effective than piq, we can conclude that preventive
activities increase or remain the same as δ increases. This is because the patient gives
a higher weight to the more effective part of his belief functional. The converse is true
when the effectiveness ordering between piq and piα is reversed.
δ-Expected Marginal Utility Effect
The δ-expected marginal utility effect ∆4 can be rewritten in the form
∆4 =
d
dδ
piCEU ·∆′u =
d
dδ
EpiCEU
[
d
dV
u
]
(3.13)
where EpiCEU denotes the expectation with respect to the distorted probability piCEU,
and d
dV
u denotes patients’ marginal utility in the different health states. ∆4 describes
how patients’ expected marginal utility is affected as their beliefs give a larger weight
to the extreme-outcome combination piα. In the following, I analyze this effect in detail.
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Note that ∆4 can be positive, negative, or zero. The overall sign of ∆4 depends on the
individual signs of d
dδ
piCEU and ∆
′
u. Note that ∆4 is only zero when at least one of the
following conditions holds:
(a) piq = piα
(b) Both utilities u(W1(V ), h1) and u(W2(V ), h2) have the same marginal utility.
Scenario (a) corresponds to a situation where patients hold a subjective belief. In this
context, the objective is independent of α and δ. Consequently, δ has no effect on pre-
ventive activities. In scenario (b), patients’ marginal utilities are the same in both health
states. Hence, patients’ expected marginal utility is a constant and therefore independent
of piCEU.
The derivative
d
dδ
piCEU = −piq + αpimax + (1− α)pimin
is positive when the reference probability piq induces a lower perceived disease probability
than the extreme-outcome combination piα. This is the case when patients are sufficiently
pessimistic. To be more precise, let αˆ(V ) denote the pessimism parameter for which both
the reference probability and the extreme outcome combination yield the same perceived
disease probability for a fixed level of effort V ∈ [0, 1]. Then,
piq(V ) = αˆ(V )pi1(V ) + (1− αˆ(V ))pin(V ). (3.14)
Solving equation (3.14) for αˆ(V ), we obtain
αˆ(V ) =
piq(V )− pin(V )
pi1(V )− pin(V ) .
Hence, the disease probability induced by piq is smaller than the disease probability in-
duced by piα for α < αˆ(V ). The converse is true when piq features a higher perceived dis-
ease probability than piα. This is when patients are sufficiently optimistic with α > αˆ(V ).
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The sign of ∆′u is discussed in the comparative static section on the parameter α. Re-
member, ∆′u is positive when patients prefer to exchange a marginal unit of prevention in
bad health with a marginal unit of prevention in good health. Conversely, ∆′u is negative
when patients would at least weakly prefer to exchange prevention in the good state with
prevention in the bad state. This proves the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4. ∆4 is negative if patients are either sufficiently pessimistic α < αˆ(V
∗) and
prefer to exchange prevention in the bad health state with prevention in the good health
state, or if they are sufficiently optimistic α > αˆ(V ∗) and prefer to exchange prevention in
the good health state with prevention in the bad health state. ∆4 is positive if patients are
either sufficiently pessimistic α < αˆ(V ∗) and prefer to exchange prevention in the good
state with prevention in the bad state, or if they are sufficiently optimistic α > αˆ(V ∗)
and prefer to exchange prevention in the bad state with prevention in good state.
Overall Effect of Confidence on Prevention
Clearly, whether confidence increases or decreases preventive activities depends on two
concurrent effects, the δ-perceived efficacy effect and the δ-expected marginal utility effect.
Similar to the analysis with respect to the pessimism parameter α, one can distinguish
different cases. When both effects are strictly positive, or at least one effect is positive and
the other effect is zero, we can conclude that the overall effect on prevention is positive.
When both effects are zero, the overall effect is zero. When both effects are negative, or
at least one effect is positive and the other negative, we can infer that the overall effect
is negative. When one of the effects is strictly positive and the other strictly negative,
the overall sign depends on the magnitude of each individual effect. When both effects
have the same magnitude, the overall effect is zero. When one effect outweighs the other
effect, the overall effect has the same sign as the effect with the larger magnitude.
In the following, I examine how preventive activities react to an increase in δ when the
objective function is strictly concave.
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Corollary 3.5. Under the Requirements (SC1) to (SC5), ∆4 is negative if patients are
sufficiently optimistic α > αˆ(V ∗), positive if patients are sufficiently pessimistic α <
αˆ(V ∗), and zero for the intermediate pessimism parameter α = αˆ(V ∗).
Proof. The proof is contained in the appendix.
As a next step, we can analyze the overall effect of confidence on prevention under the
assumption that piα and piq can be ranked according to their effectiveness.
Proposition 3.7 (Confidence). Let V ∗ be an interior solution. Moreover, piα and piq
can be ranked according to their effectiveness. Under the Requirements (SC1) to (SC5),
preventive activities react in the following way to marginal increases in δ.
(a) Prevention increases if both piα is more effective than piq and patients are sufficiently
pessimistic α < αˆ. For α = αˆ preventive activities remain unchanged. In cases of
strong enough optimism α > αˆ, the overall effect depends on the magnitude of ∆3
and ∆4. If the δ-perceived efficacy effect is stronger than the expected marginal
utility effect, we can conclude that an increase in δ entails intensified prevention.
The converse is true when the δ-expected marginal utility effect dominates the δ-
perceived efficacy effect. When both effects have the same magnitude, preventive
activities remain unchanged.
(b) Prevention decreases if both piα is less effective than piq and patients are sufficiently
optimistic α > αˆ. For α = αˆ preventive activities remain unchanged. In cases
of sufficient pessimism α < αˆ, the overall effect depends on the magnitude of ∆3
and ∆4. If the δ-perceived efficacy effect is stronger than the δ-expected marginal
utility effect, we can conclude that an increase in δ yields lower preventive activities.
The converse is true when the δ-expected marginal utility effect dominates the δ-
perceived efficacy effect. When both effects have the same magnitude, preventive
activities remain unchanged.
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Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of Corollaries 3.3 and 3.5.
In short, Proposition 3.7 says that the effect of confidence on preventive activities de-
pends on two factors. The first factor is the effectiveness ranking between the reference
probability piq and the extreme-outcome combination piα. The second factor is patients’
attitude towards ambiguity relative to αˆ.
3.4 Preventive Effort When Patients Receive New
Information
Modeling Information
This section studies how information on the underlying preventive regime affects patients’
preventive activities. Throughout the rest of the paper, I assume that the Conditions
(SC1) to (SC5) of Proposition 3.3 are satisfied. Hence, there is always a unique interior
maximizer or a unique corner solution. Information is modeled by means of signal s
conveyed by the physician. The signal is the realization of a random variable S with
values in {1, ..., n}. The index of the true underlying preventive relationship is denoted
by θ ∈ {1, ..., n}. Moreover, the patient knows the conditional distribution PS|θ of the
signal given θ. Henceforth, I denote with pij = P(S = i|θ = j) the conditional probability
that the physician conveys relationship i to be the true relationship given θ = j. In
addition, pij denotes the probability that the physician conveys the wrong relationship i
for i 6= j, and pii is the probability that the physician conveys a correct signal.
As a next step, patients’ beliefs are updated. In the special case δ = 0, the neo-additive
belief reduces to a purely Bayesian belief q = (q1, ..., qn), which is updated via Bayes’
Rule. Under the assumption that the patient observes the signal s = i, the posterior
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probability qBayesj of qj is given by
qBayesj =
qjpij
n∑
k=1
qk pik
(3.15)
Given the updated prior
qBayes = (qBayes1 , ..., q
Bayes
n )
patients maximize
piqBayes(V ) u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− piqBayes(V )) u(W2(V ), h2). (3.16)
In the general case δ ∈ [0, 1], patients revise a neo-additive belief. Contrary to the
Bayesian scenario, there are multiple ways to update non-additive probabilities. Eich-
berger et al. [2010] suggest three different ways of updating neo-additive capacities: an
optimistic updating rule, a pessimistic updating rule, also called a Dempster-Shafer up-
dating rule, and the so-called generalized Bayesian updating rule. All of these rules are
motivated by prominent updating rules for capacities discussed in the literature. By
Proposition 1, page 93 in Eichberger et al. [2010], one knows that, under each of these
rules, the update of a neo-additive capacity ν(α, δ) is still neo-additive with new optimism
and confidence parameters ν(α′, δ′), and a reference probability qBayes that corresponds
to the Bayesian update of the prior reference probability q.
In cases where patients resort to the optimistic updating rule, the parameter α is up-
dated to αO = 1. Under the pessimistic updating rule, patients revise α to αP = 0, and
under the generalized Bayesian updating rule α is not affected by the patient’s updating
process, hence αGB = α. The update of the confidence parameters depends on the signal
realization s. Assume that the patient observes the signal s = i. Then, the confidence
parameter δ is updated to
δO =
δα
(1− δ)qi + αδ
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in case of the optimistic updating rule. The confidence parameter under the pessimistic
updating rule is given by
δP =
δ(1− α)
(1− δ)qi + (1− α)δ .
Under the generalized Bayesian updating rule, we obtain the revised confidence parameter
δGB =
δ
(1− δ)qi + δ .
The following corollary characterizes patients’ objectives for each of the previously dis-
cussed updating rules.
Corollary 3.6. After observing the signal realization s, patients maximize the objective
piUCEU(V |·) u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− piUCEU(V |·)) u(W2(V ), h2)
where piUCEU(V |·) is a rule-dependent distorted probability. It is
piUCEU = (1− δO)piBayesq + δOpimax
in case of the optimistic updating rule. For the pessimistic updating rule, we obtain
piUCEU = (1− δP )piBayesq + δPpimin.
In cases where the generalized Bayesian updating rule applies, we have
piCEU = (1− δGB)piBayesq + δGBpiα.
Proof. The proof is contained in the appendix.
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Information and Preventive Activities
The following proposition compares patients holding a Bayesian belief δ = 0 with pa-
tients holding a Non-Bayesian belief 0 < δ ≤ 1 after observing the signal realization s.
Henceforth, I denote patients with δ = 0 as Bayesian patients and patients with δ > 0 as
Knightian or Non-Bayesian patients.
Proposition 3.8. Assume that there are two types of patients: a Bayesian patient with a
belief q and a Non-Bayesian patient holding a neo-additive belief with the same reference
belief q. Moreover, let V ∗ ∈ (0, 1) be an interior solution for the Bayesian patient.
(a) The Non-Bayesian patient exerts less effort than the Bayesian patient under the
optimistic updating rule if pimax is less effective than pi
Bayes
q .
(b) The Non-Bayesian patient exerts more effort than the Bayesian patient under the
pessimistic updating rule if pimin is more effective than pi
Bayes
q .
(c) The Non-Bayesian patient exerts less effort than the Bayesian patient under the gen-
eralized Bayesian updating rule if piBayesq is more effective than piα and pi
Bayes
q (V ) >
piα(V ) for all V ∈ [0, 1].
(d) The Non-Bayesian agent exerts more effort than the Bayesian patient under the
generalized Bayesian updating rule if piBayesq is less effective than piα and pi
Bayes
q (V ) <
piα(V ) for all V ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. The proof is contained in the appendix.
The results of Proposition 3.8 show that the underlying updating rule plays a crucial role
in explaining heterogeneous choices in preventive activities. If we consider the Bayesian
agent as a rational, representative patient, the Non-Bayesian patient’s behavior might be
regarded as a deviation from this representative patient. Depending on the underlying
updating rule, the Non-Bayesian agent’s choice might lead to more or fewer preventive
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activities compared to the prevention level selected by the Bayesian patient.
The proof of Proposition 3.8 is based on Proposition 3.5, which says that replacing the
distorted probability piCEU with a more effective distorted probability pˆiCEU leads to
intensified prevention if pˆiCEU exhibits a higher perceived disease probability than piCEU
for every possible effort level V ∈ [0, 1]. Due to the fact that the inequality
pimax(V ) ≤ piBayesq (V ) ≤ pimin(V )
holds for every V ∈ [0, 1], we can infer that the latter condition is satisfied for the
optimistic and pessimistic updating rule.18 In cases where the generalized updating rule
applies, piBayesq and pi
U
CEU can be ranked according to their disease probabilities when
there is a clear ranking between the extreme-outcome combination piα and the Bayesian
update piBayesq . Example 3.8 in the appendix demonstrates that there are instances where
such a clear ranking does not exist even when there are no crossing points Cprob = ∅.
This raises the question: under which conditions is a clear ordering between piq and piα
possible? The following corollary provides the answer.
Corollary 3.7. There is a maximum pessimism parameter αmin such that piq < piα for
all α < αmin. Furthermore, there is a minimal pessimism parameter αmax ≥ αmin such
that piq > piα for all α > αmax. There is no clear ordering between piq and piα when
α ∈ (αmin, αmax).
Proof. The proof is contained in the appendix.
In other words, piq always features a lower perceived disease probability than piα if patients
are sufficiently pessimistic, and piq always exhibits a higher perceived disease probability
than piα if patients are sufficiently optimistic. For intermediate values of the pessimism
parameter, there is no clear ordering between piα and piq.
18In particular, we have piBayesq (V ) > pi
U
CEU (V ) for all V ∈ [0, 1] in cases where the optimistic updating
rule applies and piBayesq (V ) < pi
U
CEU (V ) for all V ∈ [0, 1] in cases where the pessimistic updating rule
applies.
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Another interesting question related to the comparison between Bayesian and Knightian
patients is how the preventive gap between Bayesian and Non-Bayesian patients reacts
to the arrival of new information.
Definition 3.4. Let V old(α, δ) denote the solution of patients’ optimization problem
before observing the signal and let V new(α, δ) be the solution after observing the signal.
Information increases the gap between Bayesian and Non-Bayesian patients if
|V old(α, 0)− V old(α, δ)| < |V new(α, 0)− V new(α, δ)|.
Information decreases the gap between Bayesian and Non-Bayesian patients if
|V old(α, 0)− V old(α, δ)| > |V new(α, 0)− V new(α, δ)|.
The gap between Bayesian and Non-Bayesian patients is not affected by the arrival of
new information if
|V old(α, 0)− V old(α, δ)| = |V new(α, 0)− V new(α, δ)|.
Does the preventive gap between Bayesian and Non-Bayesian patients always decrease
as new information becomes available? The following numerical example shows that this
is not necessarily the case. In particular, one can find feasible model specifications such
that both an increase and a reduction of the preventive gap is possible.
Example 3.3. In the following, three preventive relationships are considered with
pi1(V ) = 1− 2
3
V, pi2(V ) =
1
2
− 1
4
V, and pi3(V ) =
1
4
− 1
8
V.
Obviously, pimin = pi1 and pimax = pi3. The utilities are defined by
u(W1(V ), h1) = 10− 2V 2 and u(W2(V ), h2) = 20− 2V 2.
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The conditional probabilities pij = P(S = i|θ = j) are specified by the stochastic matrix
P =

1
3
1
3
1
3
2
5
2
5
1
5
1
5
3
5
1
5
 .
The initial prior q = (q1, q2, q3) is given by q1 =
1
5
, q2 =
2
5
and q3 =
2
5
. Assuming that the
patient receives the signal s = 3, the Bayesian update qBayes of q is given by
qBayes1 =
1
25
1
25
+ 6
25
+ 2
25
=
1
9
qBayes2 =
6
25
1
25
+ 6
25
+ 2
25
=
2
3
qBayes3 =
2
25
1
25
+ 6
25
+ 2
25
=
2
9
.
As a next step, we can determine patients’ objectives in the Bayesian case δ = 0. Using
simple algebra, one can show that the objective function is given by
Uold1 (V ) = 15 +
17
6
V − 2V 2
before observing the signal. This is a quadratic function with the global maximizer
V old1 =
17
24
≈ 0.71. Similarly, one can show that the objective is given by
Unew1 (V ) = 15 +
145
54
V − 2V 2
after observing the signal with the maximizer V new1 =
145
216
≈ 0.67. For the Non-Bayesian
case, it is assumed that α = 1 and δ = 1
2
. Besides, the patient makes use of the generalized
Bayesian updating rule. Remember, under the generalized Bayesian updating rule the
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parameter α remains unchanged and δ is updated to
δGB =
δ
(1− δ)q3 + δ =
5
7
.
The objective function before observing the signal is given by
Uold2 (V ) =
65
4
+
49
24
V − 2V 2
with the global maximizer V old2 ≈ 0.51. After observing the signal, the objective is given
by
Unew2 (V ) =
235
14
+
1255
756
V − 2V 2
with the global maximizer V new2 ≈ 0.41. It is |V old1 −V old2 | ≈ 0.2 and |V new1 −V new2 | ≈ 0.26.
This demonstrates that
|V old1 − V old2 | < |V new1 − V new2 |.
Hence, there are instances where information increases the difference in preventive activ-
ities between Bayesian and Non-Bayesian patients.
The following model specification demonstrates the converse results. Let α = 0.75. The
patient observes again s = 3. The remaining parameters are the same as in the first
part of the example. Since the Bayesian objective is independent of α, we have the same
objective in the Bayesian case. The Non-Bayesian objective is given by
Uold3 (V ) =
245
16
+
87
32
− 2V 2
before observing the signal. The global maximizer is V old3 ≈ 0.68. After observing the
signal, one obtains the objective
Unew3 (V ) =
865
56
+
1135
432
V − 2V 2
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with the global maximizer V new3 ≈ 0.66. It is |V old1 −V old3 | ≈ 0.03 and |V new1 −V new3 | ≈ 0.01.
Consequently,
|V old1 − V old3 | > |V new1 − V new3 |.
Hence, there are instances where the gap between Bayesian and Non-Bayesian patients
decreases with the arrival of new information.
Example 3.3 is interesting because it demonstrates that Bayesian and Non-Bayesian
agents might react entirely differently to new information. Moreover, it becomes clear that
information can reinforce or attenuate extreme behavior, depending on the underlying
parameter constellations. Undoubtedly, extreme behavior is not a desirable consequence
of information campaigns or health counseling.
Excessive Preventive Behavior and Preventive Inertia
The previous section provides an outline on how Bayesian and Non-Bayesian agents react
to the arrival of new information by comparing their respective preventive activities.
Non-Bayesian agents deviate from Bayesian agents and exert lower or higher levels of
prevention. An issue of major importance is how strongly patients deviate from the true
underlying relationship piθ before and after observing the signal realization s. If patients
knew piθ, they would select effort by solving
max
V ∈[0,1]
piθ(V )u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− piθ(V ))u(W2(V )h2). (3.17)
In the following, V ∗θ denotes the solution of (3.17). By assumption, V
∗
θ is unique.
Definition 3.5. Let V ∗(α, δ) be the solution of patients’ optimization problem under
Knightian uncertainty. Patients exhibit excessive preventive behavior if they select a
higher level of effort under Knightian uncertainty than under a situation where they
know true relationship piθ. Formally, V
∗(α, δ) > V ∗θ . Patients exhibit preventive inertia
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if they select a lower level of effort under Knightian uncertainty than under a situation
where they know piθ. Formally, V
∗(α, δ) < V ∗θ .
An important question is how excessive preventive behavior or preventive inertia of
Bayesian patients relates to excessive preventive behavior or preventive inertia of Knigh-
tian patients. Before treating the general case, the following special case is examined.
Patients Can Perfectly Infer the Correct Relationship
Patients can perfectly infer the correct preventive relationship from a signal realization
when there is a signal i such that
pil = P (S = i|θ = l) = 1
for some i, l ∈ {1, ..., n}. In the special case i = l, the physician provides with probability
one the correct signal realization as s = i is observed. Otherwise, if i 6= l, physicians
always communicate the wrong preventive relationship. Still, patients can infer the correct
relationship from the wrong signal since they know how to relate the signal to the correct
relationship piθ. In cases where s = i is observed, the Bayesian update of q is given by
qBayesj =

1 for j = θ
0 for j 6= θ.
Consequently, Bayesian patients solve the ”correct” optimization problem after the signal
is observed. Thus, excessive preventive behavior and preventive inertia vanish by process-
ing the signal realization s. As a next step, we examine cases where patients beliefs are
represented by a neo-additive capacity with δ > 0. By proposition 1 in Eichberger et al.
[2010], we can infer that, under the optimistic updating rule, the updated neo-additive
capacity is of the form
νO(A) = (1− δO)piE(A) + δO
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where piE(A) denotes the Bayesian update of the reference probability pi, E is the condi-
tioning event, and A is the event measured by the underlying capacity. In our example,
piE(A) corresponds to q
Bayes
i as the signal s = i is observed. Therefore, we can deduce
that
νO(s = θ) = (1− δO) + δO = 1
Note that the same statement holds for the optimistic and pessimistic updating rule under
Knightian uncertainty. Consider first the case of the optimistic updating rule. Hence,
patients assign a probability of one to the correct relationship after observing the signal.
In cases where patients rely on the pessimistic updating rule, a similar reasoning applies.
The capacity is of the form
νP (A) = (1− δP )piE(A)
Again, since piE(A) corresponds to q
Bayes
i , we can infer that
νP (s = θ) = (1− δP ) = 1
since δP =
such statement is not true when δ > 0. This can be seen by looking at the updated
distorted probability piUCEU for each of the updating rules discussed at the beginning of
this section. Since the revised confidence parameters δO, δP and δGB are in general not
equal to zero, we can conclude that piUCEU differs from
piqBayes = piθ.
Hence, Non-Bayesian patients still deviate from the true underlying relationship even
in a highly idealized world where physicians always communicate the correct preventive
relationship. As a consequence, preventive inertia and excessive preventive behavior
persist under Knightian uncertainty and cannot be eliminated by information campaigns
and or physician counseling. Under the assumptions of Proposition 3.8, we can clearly
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identify whether Knightian patients exhibit preventive inertia or excessive preventive
behavior after observing the signal.
Corollary 3.8. Let i ∈ {1, .., n} be a signal such that patients can perfectly infer the
correct relationship
pij = P (S = i|θ = j) = 1.
Then, excessive preventive behavior and preventive inertia vanish if δ = 0 and persist for
δ > 0. Knightian patients exhibit excessive preventive behavior under the pessimistic up-
dating rule if pimin is more effective that piq, as well as the generalized Bayesian updating
rule if piBayesq is more effective than piα and α < αmin. Knightian patients exhibit preven-
tive inertia under the optimistic updating rule if pimax is less effective than piq, as well as
the generalized Bayesian updating rule, if piq is less effective than piα and α > αmax.
Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of Proposition 3.8 and Corollary 3.7.
What happens if the idealized assumption that patients can perfectly infer the correct
signal realization is abandoned?
Physicians Provide a Wrong and a Correct Signal with Positive Probability
In this general case, preventive inertia and excessive preventive behavior persist even for
Bayesian patients. This is because piUCEU 6= piθ. The following corollary investigates how
excessive preventive behavior of Bayesian patients relates to excessive preventive behavior
of Knightian patients after observing the signal.
Corollary 3.9. Let V ∗(α, 0) be an interior solution for the Bayesian patient after ob-
serving the signal realization. Besides, let V ∗(α, 0) feature excessive preventive behavior.
Formally, V ∗(α, 0) > V ∗θ . Knightian patients exhibit stronger ex-post excessive preventive
behavior than Bayesian patients under
• the pessimistic updating rule if pimin is more effective than pimax and
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• under the generalized Bayesian updating rule if piBayesq is more effective than piα and
patients are sufficiently pessimistic α < αmin.
Knightian patients exhibit a lower level of ex-post excessive preventive behavior than
Bayesian patients
• under the optimistic updating rule if pimax is less effective than pimin, and
• under the generalized Bayesian updating rule if piBayesq is less effective than piα and
patients are sufficiently optimistic α > αmax.
Similarly, we can examine how preventive inertia of Knightian patients relates to preven-
tive inertia of Bayesian patients after the signal is observed.
Corollary 3.10. Let V ∗(α, 0) be an interior solution for the Bayesian patient after
observing the signal realization. Besides, let V ∗(α, 0) feature preventive inertia. For-
mally, V ∗(α, 0) < V ∗θ . Knightian patients exhibit stronger ex-post preventive inertia than
Bayesian patients
• under the optimistic updating rule if pimax is less effective than pimin, and
• under the generalized Bayesian updating rule if piBayesq is less effective than piα and
patients are sufficiently optimistic α > αmax.
Knightian patients exhibit a lower level of ex-post preventive inertia than Bayesian pa-
tients
• under the pessimistic updating rule if pimin is more effective than pimax, and
• under the generalized Bayesian updating rule if piBayesq is more effective than piα and
patients are sufficiently pessimistic α < αmin.
Proof. The proof of Corollary 3.9 and 3.10 is a direct consequence of Proposition 3.8.
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Evidently, information can reinforce extreme behavior when the wrong signal is commu-
nicated. Assume for instance a situation where a Bayesian patient would already exhibit
excessive preventive behavior before observing the signal. Moreover, the patient trusts
highly the physician to communicate the correct signal. This implies conditional probabil-
ities pii close to 1 for all i = 1, ..., n. In cases where the physician wrongly communicates
a relationship, inducing excessive preventive behavior, patients adjust their beliefs by
assigning a larger posterior probability to this relationship. As a consequence, it is very
likely that excessive preventive behavior is reinforced.19 On the other hand, if the physi-
cian communicates the correct signal, we can conclude that piq comes closer to the true
relationship piθ in the sense that the posterior q
Bayes assigns a larger posterior probability
to the correct relationship piθ. But does this mean that excessive preventive behavior and
preventive inertia automatically diminish? The following example illustrates that this is
not the case, even when δ equals zero.
Example 3.4. Reconsider Example 3.3 by replacing the initial prior q with
qˆ =
(
3
10
,
3
10
,
2
5
)
.
The patient observes the signal s = 2 and the true underlying relationship is given by
piθ(V ) = pi2(V ) =
1
2
− 1
4
V.
If patients knew the true relationship pitheta, they would maximize
U real(V ) = pi2(V )u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− pi2(V ))u(W2(V ), h2)
Using simple algebra, we obtain
U real(V ) = 15 + 5
2
V − 2V 2
19The statement is wrong when the updating process strongly reduces the probability of other preven-
tive relationships which would, by themselves, induce even stronger excessive preventive behavior than
the relationship communicated by the physician.
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with the maximizer
V ∗θ =
5
8
= 0.625.
Patients exhibit preventive inertia if V ∗(α, δ) < 0.625 and excessive preventive behavior
if V ∗(α, δ) > 0.625. The Bayesian update of qˆ is given by
qˆBayes1 =
3
25
3
25
+ 3
25
+ 2
25
=
3
8
qˆBayes2 =
3
25
3
25
+ 3
25
+ 2
25
=
3
8
qˆBayes3 =
2
25
3
25
+ 3
25
+ 2
25
=
1
4
Henceforth, it is assumed that δ equals zero. Consequently, patients’ objectives are
independent of α. Before observing the signal, the objective is given by
Uold(V |α, 0) := 29
2
+
13
4
V − 2V 2
with the maximizer Vˆ1 =
13
16
≈ 0.81. After observing the signal, we obtain the objective
Unew(V |α, 0) := 55
4
+
15
4
V − 2V 2
with the maximizer Vˆ2 =
15
16
≈ 0.94. Obviously, patients exhibit excessive preventive
behavior before and after observing the signal realization. Besides, we have |V ∗θ − Vˆ1| =
3
16
≈ 0.19 and |V ∗θ − Vˆ2| = 516 ≈ 0.31. This implies
|V ∗θ − Vˆ1| < |V ∗θ − Vˆ2| =
5
16
≈ 0.31.
Hence, excessive preventive behavior is reinforced, even in the ”reduced” Bayesian case
and under the ”favorable” assumption that the physician provides the correct signal
realization.
The reason for this observation lies in the prior qˆ and the signal structure. Observe that
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qˆ1 = qˆ2 and
P (S = 2|θ = 1) = P (S = 2|θ = 2).
This implies that the updates of qˆ1 and qˆ2 coincide. Hence, if the correct signal realization
is provided, patients increase their posterior probability for pi2. At the same time, the
posterior probability for pi1 increases with the same magnitude. The posterior probability
for the third relationship pi3 decreases. Since pii is more effective than pij for i < j, and
since pi1(V ) > pi2(V ) > pi3(V ) for all V ∈ [0, 1], Proposition 3.5 shows that
V ∗θ=1 > V
∗
θ=2 > V
∗
θ=3.
Due to the fact that the posterior assigns a larger probability to θ = 1 and θ = 2 and
a smaller probability to θ = 3, we can infer that preventive activities increase after
observing the signal. Since patients already exhibit excessive preventive behavior before
observing the signal, we can draw the conclusion that information intensifies excessive
preventive behavior.
Example 3.4 demonstrates that information does not necessarily bring patients’ preventive
activities closer to their optimal levels, even in a favorable environment where physicians
communicate the correct relationship and probabilities are not distorted. Even worse,
there is the possibility that information induces patients to intensify excessive preventive
behavior or preventive inertia. The following paragraph shows that there are instances
where information does not affect preventive activities.
Communication of Uninformative Signals
In the following, a special case is considered where patients receive ”uninformative” sig-
nals. Henceforth, a signal s = i is called ”uninformative” if its conditionals are given
by
pij = P (S = i|θ = j) = 1
n
for j = 1, ..., n.
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Given this specification of the signal structure, we obtain
qBayesj =
qi
1
n
n∑
j=1
qj
1
n
= qi
as the Bayesian update of q. Hence, information does not affect the prior distribution.
In a sense, such a signal is completely uninformative for a Bayesian patient since it
precludes the possibility to draw any further inferences on the true underlying θ. As
a consequence, the objective function of Bayesian patients δ = 0 remains unaffected
and excessive preventive behavior or preventive inertia persist in the same magnitude as
without observing the signal. But how do Non-Bayesian patients react to uninformative
signals? Again, the answer depends on the updating rule. Since δO, δP and δGB are
in general not equal to zero, we can infer that piCEU 6= piUCEU. Hence, contrary to the
Bayesian case, Knightian patients adjust their beliefs even in the light of uninformative
signals.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper studies how patients adjust their primary preventive activities in the light of
new information when the relationship between preventive effort and disease probabilities
is characterized by Knightian uncertainty. Patients are assumed to be Choquet-expected
utility maximizers with beliefs that are represented by so-called non-extreme outcome
capacities.
In a first step, I derive conditions for the existence and and uniqueness of interior and
corner solutions of the underlying optimization problem. Subsequently, I conduct a com-
parative static analysis with respect to the pessimism parameter α and the confidence
parameter δ. It turns out that the effect of optimism on preventive activities depends
on two concurrent effects which are denoted as ”perceived efficacy effect” and ”expected
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marginal utility effect”. The perceived efficacy effect covers the fact that optimistic pa-
tients might judge the preventive regime’s capability to reduce the underlying probability
of disease differently from pessimistic patients. This is captured by the slope of the effort-
dependent distorted probability function piCEU(V ). The sign of the effect depends on the
effectiveness ranking between the worst-case relationship pimin and the best-case relation-
ship pimax. For instance, if pimax is less effective than pimin, we can infer that optimistic
patients deem the preventive regime less capable of reducing the disease probability than
pessimistic ones. In this case, the perceived efficacy effect is negative and optimistic
patients reduce preventive activities. The expected marginal utility effect captures how
patients’ expected marginal utility changes as they become more optimistic. It is negative
as long as patients prefer to exchange a marginal unit of prevention in the bad health
state with a marginal unit of prevention in the good health state. The overall effect of
optimism on prevention is determined by the sum of both individual effects.
Variation in the confidence parameter δ can be analyzed in a similar fashion. Again, there
are two concurrent effects, termed ”δ-perceived efficacy effect” and ”δ-expected marginal
utility effect”, with similar interpretations. The δ-perceived efficacy effect captures the
fact that confidence variations might entail a shift in the assessment of the preventive
regime’s capability to reduce the probability of disease. Similarly, the expected marginal
utility effect captures how patients’ expected marginal utility from prevention changes as
they become less confident. Again, the overall effect is given by the sum of both individ-
ual effects.
As a next step, I introduce information in the form of a random signal provided by the
physician. Using the pessimistic, optimistic and generalized Bayesian updating rule for
non-extreme outcome capacities, I examine how preventive activities of Knightian pa-
tients relate to preventive activities of Bayesian patients whose beliefs are represented by
a standard subjective probability. It turns out that, after observing the signal, preventive
activities of Knightian patients are consistently lower than those of Bayesian patients un-
der the optimistic updating rule if the best-case relationship pimax has a lower perceived
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effectiveness than the updated Bayesian relationship piBayesq . The same holds for the gen-
eralized Bayesian updating rule if the extreme-outcome relationship piα is less effective
than piBayesq and patients are sufficiently optimistic. Preventive activities of Knightian
patients exceed those of Bayesian patients for the pessimistic updating rule if the worst-
case relationship pimin is more effective than the updated Bayesian relationship pi
Bayes
q .
The same result holds for the generalized Bayesian updating rule if piBayesq is less effective
than piα and patients are sufficiently pessimistic. As a next step, I introduce the term
”preventive gap” as the difference between Bayesian and Knightian patients with respect
to their preventive activities. It turns out that information can increase or decrease the
preventive gap between Bayesian and Non-Bayesian patients.
Finally, I compare patients to an important benchmark case, which is a situation where
the true underlying relationship piθ is known. ”excessive preventive behavior” describes
a situation where patients exert a higher level of effort than in the benchmark case. Sim-
ilarly, the term ”preventive inertia” refers to a situation where patients exert a lower
level of effort than in the benchmark case. It turns out that information can reinforce or
attenuate excessive preventive behavior and preventive inertia. This observation has im-
portant policy implications, since it demonstrates that extensive information campaigning
potentially reinforces extreme preventive behavior among patients. This is a problematic
finding, since it questions the justification of information campaigns, at least for certain
subgroups of patients.
3.6 Mathematical Proofs
Throughout this section, I write u′ and refer to the partial derivative ∂u
∂V
. Similarly, I
write u′′ and refer to the second-order partial derivative ∂
2u
∂V 2
if not specified differently.
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Proof of Corollary 3.1. The proof is straightforward. One obtains
Eq[f(·|V )] =
n∑
i=1
qi
{
pii(V )u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− pii(V ))u(W2(V ), h2)
}
= u(W1(V ), h1) ·
( n∑
i=1
qipii(V )
)
+ u(W2(V ), h2) ·
(
1−
n∑
i=1
qipii(V )
)
= piq(V )u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− piq(V ))u(W2(V ), h2).
Defining
pimax(V ) := arg max
pii∈Φ
{
pii(V )u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− pii(V ))u(W2(V ), h2)
}
pimin(V ) := arg min
pii∈Φ
{
pii(V ) u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− pii(V )) u(W2(V ), h2)
}
,
one can express Zmin and Zmax as
Zmax(V ) = pimax(V )u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− pimax(V ))u(W2(V ), h2)
Zmin(V ) = pimin(V )u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− pimin(V ))u(W2(V ), h2)
With this notation, the objective can be rewritten as
U(V |α, δ) = piCEU(V |α, δ)u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− piCEU(V |α, δ))u(W2(V ), h2) (3.18)
where
piCEU(V |α, δ) = (1− δ)piq(V ) + δ(αpimax(V ) + (1− α)pimin(V )) (3.19)
Proof of Proposition 3.1. The objective is continuous if the functions Eq[f(·|V )], Zmin
and Zmax are continuous. By Corollary 3.1, it follows that
Eq[f(·|V )] = piq(V )u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− piq(V ))u(W2(V ), h2).
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The function piq is continuous since it is a sum of continuous functions. Since u is contin-
uous, we can conclude that Eq[f(·|V )] is continuous, since sums and products of contin-
uous functions are continuous. Hence, what remains to be shown is the continuity of the
functions Zmin and Zmax. This can be shown because the minimum and the maximum
of continuous functions is again continuous. Let (Vn)n∈N be a sequence in [0, 1] with
Vn → V ∗ for n → ∞. Due to the fact that [0, 1] is closed, it follows that V ∗ ∈ [0, 1].
Since pii is continuous for i = 1, ..., n, we can infer that pii(Vn) → pii(V ∗) for n → ∞.
This implies that pi(Vn) converges to pii(V
∗) for all i = 1, .., n. If all sequences converge,
we can conclude that the sequence of minima and the sequence of maxima also converge.
Moreover, the limit of min{pi1(Vn), ...., pin(Vn)}, or of max{pi1(Vn), ...., pin(Vn)} must be
contained in the set of limiting values {pi1(V ∗), ...., pin(V ∗)}. Otherwise, we could find
a natural number n0 ∈ N such that min{pi1(Vn), ...., pin(Vn)} 6∈ {pi1(Vn), ...., pin(Vn)} for
n ≥ n0. This is a contradiction proving that Zmin and Zmax are continuous.
Since [0, 1] is compact, and since the objective U(V |α, δ) is continuous on [0, 1]. We can
use Weierstrass’ theorem to show that a solution of max
V ∈[0,1]
U(V |α, δ) exists.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. In this proof, I call a function C2 if it is twice continuously
differentiable on its domain. The objective U is C2 if the functions Eq[f(·|V )], Zmin and
Zmax are C
2. By Corollary 3.1, we obtain
Eq[f(·|V )] = piq(V )u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− piq(V ))u(W2(V ), h2).
The function piq is C
2, since it is a sum of C2-functions. Since u is C2, we can conclude
that Eq[f(·|V )] is C2, because sums and products of C2-functions are C2. Hence, what
remains to be shown is that Zmin and Zmax are C
2 when there are now crossing points
and at least piecewise continuously differentiable if the sets Cprob and Cutility are finite.
Consider first a point Vˆ ∈ [0, 1] that is not a crossing point of functions in Φ or the
utilities u(W1(V ), h1) and u(W2(V ), h2). This means Vˆ 6∈ Cprob ∪ Cutility. Then, there is
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a δ > 0 such that
pii1(V ) > pii2(V )... > piin(V )
for all V ∈ (Vˆ − δ, Vˆ + δ) where ij ∈ {1, ..., n} for j ∈ {1, ..., n}. This means we can find
a neighborhood of points around Vˆ such that the ordering between the functions pii ∈ Φ
remains stable in this neighborhood. Now, we can differentiate between the following
cases:
(a) u(W1(Vˆ ), h1) > u(W2(Vˆ ), h2)
(b) u(W1(Vˆ ), h1) = u(W2(Vˆ ), h2)
(c) u(W1(Vˆ ), h1) < u(W2(Vˆ ), h2)
Consider first case (a). Since u is continuous, we can conclude that there is ε1 > 0 such
that u(W1(V ), h1) > u(W2(V ), h2) for all V ∈ (Vˆ − ε1, Vˆ + ε1). This implies
Zmin(V ) = piin(V )u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− piin(V ))u(W2(V ), h2)
for all V ∈ (Vˆ −min{ε1, δ}, Vˆ +min{ε1, δ}). This shows that Zmin is, as sum and product
of C2-functions, C2 on (Vˆ −min{ε1, δ}, Vˆ + min{ε1, δ}), and therefore also C2 in Vˆ . A
similar argument holds for case (c) with the difference that there is an ε2 > 0 such that
u(W1(V ), h1) < u(W2(V )h2) for all V ∈ (Vˆ − ε2, Vˆ + ε2). Hence,
Zmin(V ) = pii1(V )u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− pii1(V ))u(W2(V ), h2)
for all V ∈ (Vˆ −min{ε2, δ}, Vˆ + min{ε2, δ}). Again, we can conclude that Zmin is C2 on
(Vˆ −min{ε2, δ}, Vˆ + min{ε2, δ}). In case (b), three subcases can occur.
(d) there is ε3 > 0 such that u(Wl(V ), hl) < u(Wk(V ), hk) for all V ∈ (Vˆ − ε3, Vˆ +
ε3)\{Vˆ } and l, k ∈ {1, 2} with l 6= k
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(e) there is ε4 > 0 such that u(Wl(V ), hl) = u(Wk(V ), hk) for all V ∈ (Vˆ − ε4, Vˆ + ε4)
and l, k ∈ {1, 2} with l 6= k
(f) there is ε5 > 0 such that u(Wl(V ), hl) < u(Wk(V ), hk) for all V ∈ (Vˆ − ε5, Vˆ ) and
u(Wl(V ), hl) > u(Wk(V ), hk) for all V ∈ (Vˆ , Vˆ + ε5)
Subsequently, I consider w.l.o.g. the case l = 1 and k = 2. In case (d), we can conclude
that
Zmin(V ) = pii1(V )u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− pii1(V ))u(W2(V ), h2)
for all V ∈ (Vˆ −min{ε3, δ}, Vˆ +min{ε3, δ}). Hence, Zmin is C2 in Vˆ . In case (e), we have
Zmin(V ) = u(W1(V ), h1) = u(W2(V ), h2)
for all V ∈ (Vˆ −min{ε4, δ}, Vˆ + min{ε4, δ}). As in the previous cases, we can conclude
that Zmin is C
2 in Vˆ . In the remaining case (f), we can infer that Vˆ is a crossing point
of the utility functions u(W1(V ), h1) and u(W2(V ), h2). Formally, Vˆ ∈ Cutilities. Since
Cutilities = ∅ by assumption, we can exclude case (f). Hence, Zmin is C2 in Vˆ . The
same proof applies for the function Zmax with the difference that one needs to replace the
minimizing relationship pimin with the respective maximizing relationship pimax for each
of the cases (a) to (f). Since Cprob ∪Cutility is a finite set, we obtain that the objective is
C2 up to finitely many points. If Cprob ∪ Cutility = ∅, the objective is C2.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Due to Requirement (SC1), Proposition 3.2 shows that the ob-
jective is twice continuously differentiable. The second order condition of U is given
Chapter 3. Primary Prevention Under Ambiguity 139
by:
∂2U
∂V 2
=pi′′CEU(V |α, δ) · (u(W1(V ), h1)− u(W2(V ), h2))
+ 2pi′CEU(V |α, δ)(W ′1(V )u′(W1(V ), h1)−W ′2(V )u′(W2(V ), h2))
+ piCEU(V |α, δ)W ′′1 (V )u′(W1(V ), h1) + (1− piCEU(V |α, δ))W ′′2 (V )u′(W2(V ), h2)
+ piCEU(V |α, δ)W ′1(V )2u′′(W1(V ), h1) + (1− piCEU(V |α, δ))W ′2(V )2u′′(W2(V ), h2)
(3.20)
By Requirement (SC2), we obtain u(W2(V ), h2) > u(W1(V ), h1). Together with Require-
ment (SC3), it follows that
pi′′CEU(V |α, δ)(u(W1(V ), h1)− u(W2(V ), h2)) < 0 (3.21)
By using Requirement (SC5) and the fact that pi
′
CEU < 0, we obtain
2pi′CEU(V |α, δ) · (W ′1(V )u′(W1(V ), h1)−W ′2(V )u′(W2(V ), h2)) ≤ 0. (3.22)
Due to Requirement (SC4), we can infer
piCEU(V |α, δ)W ′′1 (V )u′(W1(V ), h1) + (1− piCEU(V |α, δ))W ′′2 (V )u′(W2(V ), h2) ≤ 0. (3.23)
Furthermore, we can conclude from u′′ ≤ 0 and piCEU(V |α, δ) ∈ [0, 1] that
piCEU(V |α, δ)W ′1(V )2u′′(W1(V ), h1)+(1−piCEU(V |α, δ))W ′2(V )2u′′(W2(V ), h2) ≤ 0. (3.24)
Due to the inequalities (3.21), (3.22), (3.23), and (3.24), the claim is proved.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. The Lagrangian is of the form
L(V, λ1, λ2) := piCEU(V |α, δ)u(W1(V ), h1)+(1−piCEU(V |α, δ))u(W2(V ), h2)+λ1V+λ2(1−V )
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The first order condition
∂L
∂V
(V0) = 0
yields
∂U
∂V
(V0|α, δ) + λ1 − λ2 = 0.
Furthermore, we obtain the non-negativity conditions λi ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2, the inequal-
ity constraints V ≥ 0 and V ≤ 1, as well as, the following complementary slackness
conditions:
λ1(−V0) = 0
λ2(V0 − 1) = 0
In order to solve the optimization problem, four different cases must be considered.
1. λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0: In this case, we have V0 = 0 and V0 = 1, which is a contradiction.
2. λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 0. This is the case of an interior solution; the first order condition
is equivalent to ∂U
∂V
= 0.
3. λ1 = 0 and λ2 > 0: In this case, we can conclude V0 = 1. Plugging these conditions
into the first order condition, we obtain in the limit
lim
V0→1−
∂U
∂V
(V0|α, δ)− λ2 = 0.
Since λ2 is required to be strictly positive, we need to rely on the condition
lim
V0→1−
∂U
∂V
(V0|α, δ) > 0
to guarantee that the corner solution V0 = 1 is a feasible solution.
4. λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0: From the complementary slackness conditions, we can conclude
that V0 = 0. Resorting to an argument similar to the one in the previous case, we
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obtain the following limit for the first order condition:
lim
V0→0+
∂U
∂V
(V0|α, δ) + λ1 = 0
Since λ1 is assumed to be strictly positive, it follows that the condition
lim
V0→0+
∂U
∂V
(V0|α, δ) < 0
needs to be satisfied in order to guarantee that V0 = 0 is a feasible corner solution.
It remains to be shown that there can never be more than one corner solution. Assume
that the conditions limV0→1−
∂U
∂V
(V0|α, δ) > 0 and limV0→0+ ∂U∂V (V0|α, δ) < 0 hold at the
same time. Since U is continuously differentiable, we can deduce that the derivative UV
is continuous on [0, 1]. By the intermediate value theorem, we can conclude that there
exists Vˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that UV (Vˆ ) = 0. Furthermore, the derivative changes its sign from
negative to positive at Vˆ . Therefore Vˆ must be a minimizer. This is a contradiction to
the assumption that U is strictly concave.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Consider two preventive relationships pi and pˆi, where pˆi is more
effective than pi. The derivative of
pi(V )u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− pi(V ))u(W2(V ), h2)
with respect to V is given by
∂U
∂V
= pi′(V )[u(W1(V ), h1)− u(W2(V ), h2)]
+ pi(V )W ′1(V )u
′(W1(V ), h1) + (1− pi(V ))W ′2(V )u′(W2(V ), h2).
I define
g(V ) := pi′(V )[u(W1(V ), h1)− u(W2(V ), h2)]
and
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b(V ) :=pi(V )W ′1(V )u
′(W1(V ), h1) + (1− pi(V ))W ′2(V )u′(W2(V ), h2)
=W ′2(V )u
′(W2(V ), h2) + pi(V ) (W ′1(V )u
′(W1(V ), h1)−W ′2(V )u′(W2(V ), h2))
=W ′2(V )u
′(W2(V ), h2) + pi(V )∆′u
Since ∆u = u(W2(V ), h2)− u(W1(V ), h1) ≥ 0 and pi′(V ) < 0, we can conclude g(V ) ≥ 0.
Similarly, it follows that b(V ) ≤ 0. Due to the fact that ∆′u ≥ 0 by Condition (SC5) and
pˆi(V ) ≥ pi(V ) for all V ∈ [0, 1], we can conclude that
b(V ) ≤ pˆi(V )W ′1(V )u′(W1(V ), h1) + (1− pˆi(V ))W ′2(V )u′(W2(V ), h2).
Moreover, since pi′(V ) ≥ pˆi′(V ) for all V ∈ [0, 1], it follows that
g(V ) ≤ pˆi′(V )[u(W1(V ), h1)− u(W2(V ), h2)].
Consequently,
g(V ) + b(V ) ≤ ∂U
pˆi
∂V
where ∂U
pˆi
∂V
denotes the derivative of
pˆi(V )u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− pˆi(V ))u(W2(V ), h2)
with respect to V . As a consequence, we obtain
∂U
∂V
≤ ∂U
pˆi
∂V
.
Since for an interior maximum, the derivative ∂U
∂V
changes its sign from positive to neg-
ative, we can conclude that preventive effort given pi is smaller than prevention under
relationship pˆi.
If V ∗ = 0 is the global maximizer of U on [0, 1], we can deduce that U is strictly decreasing
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in V . In this case there are two possibilities. The first one is that the partial derivative
of U pˆi is still strictly decreasing in V = 0. Then, the solution of max
V ∈[0,1]
U pˆi is still given by
V ∗ = 0. Hence, a higher effectiveness has no effect on preventive activities. The second
possibility is that U pˆi is not strictly decreasing in V = 0 anymore. In this case, the first
order condition has a zero V ∗ ∈ (0, 1). Since U pˆi is strictly concave, V ∗ is the unique
global maximizer. If V ∗ = 1 is the global maximizer of U on [0, 1], we obtain that U is
strictly increasing on [0, 1]. Besides, we have 0 ≤ ∂U
∂V
≤ ∂U pˆi
∂V
. Hence, U pˆi is still strictly
increasing in V . Thus, V ∗ = 1 remains the solution.
Proof of Corollary 3.2. It is
∆1 = ∆u
d2
dα dV
piCEU = ∆uδ [pi
′
max(V )− pi′min(V )]
By assumption, we have ∆u < 0 and pi
′
max(V )−pi′min(V ) > 0. Therefore, we can conclude
that ∆1 < 0 for δ > 0 and ∆1 = 0 for δ = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.6. The proof is straightforward. The result of part (a) is trivial
since the objective is independent of α in cases of full confidence. If the agent gives
a positive weight to extreme outcomes, the parameter α influences prevention. This is
the case for part (b). As α increases, the patient becomes more optimistic. In cases
where pimin has a higher perceived effectiveness than pimax, we can conclude that the
belief function piCEU(·|α, δ) shifts towards another belief function piCEU(·|α′, δ) which has
a lower perceived effectiveness. By Corollary 3.2, we obtain ∆1 ≤ 0. Moreover, ∆2 is
negative due to Requirement (SC5). Together, this implies that prevention either remains
unchanged or decreases. Where there is an interior solution, we have ∆1 < 0. Where
there is a corner solution, we have ∆1 = 0 for V
∗ = 0 and ∆1 ≤ 0 for V ∗ = 1. On the
other hand, if pimax is more effective than pimin, we can deduce that ∆1 ≥ 0. Hence, the
overall effect is positive if ∆1 > ∆2, negative if ∆1 < ∆2, and zero if ∆1 = ∆2.
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Proof Corollary 3.3. It is
∆3 = ∆u · ∂
2piCEU(V |α, δ)
∂δ∂V
= ∆u ·
(−pi′q(V ) + αpi′1(V ) + (1− α)pi′n(V ))
Consequently, it is necessary to differentiate between the following cases:
(1) ∆3 > 0 iff αpi
′
1(V ) + (1− α)pi′n(V ) < pi′q(V )
(2) ∆3 < 0 iff αpi
′
1(V ) + (1− α)pi′n(V ) > pi′q(V )
(3) ∆3 = 0 iff αpi
′
1(V ) + (1− α)pi′n(V ) = pi′q(V )
Now, the statement of the corollary follows directly from Definition 3.3.
Proof of Corollary 3.5. Due to Condition (SC5), we can infer that ∆
′
u ≥ 0. Therefore,
the sign of the δ-expected marginal utility effect is determined by the sign of d
dδ
piCEU. It
is
sign
(
d
δ
piCEU
)
=

+1 for α < αˆ(V ∗)
0 for α = αˆ(V ∗)
−1 for α = αˆ(V ∗).
Proof of Corollary 3.6. Since neo-additive capacities remain neo-additive with revised pa-
rameters α′ and δ′, we can replace the ex-ante capacity ν(α, δ) with the updated capacity
ν(α′, δ′). By using Corollary 3.1, we can see that patients maximize
U(V |α′, δ′) = piCEU(V |α′, δ′)u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− piCEU(V |α′, δ′))u(W2(V ), h2)
where
piCEU(V |α′, δ′) = (1− δ′)piq(V ) + δ′(α′pimax(V ) + (1− α)pimin(V ))
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with rule-dependent α′ and δ′. Replacing these parameters by αO and δO in case of the
optimistic updating rule, by αP and δP in case of the pessimistic updating rule, and by
αGB and δGB in case of the generalized Bayesian updating rule concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.8. In this proof, each updating rule is examined separately.
Optimistic Updating Rule
Under the optimistic updating rule, the Non-Bayesian patient maximizes the objective
with respect to the preventive relationship
piOCEU(V ) = (1− δO)piBayesq (V ) + δOpimax(V ).
First of all, note that
piBayesq − (1− δO)piBayesq (V )− δOpimax(V ) = δO(piBayesq (V )− pimax(V )) ≥ 0.
Since
(piBayesq )
′(V ) ≤ (1− δO)piBayesq (V )′ + δOpimax(V )′,
if pimax is less effective than pi
Bayes
q , we can conclude that pi
O
CEU is less effective than pi
Bayes
q .
By using Proposition 3.5, we obtain the claims for the optimistic updating rule.
Pessimistic Updating Rule
Similarly, for the pessimistic updating rule, the Non-Bayesian agent relies on the rela-
tionship
piPCEU(V ) = (1− δO)piBayesq (V ) + δOpimin(V ).
It is
piBayesq − (1− δO)piBayesq (V )− δOpimin(V ) = δO(piBayesq (V )− pimin(V )) ≤ 0.
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Since pimin is more effective than piq, we can infer that
(piBayesq )
′(V ) ≥ (1− δP )piBayesq (V )′ + δPpimin(V )′.
Hence, piBayesq is less effective than pi
P
CEU. Again, by using Proposition 3.5, we can infer
the claim for the pessimistic updating rule.
Generalized Bayesian Updating Rule
In case of the generalized Bayesian updating rule, the Non-Bayesian patient maximizes
an expected utility with respect to the distorted probability
piGBCEU(V ) = (1− δGB)piBayesq (V ) + δGB(αpimin(V ) + (1− αpimax(V )).
Again, we can consider the difference
piBayesq (V )− (1− δGB)piBayesq (V )− δGB(αpimax(V ) + (1− α)pimin(V ))
= (1− δGB)(piBayesq (V )− αpimax(V )− (1− α)pimin(V ))
As a consequence, we can distinguish three possible cases:
(1) piBayesq (V ) > piα(V )
(2) piBayesq (V ) = piα(V )
(3) piBayesq (V ) < piα(V )
In case (1), we have piBayesq > pi
GB
CEU, in case (2), we can infer pi
Bayes
q = pi
GB
CEU, and in case
(3), we can deduce that piBayesq < pi
GB
CEU. The remaining part of the proof follows directly
from Proposition 3.5.
Proof of Corollary 3.7. Remember that the condition piBayesq (V ) < piα(V ) is fulfilled when
patients are sufficiently pessimistic with α < αˆ(V ). Similarly, the condition piBayesq (V ) >
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piα(V ) is fulfilled when patients are sufficiently optimistic with α > αˆ(V ). Hence, a clear
ordering between piq and piα is possible whenever α < αˆ(V ) for all V ∈ [0, 1] or α > αˆ(V )
for all V ∈ [0, 1]. Defining
αmin := min
V ∈[0,1]
αˆ(V ) and αmax := max
V ∈[0,1]
αˆ(V ),
we obtain piq(V ) < piα(V ) for all V ∈ [0, 1] if and only if α < αmin. Similarly, piq(V ) >
piα(V ) for all V ∈ [0, 1] if and only if α > αmax.
3.7 Examples
Example 3.5. Let Φ = {pi1, pi2 pi3} with pi1(V ) = 1− 12V , pi2(V ) = 1− V 2, and pi3(V ) =
1 − V . Obviously, each pii is twice continuously differentiable and strictly decreasing on
[0, 1]. Figure 3.10 illustrates these functions graphically in one diagram.
Figure 3.10: Preventive Relationships with a Single Crossing Point
At the point Vˆ = 1
2
, pi1 and pi2 intersect. Moreover, we can see that pi1 is smaller than pi2
for all 0 ≤ V < Vˆ and larger than pi2 for all Vˆ < V ≤ 1. Assume furthermore, that the
utility in the bad state is always lower than the utility in the good state
u(W1(V ), h1) < u(W2(V ), h2)
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for all V ∈ [0, 1]. Then, we obtain for pimin:
pimin(V ) =

1− V 2 for 0 ≤ V < Vˆ
3
4
for V = Vˆ
1− 1
2
V for V > Vˆ
For pimax, we have pimax = pi3. This implies that pimax is continuously differentiable.
Obviously, pimin is not continuously differentiable due to a kink at V =
1
2
. Formally,
lim
V→Vˆ −
d
dV
pimin(V ) = −1 6= lim
V→Vˆ +
d
dV
pimin(V ) = −1
2
.
This implies that the objective is not necessarily continuously differentiable at Vˆ = 1
2
.
This becomes clear, as we consider the special case α = 0, δ = 1, u(w, h) = w, W2(V ) =
5− V , W2(V ) = 10− V and q1 = q2 = 12 . Then, the objective is given by
U(V |α = 0, δ = 1) =

10− 7
2
V for 0 ≤ V ≤ 1
2
33
4
for V = 1
2
10− V − 5V 2 for 1
2
< V ≤ 1.
For the limit of the derivatives from the left and from the right, we obtain
lim
V→Vˆ −
d
dV
U(V |α = 0, δ = 1) = −7
2
6= lim
V→Vˆ +
d
dV
U(V |α = 0, δ = 1) = −6
This proves that U is not differentiable at Vˆ = 1
2
.
Example 3.6. Let pi1(V ) = 1−V , pi2(V ) = 1− 14V , W1(V ) = 10− 12V , W2(V ) = 10−V 5,
u(w, h) = w, δ = 1, q1 = q2 =
1
2
, and α = 0. Obviously, the Assumptions 1,2 and 3 are
fulfilled for this model specification. Moreover, there is no crossing point of pi1 and pi2 on
the domain D = [0, 1]. The utilities u(W1(V ), h1) = W1(V ) and u(W2(V ), h2) = W2(V )
Chapter 3. Primary Prevention Under Ambiguity 149
have a crossing point at Vˆ = 4
√
1
2
. The objective function is of the form
U(V |α = 0, δ = 1) = pimin(V )u(W1(V ), h1) + (1− pimin(V ))u(W2(V ), h2)
where
pimin(V ) =

pi1(V ) for 0 ≤ V ≤ Vˆ
pi2(V ) for Vˆ ≤ V ≤ 1
Figure 3.11 gives a graphical representation of the objective function. Obviously, the
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Effort
9.4
9.5
9.6
9.7
9.8
9.9
10.0
Objective
Figure 3.11: Objective Function with a Kink
objective has a kink at Vˆ . Hence, U is not differentiable at the point Vˆ .
Example 3.7. Throughout this example, assume that
u(W1(V ), h1) = 10− 2V 3 and u(W2(V ), h2) = 20− 2V 3
as well as q1 = q2 =
1
2
. I contemplate three scenarios. For each scenario, I compare the
following parameter constellations:
(1) Full Confidence: δ = 0
(2) Extreme Optimism: δ = 1 and α = 1
(3) Extreme Pessimism: δ = 1 and α = 0.
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Furthermore, I specify for each scenario a different set of belief functions Φi for i = 5, 6, 7.
Scenario I
Let the set of preventive relationships be given by Φ5 = {pi9, pi10} where pi9(V ) = 1− 215V
and pi10(V ) =
1
2
− 7
15
V . Figure 3.12 displays the objective for each scenario.
Figure 3.12: Confidence Increases Preventive Activities for Pessimists
Observe that a higher degree of confidence20 yields lower preventive activities when pa-
tients are optimistic, and more preventive activities when patients are pessimistic. The
following model specification demonstrates the converse result.
Scenario II
Let Φ6 = {pi11, pi12} where pi11(V ) = 1− 715V and pi12(V ) = 12− 315V . Figure 3.13 represents
the objective for the case of full confidence, extreme optimism and extreme pessimism.
Given this new constellation of beliefs, we obtain that confidence increases preventive
activities when patients are optimistic and decreases prevention when patients are pes-
simistic. The following model specification shows that ∆3 can be zero.
20This means δ decreases.
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Figure 3.13: Confidence Increases Preventive Activities for Optimists
Scenario III
Let Φ7 = {pi13, pi14} where pi13(V ) = 1 − 215V and pi14(V ) = 1 − 215V . The following
diagram displays the objective function in cases of full confidence, extreme optimism and
extreme pessimism.
Figure 3.14: Confidence Has No Influence on Preventive Activities
Obviously, there is no influence of confidence on preventive activities given this constel-
lation of parameters.
Example 3.8. Let pi1(V ) = 1− 34V , pi2(V ) = 12− 14V , and pi3(V ) = 14− 15V . The prior q is
given by q = (0, 1, 0) and α = 1
2
. Hence, we have piq = pi2 and piα(V ) = pi 1
2
(V ) = 5
8
− 19
40
V .
Figure 3.15 displays the extreme outcome function pi 1
2
and the reference function piq in
one diagram. Obviously, pi 1
2
and piq have a crossing point at V0 =
5
9
. As a consequence,
Chapter 3. Primary Prevention Under Ambiguity 152
Figure 3.15: Example Showing That There Is No Clear Ranking Between piα and piq
pi 1
2
(V ) > piq(V ) for V < V0 and pi 1
2
(V ) < piq(V ) for V > V0.
Chapter 4
Value of Information
4.1 Introduction
For decades economists have been studying the relationship between decision-making
under uncertainty and the so-called value of information. A famous and well-known result
in this context is Blackwell’s theorem (Blackwell 1953), stating that an experiment is more
valuable than another if and only if the same experiment is more informative than the
latter. In order to obtain this equivalence (e.g. Cre´mer 1982), a standard assumption has
been that decision-makers are subjective expected utility (seu) maximizers, cf. Savage
[1954].
Over the last decades, seu preferences have been subject to severe criticism, e.g. Ellsberg
[1961] showed with the prominent Ellsberg paradox, that a decision-maker may display
preferences which do not allow for subjective probabilities, thus showing an incompat-
ibility with Savage’s seu theory. A well-established model of decision-making under
uncertainty incorporating behavioral patterns that are in line with preferences displayed
in the Ellsberg paradox, is given by the so-called maxmin expected utility (meu) model.
Maxmin preferences were axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989].
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In recent years, multiple prior models have been used extensively in a wide range of
economic fields like finance and behavioral economics (Gilboa et al. 2010, Riedel 2009).
Given the importance of multiple priors and meu in particular, it is worthwhile to know
whether Blackwell’s theorem extends to this class of preferences. This has been the
objective of C¸elen [2012], who offers a simple proof for the validity of Blackwell’s theorem
under meu preferences.
In this comment, we demonstrate that C¸elen’s proof relies on a value of information for
meu preferences that is not defined via backward induction and thus is incompatible
with the intertemporal extension of meu introduced by Epstein and Schneider [2003].
In particular, optimal strategies in C¸elen’s framework prescribe decisions conditional on
signal realizations that a meu decision-maker will not find optimal to adhere to once
those signal realizations have been observed. In this sense, C¸elen’s framework features
dynamic inconsistency.
4.2 Framework and Definition of the Value of Infor-
mation in C¸elen’s Model
In the following, we adopt C¸elen’s framework and notation. Let Ω := {ω1, . . . , ωn} be the
finite set of states of the world and X := {a1, . . . , aχ} the finite set of actions available
to a decision-maker. Moreover, we denote by ∆(Ω) and ∆(X) the set of all probability
distributions defined on Ω and X, respectively. Let further u : Ω × X → R be a utility
function and u with uij = u(ωi, aj) the corresponding utility matrix. An seu decision-
maker is characterized by (pi,u), where pi ∈ ∆(Ω) is a prior over the states.
An experiment is a tuple (S,p) with the signal space S = {s1, . . . , sσ} and the Markov
matrix p with pij = Pr(sj|ωi) for sj ∈ S. C¸elen introduces a strategy as a vector valued
mapping f : S → ∆(X), thus characterizing all (mixed) actions the decision-maker plans
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to take after observing certain signal realizations s. The σ × χ-matrix f is defined such
that (fi1, · · · , fiχ) := f(si).
In this framework, C¸elen determines the value of the experiment (S,p) for a given strategy
f as
Uf(pi,u)(S,p) =
∑
j
Pr(sj)
∑
i
Pr(ωi|sj)
∑
k
fjku(ωi, ak) (4.1)
=
∑
j
∑
i
pijpii
∑
k
fjkuik (by Bayes’ rule) . (4.2)
With a strategy f ∗ maximizing (4.2), C¸elen defines U∗(pi,u)(S,p) = Uf
∗
(pi,u)(S,p) as the value
of the experiment for an seu decision-maker.
Building on this, C¸elen extends the definition of the value of an experiment to the class
of meu preferences. For that purpose, he characterizes an meu decision-maker by (A, u),
where A ⊂ ∆(Ω) is a convex and compact set of priors. As a counterpart of U∗(pi,u)(S,p),
he defines
W∗(A,u) = max
f
min
pi∈A
Uf(pi,u)(S,p) (4.3)
as the value of an experiment (S,p) for an meu decision-maker. It is expression (4.3)
that C¸elen relies on in his proof of the generalized Blackwell theorem.
4.3 A Recursively Defined MEU Value of Informa-
tion
It is insightful to note that C¸elen’s framework basically describes an intertemporal setting
with two periods, a useful distinction that could be concealed by the fact that the decision-
maker only acts once. In the second period, after observing a signal realization, the
decision-maker takes a (mixed) action. In the first period, before observing the signal
realization, the value of the experiment (S,p) is determined. C¸elen accounts for the
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intertemporal structure insofar as he considers strategies, that is complete contingent
plans for appropriate play after observing signal realizations.
His formulation, however, is in contrast to the usual intertemporal formulation of meu
preferences that was provided by Epstein and Schneider [2003]. One of the main charac-
teristics of the recursive definition of intertemporal meu in Epstein and Schneider [2003]
is the compatibility with backward induction. We follow their approach and present here
an alternative definition of the value of information for meu preferences. According to
backward induction, the first step to define a value of information is to determine an
optimal action after observing signal realization sj, j = 1, . . . , σ, which is given by
g∗j ∈ argmax
g∈∆(X)
min
µ∈M(sj)
Eµ[u] . (4.4)
Here, M(sj) is the set of posteriors after observing signal realization sj, formally
M(sj) := {p(·|sj) : p ∈ A} , (4.5)
where p(·|sj) denotes the conditional probability of the prior p ∈ ∆(Ω) given the signal
sj. We obtain p(·|sj) via Bayes’ rule and update each prior p in this way.1
According to the principle of backward induction, we determine the value of information
in the first period on the assumption of optimal actions in the second period. Thus, we
suggest the following definition of the value of an experiment (S,p) for meu preferences:
W˜∗(A,u) = min
pi∈A
∑
i,j
piipij
∑
k
g∗jkuik . (4.6)
Here, g∗j denotes an optimal decision after observing signal realization sj, given in (4.4).
This alternative way of defining the value of an experiment is in line with the intertemporal
1Epstein and Schneider [2007] show that further restrictions on the setM can be made. For the sake
of simplicity, you may think of full Bayesian updating.
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model of recursive utility under multiple priors as pointed out in Epstein and Schneider
[2003, 2007].
The key characteristic of (4.6) is that optimal actions are determined with the meu rule
for each signal realization sj individually. In particular, the worst posterior in (4.4) in
general depends on the signal realization sj. This is in contrast to (4.3). By following the
derivation of the seu counterpart, essentially the step from (4.1) to (4.2), C¸elen silently
assumes that the worst prior from the ex-ante perspective coincides with the preimage
of all worst posteriors, irrespective of the signal realization. For the seu decision-maker
this argumentation is innocent as there is a unique prior, and thus a unique posterior as
well. For the meu decision-maker, however, this argument is in conflict with backward
induction.
In the appendix, we demonstrate that the conflict of C¸elen’s framework with intertemporal
recursive utility can be made even more concrete. We provide an example in which the
optimal strategy derived in C¸elen’s framework prescribes actions that are different from
what a meu decision-maker will actually do after observing those signals realizations.2
This supports our claim that the value of information for meu preferences should be
defined by (4.6). By construction, our definition of the value of information is compatible
with dynamic consistency.
2One could think that the reason we observe this form of dynamic inconsistency is the missing
assumption of rectangularity of the prior set, a key assumption in Epstein and Schneider [2003] to ensure
dynamic consistency within an intertemporal setting of recursive utility. But this is not the case. Even
though C¸elen’s setting is not fully transferable to the setting of Epstein and Schneider, in particular
the analysis in Epstein and Schneider [2007] suggests that rectangularity is no issue in this setting,
simply because the learning process is defined via conditional one-step-ahead conditionals, as required
by Epstein and Schneider [2003]. The reason for the peculiar properties of C¸elen’s framework lies in the
fact, that utilities are defined in a non-recursive way. His framework is thus incompatible with Epstein
and Schneider right from the start.
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4.4 Results and Discussion
We have shown that C¸elen’s proof of the Blackwell theorem only applies to a value of
information that is defined in a non-recursive utility framework. We have offered a defi-
nition for the value of information derived via backward induction, thus compatible with
the dynamic consistent intertemporal axiomatization of Epstein and Schneider [2003].
Consequently, we suggest that the proof of the Blackwell theorem should deal with ex-
pression (4.6) as the definition of the value of information for meu preferences. This proof
is still pending.
4.5 Example Demonstrating That C¸elen’s Value of
Information Is No Dynamically Consistent
After observing a certain signal realization, an meu decision-maker will in general not
adhere to actions she determined to be optimal before the signal realization has been
observed. In other words, an optimal strategy f ∗ determined in C¸elen’s framework in
general prescribes, for all signal realization contingencies, actions that are different from
what an meu decision-maker will actually do after observing those signal realizations.
We demonstrate this with a simple example. We restrict the number of states of the world
Ω = {ω1, ω2}, actions, X = {a1, a2} and signal realizations S = {s1, s2} to two. By that,
we can write a prior pi as (pi1, 1−pi1). Moreover, the Markov matrix p is fully specified by
p11 = p22 = λ and p12 = p21 = 1− λ with 1/2 < λ < 1. We assume 1/2 < λ < 3/4. Due
to the restriction on two signal realizations, we can write f12 = 1− f11 and f21 = 1− f22.
To further simplify our example, we specify payoffs by u11 = 1, u12 = −1, u22 = 2 and
u21 = 0. This is a simple example of a setting in which the decision-maker wants to learn
the true ω because action a1 is optimal if ω = ω1 and action a2 is optimal if ω = ω2.
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With these specifications, (4.2) reduces to
Uf(pi,u)(S,p) = (2f11 − 2f22 − 1) pi1 + 2− 2 (1− f22)λ− 2f11(1− λ) . (4.7)
For the set of priors, we specify A = {(pi1, 1− pi1) : 1/4 ≤ pi1 ≤ 3/4}.
In order to determine C¸elen’s optimal strategy f ∗ in equation (4.3), we first calculate,
for a given strategy f , the prior that minimizes (4.7). This is given by
piworst =

(
1
4
, 3
4
)
if f11 − f22 > 12
any pi ∈ A if f11 − f22 = 12(
3
4
, 1
4
)
if f11 − f22 < 12 .
(4.8)
Building on this, we can derive the optimal strategy f ∗. We calculate
f ∗(s1) = (1, 0) , f
∗(s2) =
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
. (4.9)
In words, the optimal strategy in the C¸elen framework consists of taking action a1 if
s = s1 and mixing over actions a1 and a2 with equal weights if s = s2.
We now demonstrate that an meu decision-maker that determines her optimal strategy
via (4.3) would actually revise her optimal plan as soon as the signal materializes. The
decision rule after observing a signal realization sj is given by (4.4), where g is a random-
ization over actions a1 and a2, andM⊂ ∆(Ω) is the set of posteriors that depends on the
set of priors A, the likelihood p and the signal realization sj observed. In our example,
the expected value of the decision g under the posterior µ is
Eµ[u] = µ1 (g1 · 1 + (1− g1) · (−1)) + (1− µ1) (g1 · 0 + (1− g1) · 2)
= (4g1 − 3)µ1 + 2(1− g1) .
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Using the notation µ
1
:= minµ∈M µ1 and µ¯1 := maxµ∈M µ1, the worst posterior is
µworst =

(
µ
1
, 1− µ
1
)
if g1 >
3
4
any µ ∈M if g1 = 34
(µ¯1, 1− µ¯1) if g1 < 34 .
(4.10)
We rewrite Eµ[u] = g1 (4µ1 − 2) + 2 − 3µ1. From that we can infer that g1 is chosen
minimal if the relevant posterior fulfills µ1 < 1/2 and g1 is chosen maximal if the relevant
posterior fulfills µ1 > 1/2. Our assumption λ < 3/4 implies for all signal realizations
µ
1
< 1/2 and µ¯1 > 1/2. Thus for g1 ≥ 3/4, it is optimal to lower g1 as much as possible.
Considering the case g1 ≤ 3/4, it is optimal to increase g1 as much as possible. Taken
together, this shows g∗ = (3/4, 1/4), independent of the signal realization. In words, the
optimal action of the meu decision-maker (both after receiving s = s1 and s = s2) is to
mix over actions a1 and a2 with the ratio 3 to 1.
As we have shown above, this is different from the behavior prescribed in C¸elen’s frame-
work, given in expression (4.9). This shows the dynamic inconsistency and thus illustrates
the incompatibility of C¸elen’s framework with the recursive setting of Epstein and Schnei-
der [2003, 2007].
Chapter 5
Implementing Ambiguity - the
Monopoly Market
5.1 Models with Perfect and Imperfect Information
Every economic model is an attempt to provide a simplified description of the world
with the inherent objective to obtain a better understanding of real-world phenomena
as well as complex economic interrelations and interactions. Since every model is just
a simplification of the real world, it neglects a certain number of influencing factors or
determinants and is therefore strictly speaking ”always wrong”, compare Box and Draper
[1987], page 424. As such, constructing a model goes hand in hand with a process of for-
mal abstraction in which the modeler is required to identify and select a certain number of
influencing factors, or variables, that he or she deems relevant for the underlying analysis.
The primitives of each model specify these variables and establish logical relationships
between them. Deardorff [2001] gives the following definition of an economic model: An
economic model is ”a collection of assumptions, often expressed as equations relating vari-
ables, from which inferences can be derived about economic behavior and performance.”
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Let me hereafter introduce a simple and well-known example for a stylized ”economic
model” that is going to serve as a template for the considerations of this chapter.
Example 5.1 (Monopoly with Linear Demand under Certainty). Consider a monopoly
market and a firm that produces a homogeneous good. Market demand is linear and
given by
D(p) = max{0, a− bp, 0}
where a, b > 0 are parameters and p denotes the price of the good. The parameter
a can be interpreted as the maximum number of possible customers whereas the slope
parameter b captures how fast demand decreases when prices increase. Moreover, the
firm faces a marginal cost of c > 0 for producing one unit of the good and no fixed costs.
The firm is assumed to set a price such that its profit
Π(p) = (p− c)D(p)
is maximized. The profit function is continuous, since sums and products of continuous
functions are continuous. Moreover, the objective is piecewise continuously differentiable
with a kink at p0 =
a
b
. The following proposition describes the solution of the monopolist’s
Figure 5.1: Objective in the Certainty Case
optimization problem in the certainty case.
Chapter 5. Monopoly Pricing Under Ambiguity 163
Corollary 5.1. The solution of the monopolist’s optimization problem under certainty
is given by
pcertainty =

pM = a+bc
2b
a > bc
[p0,∞) a ≤ bc
Proof. The proof is contained in the last section of this chapter.
The result of Proposition 5.1 can be interpreted in the following way: As long as the
marginal cost parameter is small enough, the monopolist charges the monopoly price pM .
As marginal costs increase, the monopoly price pM increases as well. As soon as the
monopoly price exceeds the threshold value p0 =
a
b
, demand is zero. As a consequence,
the best the monopolist can do in such cases is to secure a profit of zero by setting a price
p ≥ p0.
Implicitly, this model features assumptions on the firm’s state of knowledge with respect
to the underlying variables and relationships. To be more precise, the calculation of the
monopoly price presumes that the firm manager knows the relationship between prices
and market demand, as well as the underlying cost structure of the firm. The start-
ing point for the introduction of ambiguity into preexisting economic models consists in
identifying each agent’s degree of information with respect to the underlying parameters.
Doing so, one can roughly distinguish between two different cases which are treated in
the following. The case of perfect information, where the decision-maker knows a certain
parameter or functional relationship, and the case of imperfect information where this
knowledge is at least partially absent. The simple monopoly model is an example for
perfect information, since all relevant parameters are assumed to be known.
Whether it is reasonable to drop the assumption of perfect information for a specific
variable or not strongly depends on the modeling context and the narrative of the under-
lying problem. Assume, for instance, that the monopolist can rely on a number of high
quality market studies, and that all of these studies indicate that market demand in the
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current state of the economy is given by D(p). Moreover, assume that the monopolist
has been operating successfully in the market for many years and that the results of the
market research studies correspond to the monopolist’s experience from past years. In
such a case, it seems inappropriate to assume that, given the overwhelming evidence, the
monopolist would perceive market demand as uncertain in the current state of the econ-
omy. On the other hand, if we consider situations where performing market studies is too
costly or time-consuming, or where the monopolist issues a completely new product into
the market, one can more easily support the hypothesis that the assumption of perfect
information is doubtful.
Imperfect information prescribes the presence of uncertainty. According to Knight [1921],
uncertainty can be classified into two categories: risk and ambiguity. In cases where uncer-
tainties are captured by risk, decision-makers ignore a crucial parameter or relationship,
but they know the set of possible outcomes for this parameter and the probability for
each of these outcomes. The following section extends Example 5.1 to a scenario where
the monopolist ignores the overall number of consumers a.
Example 5.2 (Monopoly with Linear Demand under Risk). Suppose the monopolist
knows that there are two scenarios: In the first scenario, the overall number of consumers
is high and denoted by aH > 0; in the second scenario, there is a smaller, but positive,
number of consumers 0 < aL < aH .
1 Besides, the monopolist knows the probability of
each scenario. Let s ∈ (0, 1) denote the probability that aH is the true underlying pa-
rameter.2 Then, market demand is given by D1(p) = max{0, aH − bp, 0} with probability
s and by D2(p) = max{0, aL − bp, 0} with probability 1− s. Under the assumption that
the monopolist maximizes his expected profit, we obtain the following objective:
Es[Π](p) := (p− c) (sD1(p) + (1− s)D2(p))
1If we had aH = aL, we would be back in the certainty case.
2At this point, I exclude the extreme cases s = 0 and s = 1, since the solution of these cases
corresponds to the certainty case treated in Example 5.1. This can be achieved by replacing the demand
function D(p) with D1(p) or D2(p) respectively.
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Throughout the rest of the paper, I condense the notation slightly writing Es[Π] instead
of Es[Π](p) if not otherwise specified. Knowing that sums and products of continuous
functions are continuous, we can infer that the monopolist’s profit function is also con-
tinuous. Furthermore, the objective is only piecewise continuously differentiable. This is
because it has two kinks at p0 =
aL
b
and p1 =
aH
b
, see Figure 5.2 for an illustration. The
Figure 5.2: Objective Function Under Risk
following proposition characterizes the solution of the monopoly model under risk.
Proposition 5.1. The following prices are possible solutions of the monopolist’s opti-
mization problem under risk:
1. p∗ = saH+(1−s)aL+bc
2b
2. p∗∗ = aH+bc
2b
3. p∗∗∗ ∈ [p1,∞].
Which of these candidates is the global maximizer depends on the underlying parameter
constellations and the threshold value
sˆ =
(b c− aL)2
(aL − aH)2
.
The price p∗ is the only solution of the optimization problem if one of the following sets
of conditions is met:
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1. C1: bc < 2aL − aH
2. C2: aH ≥ max{bc, 2aL − bc}, 2aL − saH − (1− s)aL ≥ bc, and s ∈ [0, sˆ) ∪ {1}
3. C3: aH ≥ max{bc, 2aL − bc}, 2aL − saH − (1− s)aL ≥ bc, and sˆ > 1
The price p∗∗ is the only solution of the optimization problem if one of the following sets
of requirements holds:
4. C4: aH ≥ max{bc, 2aL − bc}, 2aL − saH − (1− s)aL ≥ bc, and s ∈ (sˆ, 1)
5. C5: aH ≥ max{bc, 2aL − bc} and 2aL − saH − (1− s)aL ≤ bc
Both p∗ and p∗∗ are the solution of the optimization problem if the following assumptions
are met:
6. C6: aH ≥ max{bc, 2aL − bc}, 2aL − saH − (1− s)aL ≥ bc, and s ∈ {sˆ, 1}
Every p∗∗∗ ∈ [p1,∞] is a solution of the optimization problem if the following condition
is satisfied:
7. C7: aH < bc
Proof. The proof is contained in the last section of this chapter.
The result of Proposition 5.1 can be summarized in the subsequent manner: The optimal
monopoly price crucially depends on marginal costs. There are three cases. In the first
case, marginal costs are so small such that the demand remains positive in both potential
scenarios aH and aL. The second case deals with intermediate values of c; it can either
occur that the monopoly price yields positive demand for both scenarios, or that the
demand in the low number of consumers scenario aL is zero but remains positive in the
high number of consumers scenario aH . Whether p
∗ or p∗∗ is the solution depends on the
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probability s and the threshold value sˆ. If s equals one, the model reduces to a model
of certainty with a = aH . In this case p
∗ = p∗∗ is the optimum. For small values of s,
the monopolist expects the low consumer scenario aL to materialize. Consequently, the
monopolist’s objective gives a small weight to scenario aH and a large weight to scenario
aL. Under these assumptions, the price p
∗ is optimal. The threshold value sˆ has no bite
when both scenarios aL and aH are sufficiently similar. In cases where difference between
aH and aL is large enough
3, p∗∗ is optimal if the monopolist’s belief s gives sufficiently
weight to scenario aH . Finally, if marginal costs are so large that the corner solution price
p∗∗ exceeds the value p1 = aHb , we can infer that D1(p
∗∗) = D2(p∗∗) = 0. Hence, the best
the monopolist can do is to secure a profit of zero. This can be achieved by any price
p∗∗∗ ∈ [p1,∞).
Note that the higher the probability s of the high demand scenario, the higher the result-
ing monopoly price p∗. In cases where one of the corner solutions p∗∗ or p∗∗∗ is optimal,
the monopoly price is independent of s.
5.2 Why Ambiguity?
Whether the monopolist’s imperfect information with respect to an underlying variable
should be modeled by a decision-theoretic framework featuring risk, or by a framework
featuring ambiguity, is a challenging question that cannot be answered completely satis-
factorily. Under ambiguity, the decision-maker knows the set of possible outcomes but is
confronted with a lack of (reliable) probabilistic information. In fact, ambiguity presumes
that, due to the absence of crucial information, the monopolist is incapable of assigning a
well-defined probability to the events {aH} and {aL}. Therefore, the real underlying issue
is to assess whether we can justify the existence of a well-defined probability distribution
that the monopolist may use as a basis for his decision-making process.
The existence problem is at the same time mathematical and philosophical in nature and
3The threshold value sˆ converges to zero if the difference ∆a = |aH −AL| converges to infinity.
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broadly discussed in the literature. From a mathematical point of view, a probability is
defined via Kolmogorov’s axioms, see Kolmogorov [1950] for more details. Kolmogorov’s
axioms result in a sound formal theory but leave room for interpretation when it comes to
answering the question where probabilities come from and how to interpret them. This is
exactly the point where the philosophical discussion on probabilities sets in. The problem
of appropriately defining probabilities has been addressed by different schools of thought.
A discussion of these can be found in many textbooks on decision-theory and philosophy.
In the following, I summarize and discuss briefly the main interpretations of probabilities
introduced in Peterson [2009] starting with Laplace’s classical definition of probabilities,
see Laplace and Truscott [1814].
According to Laplace’s notion of probabilities, a probability is defined as a ratio, namely
the number of favorable cases divided by the total number of cases where each case is
presumed to be ”equally possible”. As an example of the classical definition of a proba-
bility, consider, for instance, an urn containing r1 red balls and r2 blue balls. Then, the
probability of drawing a red ball is the number of favorable cases r1 divided by the total
number of cases r1 + r2. The classical definition of probabilities has its limitations. It
is, for instance, not clear whether events can always be divided in such a way that they
are equally possible. Moreover, the procedure of dividing the state space into equally
possible events needs to be done by using symmetry arguments, such as the principle of
insufficient reason, in order to avoid the problem of circular logical arguments,4 compare
Ha´jek [2012]. Secondly, the classical definition only applies to finite state spaces.
The second notion for probabilities is the so-called frequentist definition. Frequentism
presumes that probabilities directly arise from empirical observations; therefore, a prob-
ability is defined as relative frequency. Formally, the probability of an event A is defined
as the number of observations in which A occurred divided by the total number of ob-
servations, see for instance Peterson [2009], pp. 136-137. The problem of the frequency
definition is that different series of observations give rise to different probabilities. An
4Otherwise, one would implicitly assume that ”equally possible” has the same meaning as ”equally
probable”.
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extension of the frequentist view is proposed by Venn [1888], who attempts to resolve
the problems of the relative frequency definition by assuming that the probability of an
event equals the limit of the relative frequency if the underlying experiment was repeated
infinitely many times. The problem of this alternative definition is that it is not clear
whether it is always possible to repeat an experiment infinitely many times, or whether
the relative frequency really converges, since we cannot observe the whole sequence of
trials.
The third interpretation of probabilities is the propensity definition pioneered by Karl R.
Popper.5 Peterson [2009], pp.139-140, provides the subsequent definition of a probability
according to the propensity approach:
”[...] probabilities can be identified with certain features of the external world, namely
the disposition or tendency of an object to give rise to a certain effect.”
The propensity interpretation is criticized for a variety of reasons. The first one is that
the term ”propensity” is dubious, since it cannot be defined in a clear manner. The
second objection frequently put forward against propensities is that they entail a tempo-
ral structure which precludes Bayes’ theorem.6 See for instance Humphreys [1985] for a
critique on the propensity approach.
The fourth interpretation of probabilities is the so-called logical or epistemic notion of
probabilities. According to Ha´jek [2012], the logical interpretation dates back to Keynes
[1921], Johnson [1921], Jeffreys [1939], and Carnap [1962]. The logical approach assigns
probabilities to hypotheses which are, by definition, unverified logical statements. More
precisely, the logical interpretation presumes that probabilities can be logically deduced
from evidence E supporting a certain hypothesis H, compare Peterson [2009], page 141.
Mathematically speaking, the logical probability p(H|E) assigns a probability to the event
that the hypothesis H is true. Assume, for instance, that we intend to assign a probabil-
ity to the hypothesis that the so-called ”giant impact hypothesis” regarding the moon’s
5Compare Popper [1957] and Popper [1959].
6Compare Peterson [2009], pp. 140-141.
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origin is true. In this case, the underlying logical probability describes how strongly the
giant impact hypothesis is supported, given current scientific evidence at hand. One focus
of the criticism put forward against logical probabilities is the way evidence is connected
to probabilities in Carnap’s approach7 and the fact that probabilities are solely evidence-
dependent excluding the possibility of guesses.8
At this point, I want to mention that there are different perceptions in the literature on
how to define objective probabilities. Anscombe and Aumann [1963] tie the definition of
objective probabilities to interpersonal agreement. When two persons’ subjective beliefs
coincide, then they are called objective in the sense of Anscombe-Aumann. This approach
is criticized in Gilboa [2009], pp. 138-139. Loosely speaking, the critique is that according
to Anscombe-Aumann’s definition objectiveness might just be the result of a coincidental
match of beliefs. But why should we think that coincidence can be a foundation of an
objective probability? In this thesis, I adopt a more restrictive view on what should be
called an objective probability. Therefore, I adopt the definition proposed in Peterson
[2009], page 133, that objective probabilities are derived from facts in the external world
and not from personal judgment. With this definition in mind, I subsume the classical,
frequentist, logical, and propensity approaches to probability under the term ”objective
probabilities”.
In contrast to objective probabilities, subjective probabilities arise from the agents them-
selves, the ”subjects”, and can be interpreted as individual assessments of risky situations.
Therefore, subjective probabilities are frequently denoted as ”beliefs”. The subjective def-
inition does not require the agents to derive probabilities from facts or knowledge, the
”objects”, related to the problem. Major contributions for the subjective interpretation
originate from Ramsey [1931], De Finetti [1937], and Savage [1954]. Briefly summarized,
the subjective approach allows us the elicitation of beliefs by offering hypothetical bets.
Note that according to Ramsey [1931], agents are not required to ”know” their subjective
probability. It is rather that, if agents conform to Savage’s axioms, one can infer their
7There is the need to introduce some weighting between different pieces of evidence, compare Ha´jek
[2012], page 11, for more details.
8See Peterson [2009], page 141.
Chapter 5. Monopoly Pricing Under Ambiguity 171
subjective beliefs by observing their betting behavior. The subjective interpretation of
probabilities is criticized for the fact that beliefs are attached to preferences. In a sense,
it is not excluded that a preference for certain states of the world influences an agent’s
personal probabilistic judgments, compare Ha´jek [2012] for more details.
Following the discussion of the different schools of thought on probability, I return to the
initial question of this section, namely which prerequisites need to be satisfied such that
the implementation of ambiguity into preexisting economic models is justified. In order
to answer this question, we should keep in mind that the concept of ambiguity obviously
originates from the subjective school of thought on probabilities. Both the subjective
school and the advocates of ambiguity models share the view that beliefs can be purely
subjective in nature. But wherein lies the difference? Remember, the development of
non-expected utility models originates from Ellsberg’s discovery that agents’ behavior
might contradict the existence of a single subjective belief.
Taking these considerations together, one realizes that modelers face two major obstacles
when implementing ambiguity preferences.
The first obstacle is to provide a sound justification of why objective probabilities seem
inappropriate in the context of the model setup. Given the strict definition of objec-
tive probabilities in Peterson [2009], one can see that the derivation of such probabilities
presumes the availability of facts or evidence from the external world. Conversely, this
means that the justification of objective probabilities is not guaranteed whenever agents
are insufficiently informed about these facts and therefore prone to rely on individual
probabilistic judgments.
Frequently, the rationale in this step boils down to one, or several, of the following rea-
sons: First of all, agents might lack crucial data; data might be absent or inaccessible
and its procurement time-consuming or associated with high costs. Secondly, even if data
was available, it could originate from an unreliable source of information and therefore be
judged as insufficient or imprecise. Finally, there is the possibility that agents dispose of
contradictory information, or information highlighting different aspects of the underlying
uncertainty.
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The second obstacle to ambiguity is to argue why agents violate SEU. Suppose that a set
of conditions was identified such that the hypothesis of subjective probabilities can be
supported. If the agents conform to the axioms of Savage [1954], one can ”replace” ob-
jective probabilities with subjective ones and conduct an analysis based on the expected
utility calculus. Since SEU is widely considered as the benchmark model of decision mak-
ing under uncertainty, it is indispensable to point out why the agents might not conform
to this model. The main argument frequently put forward to support this hypothesis
is the Ellsberg paradox by Ellsberg [1961]. It demonstrates that, in situations where
probabilities are not objectively given, decision-makers might display preferences that
refute the hypothesis of subjective probabilities. The validity of the Ellsberg paradox has
been confirmed by a variety of experimental studies such as Camerer and Weber [1992]
or Halevy [2007].
On the whole, modelers are confronted with two major challenges when arguing in favor
of ambiguity models. The first one is to support the hypothesis that probabilities are
unlikely to be objective, and the second one is to refute the SEU model.
At the end of this section, I want to point out that whenever one decides to generalize
a baseline model by making use of non-expected utility models, you find yourself implic-
itly in the tradition of the Non-Bayesian school of thought on probabilities and decision
making. The decision whether or not to include ambiguity into economic models is not
necessarily a question of ”right” or ”wrong” that can be easily determined along a series
of clear-cut objective criteria. It is rather a commitment to the Non-Bayesian approach
which needs defense on the grounds of plausible reasoning.
5.3 Implications of Ambiguity for Monopoly Pricing
The previous section of this chapter addresses the question whether it is appropriate to
introduce ambiguity into a preexisting baseline model or not. In the following, I discuss
the implications of the most prominent models of decision making under uncertainty for
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the baseline monopoly example. Note that the problem of monopoly pricing under am-
biguity is addressed by a novel strain of literature in Industrial Organization. Asano and
Shibata [2011] consider a continuous-time dynamic pricing model where a monopolist
can make irreversible quality investments. The authors find that, contrary to risk, the
presence of Knightian uncertainty decreases prices and optimal quality. Bergemann and
Schlag [2011] investigate monopoly pricing under MEU and the minimax regret criterion.
The authors find that both decision criteria lead to lower monopoly prices than under a
certainty. Using a maxmin rule, a recent paper by Zheng et al. [2015] investigates optimal
non-linear monopoly pricing under ambiguity. There is a continuum of different types
of buyers. Each type is characterized by a certain valuation for the product. Knightian
uncertainty is modeled by so-called ε-contaminations, see Eichberger and Kelsey [1999]
for more details. The authors find that, under Knightian uncertainty, the monopolist
assumes a larger portion of buyers to have the lowest possible valuation of the product.
Besides, the monopolist adjusts her pricing strategy under ambiguity by offering a larger
discount to all consumers.
The objective of this section is to investigate the pricing problem in a simple static
framework for the most prominent models of decision making under uncertainty. In this
context, I assume that the monopolist is risk-neutral and faces demand ambiguity with
respect to the intercept a. Moreover, I abstract from quality investments. Contrary to
Asano and Shibata [2011] and Bergemann and Schlag [2011], I can demonstrate that
Knightian uncertainty can increase or decrease optimal prices. Besides, I can show that,
due to the possibility of corner solutions, there are instances where ambiguity has no
effect on optimal prices.
An important point to be considered is whether the monopolist’s attitude towards am-
biguity should be included into the model framework or not. Naturally, this question
is closely related to the research agenda intended by the introduction of ambiguity. If,
for instance, the aim of research solely consists in comparing a risky environment with
an ambiguous situation characterized by extreme pessimism, then the MMEU model de-
veloped by Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989] might be the right choice, since it features a
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simple and parsimonious formal structure, which is sufficient to address the underlying
question. In terms of the monopoly example the underlying question would be how the
monopoly price is affected if the monopolist features extreme pessimism with respect to
the maximum number of consumers.
Example 5.3 (Monopoly with Linear Demand and MMEU-Preferences). MMEU-pre-
ferences presume that the monopolist’s beliefs are represented by a nonempty, closed,
and convex set of priors P , see Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989], page 145. Since I consider
only a model with two outcomes, we can associate every prior (s, 1− s) with the number
s ∈ [0, 1]. By using this simplified notation, we can represent P by means of a compact
interval P = [s, s] where 0 ≤ s < s ≤ 1. Under MMEU, the monopolist’s optimization
problem is given by
max
p≥0
min
s∈[s,s]
Es[Π] (5.1)
where
Es[Π] = (p− c)(sD1(p) + (1− s)D2(p))
denotes the expected profit given the belief (s, 1 − s). As in the risk case, the objective
function has two kinks at p0 =
aL
b
and p1 =
aH
b
. The following corollary states the
monopolist’s worst-case priors.
Corollary 5.2. The prior sworst inducing worst-case expected profits is given by
sworst :=

s for p < c
[s, s] for p = c
s for c < p < aH
b
[s, s] for p ≥ aH
b
Proof. The proof is contained in the last section of this chapter.
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By using Corollary 5.2, we obtain the following representation for the reduced objective:
Esworst [Π] =: Ψ(p) =

Es[Π] for 0 ≤ p < c
Es[Π] for p ≥ c
Note that
Es[Π] = Es[Π] = Es[Π] = 0
for p = c and p ≥ aH
b
. Therefore, we can replace Esworst [Π] by Es[Π] in cases where p
equals the marginal cost parameter c or where p exceeds the threshold value aH
b
. The
monopolist’s problem can be expressed as
max
p≥0
Ψ(p). (5.2)
The subsequent corollary characterizes the solution of problem (5.1).
Corollary 5.3. The following prices are possible solutions of the monopolist’s optimiza-
tion problem under MMEU-preferences:
1. p∗pess =
saH+(1−s)aL+bc
2b
2. p∗∗pess =
aH+bc
2b
3. p∗∗∗pess ∈ [p1,∞]
Which of these candidates is the global maximizer depends on the Conditions C1 to C7
and the threshold value sˆ defined in Proposition 5.1. Note that it is necessary to replace
the probability s with the worst-case prior s in Conditions C2 to C6. The price p
∗
pess is
the only solution of the optimization problem if one of the Conditions C1, C2, or C3 is
satisfied. The price p∗∗pess is the only solution of the optimization problem if the Condition
C4 or the Condition C5 holds. Both p
∗
pess and p
∗∗
pess are global maximizers if Requirement
C6 is met. Every p
∗∗∗
pess ∈ [p1,∞] is a solution of the optimization problem if C7 holds.
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Proof. The proof is contained in the last section of this chapter.
Note that the risky monopoly price p∗, which is defined in Example 5.2, is at least as large
as the pessimistic monopoly price p∗pess in cases where the belief s is not smaller than the
worst-case belief s. This condition is automatically fulfilled when the monopolist relies
on a full prior set P = [0, 1]. In cases where P is a strict subset of [0, 1], we can conclude
that p∗ is smaller than p∗pess if s < s. Such a scenario is not very plausible, since it
presumes that the monopolist exhibits stronger pessimistic under risk than in the worst-
case scenario under ambiguity. The concept of a prior set, however, implicitly assumes
that P contains all conceivable priors from an ex-ante perspective. For this reason, one
could argue that, in such cases, the prior set P lacks a crucial belief.
What we learned so far from the MMEU-approach is that extreme pessimism with respect
to the maximum number of consumers leads to a lower monopoly price than in a scenario
where the monopolist holds a subjective belief s with s > s. These results are consistent
with the findings of Asano and Shibata [2011] and Bergemann and Schlag [2011]. A
legitimate question, which cannot be answered by the MMEU-model, is, what happens if
the monopolist displays optimism instead of pessimism. It remains unclear how ambiguity
affects monopoly pricing for intermediate cases of optimism and pessimism. Is it that an
increase in optimism always yields a higher monopoly price? A model accommodating
different attitudes towards ambiguity is the α-MEU model by Ghirardato et al. [2004].
Example 5.4 (Monopoly under α-MEU). A monopolist making use of the α-MEU heuris-
tics maximizes the objective
max
p≥0
{
α min
s∈[s,s]
Es[Π] + (1− α) max
s∈[s,s]
Es[Π]
}
(5.3)
where
Es[Π] = (p− c)(sD1(p) + (1− s)D2(p))
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denotes the expected profit given the belief (s, 1 − s). Following a reasoning similar to
the one developed in Example 5.3, I identify the monopolist’s worst- and best-case priors
before deriving optimal prices. Since the worst-case priors are the same as in the MMEU
case, see Corollary 5.2, I proceed by characterizing the best-case priors.
Corollary 5.4. The monopolist’s best-case priors
sbest := arg max
s∈[s,s]
Es[Π]
are given by
sbest =

s for p < c
[s, s] for p = c
s for c < p < aH
b
[s, s] for p ≥ aH
b
.
Proof. The proof is contained in the last section of this chapter.
By using Corollary 5.2 and Corollary 5.4, the α-MEU-objective can be rewritten in the
following way:
Ψα(p) =

αEs[Π] + (1− α)Es[Π] for 0 ≤ p < c
αEs[Π] + (1− α)Es[Π] for p ≥ c
(5.4)
Corollary 5.5. Objective (5.4) can be rewritten in the subsequent manner:
Ψα(p) =

Es1(α)[Π] for 0 ≤ p < c
Es2(α)[Π] for p ≥ c
where
s1(α) := αs+ (1− α)s and s2(α) := αs+ (1− α)s.
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Figure 5.3: Objectives for α = 0, α = 12 , and α = 1
Moreover, we can interpret si(α) as a distorted probability
0 ≤ si(α) ≤ 1.
Proof. The proof is contained in the last section of this chapter.
The following corollary characterizes the solution of the monopolist’s optimization prob-
lem under α-MEU.
Corollary 5.6. The following prices are possible solutions of the monopolist’s optimiza-
tion problem under α-MEU preferences:
1. p∗α =
s2(α)aH+(1−s2(α))aL+bc
2b
2. p∗∗α =
aH+bc
2b
3. p∗∗∗α ∈ [p1,∞]
Which of these candidates is the global maximizer depends on the Conditions C1 to C7
and the threshold value sˆ defined in the risk case. Note that it is vital to replace the
probability s with s2(α) in Conditions C2 to C6. The price p
∗
α is the only solution of the
optimization problem if one of the Conditions C1, C2, or C3 is satisfied. The price p
∗∗
α
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is the only solution of the optimization problem if Requirement C4 or Requirement C5
holds. Both p∗α and p
∗∗
α are the solution of the optimization problem if Condition C6 is
met. Every p∗∗∗α ∈ [p1,∞] is a solution of the optimization problem if Condition C7 holds.
Proof. The proof is contained in the last section of this chapter.
Now, we can answer the initial question of this paragraph. How does the monopoly price
change if the monopolist is more optimistic? Taking the derivative of p∗α with respect to
α yields
∂p∗α
∂α
=
(s− s)(aH − aL)
2b
< 0.
Hence, a higher degree of optimism yields a higher monopoly price in cases where the
interior solution p∗α is optimal. The monopoly price is independent of α in cases where
the corner solutions p∗∗α and p
∗∗∗
α are optimal. Moreover, the α-MEU approach contains
the the MMEU-example as a special case for α = 1.
The problem of the α-MEU model is that it still lacks a sound axiomatic foundation. As
a consequence, agents’ choices are based on a heuristic approach. This complicates the
empirical validation of the model as well. If an axiomatic foundation is desirable or nec-
essary, the modeler needs to discard the α-MEU model. Another argument against the
α-MEU and MMEU model is that both frameworks cannot accommodate how strongly
decision-makers are exposed to ambiguity. Is it really realistic to assume that the magni-
tude of ambiguity has no influence on the monopolist’s decisions? Imagine, for instance,
that the monopolist can rely on a data set on market demand, which has some predictive
power. However, due to personal experience, the monopolist knows that she cannot fully
trust this data set. The α-MEU approach would prescribe that the monopolist ignores
the data set. Instead, she would look at a convex combination of the worst and best pos-
sible outcome and make her decision according to this decision rule. Prominent models
of decision making under uncertainty accommodating the magnitude of ambiguity are
the Choquet-expected utility model, the variational model of preferences, and the KMM
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model.
Among these models, the Choquet-expected utility model provides the most striking
difference from a structural point of view, since it is the only decision-theoretic model
dismissing the assumption of additive probabilities. The variational and the KMM model
retain additivity9 and rely therefore on a set of priors. Hence, the special appeal of the
CEU-model results from the fact that it can model beliefs with a single structural com-
ponent, the underlying capacity. One of the main advantages of the Choquet model lies
in its tremendous flexibility in modeling beliefs. An interesting class of capacities are
neo-additive capacities, since they allow for the separation of confidence, or the degree of
ambiguity, and a decision-maker’s attitude towards ambiguity. In addition, neo-additive
capacities incorporate the α-MEU heuristics and the MMEU model as special cases.
Example 5.5 (Monopoly under Neo-Additive Capacities). In this example, a more for-
mal approach is required to derive the monopolist’s objective. To begin with, assume
that there is a state space Ω consisting of two elements ω1 and ω2 with the following
interpretations: The event {ω1} occurs when the monopolist faces the high consumer
scenario aH . Similarly, the event {ω2} occurs in the low consumer scenario aL. Moreover,
the monopolist’s beliefs are represented by a finite set of priors P ⊂ ∆(Ω) where ∆(Ω)
denotes the simplex
∆(Ω) :=
{
(s1, s2) : s1 + s2 = 1, s1 ≥ 0, s2 ≥ 0
}
.
Since the state space consists of two elements only, we can represent every prior in
(s1, s2) ∈ ∆(Ω) by its first component s1 ∈ [0, 1], which is the probability of the high
demand scenario. Using this simplified notation, we can describe the prior set P by
P =
{
s1, ..., sn : si ∈ [0, 1], si 6= sj for i 6= j
}
.
9To be more precise: the KMM model relies on a set of second-stage priors.
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Without loss of generality, I assume that the probabilities in P are ordered in the following
way:
0 ≤ s := s1 < s2 < ... < sn =: s ≤ 1
If the monopolist knew the true underlying probability s, she could proceed by maximizing
her expected profit with respect to s. In this case, the solution would correspond to the
risk case treated in Example 5.1. In this example, s is unknown. In fact, the monopolist
can derive for every fixed price p ≥ 0 and every prior si ∈ P an expected profit of the
form
Esi [Π](p) := (p− c)
(
siD1(p) + (1− si)D2(p)
)
.
Henceforth, X(p) denotes the collection of these expected profits. Formally,
X(p) :=
{
Esi [Π](p) : si ∈ P
}
.
In the following, I assume that there is a second-stage belief ν defined on the set of first-
stage priors P , which reflects the monopolist’s uncertainty with respect to the beliefs in
the prior set P . The value ν(s) denotes the monopolist’s belief, or subjective probability,
that (s, 1− s) is the true distribution of possible demand realizations in the future. The
belief ν is assumed to be a neo-additive capacity. The following definition of a neo-additive
capacity is adopted from Eichberger et al. [2009], page 359:
Definition 5.1. Let q = (q1, ..., qn) be a probability measure on (P ,Σ) where Σ denotes
a σ-algebra of events on P . Then, for real numbers α and δ we can define a neo-additive
capacity ν by ν(∅) = 0, ν(Φ) = 1, ν(A) = δα + (1− δ)q(A) where A ∈ Σ is a nonempty
and strict subset of P .
The monopolist is assumed to be a Choquet-expected utility maximizer, see Schmeidler
[1989] for an axiomatization of Choquet expected utilities. The Choquet model pre-
sumes that a decision-maker maximizes a Choquet integral with respect to a capacity.
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Chateauneuf et al. [2007] demonstrate for the class of neo-additive beliefs that the re-
spective Choquet integral can be expressed in the following way:10
∫
P
fdν = (1− δ)Eq[f ] + δ
(
αmax{x : f−1(x) /∈ N}+ (1− α) min{x : f−1(x) /∈ N}
)
(5.5)
In this context, f : P → R denotes a measurable function with finite range. N = {A ∈
Σ : ν(A) = 0} is the collection of null-events of ν, Eq[f ] is the expectation of f with
respect to the probability distribution q, max{x : f−1(x) /∈ N} denotes the best case of
f given x is not the realization of a null-event and min{x : f−1(x) /∈ N} denotes the
worst-case of f given x is not the realization of a null-event.
In this example, f depends on prices and assigns to each prior si ∈ P an expected profit
Esi [Π](p). Formally, we consider for each fixed p a mapping
f(si|p) := Esi [Π](p). (5.6)
This definition of f corresponds to the intuition that the monopolist maximizes a gener-
alized average of expected profit functions. The difference to a standard risk approach is
that this average is taken with respect to a distorted probability ν. Using the definition
of f(·|p), we can derive the monopolist’s objective. It is
U(p) :=
∫
P
f(·|p)dν = (1− δ)
n∑
i=1
qiEsi [Π](p)
+ δ
[
αmax
si∈P
Esi [Π](p) + (1− α) min
si∈P
Esi [Π](p)
] (5.7)
The expectation
n∑
i=1
qiEsi [Π](p) can be rewritten in the following way:
10See Lemma 3.1 in Chateauneuf et al. [2007], page 541.
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n∑
i=1
qiEsi [Π](p) =
n∑
i=1
(p− c)qi(siD1(p) + (1− si)D2(p))
= (p− c)
n∑
i=1
(qisiD1(p) + qi(1− si)D2(p))
= (p− c)(s˜D1(p) + (1− s˜)D2(p))
= Es˜[Π](p)
where
s˜ =
n∑
i=1
qisi.
Hence, we obtain the following representation of the objective:
U(p) = (1− δ)Es˜[Π] + δ
(
αmin
s∈P
Es[Π] + (1− α) max
s∈P
Es[Π]
)
(5.8)
The following corollary gives the solution of the monopolist’s problem under neo-additive
capacities.
Corollary 5.7. The following prices are possible solutions of the monopolist’s optimiza-
tion problem under neo-additive capacities:
1. p∗α,δ =
s2(α,δ)aH+(1−s2(α,δ))aL+bc
2b
2. p∗∗α,δ =
aH+bc
2b
3. p∗∗∗α,δ ∈ [p1,∞]
The parameter s2(α, δ) is defined as
s2(α, δ) = (1− δ)s˜+ δ(αs+ (1− α)s)
= (1− δ)
n∑
i=1
qisi + δ(αs1 + (1− α)sn)
(5.9)
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and can be interpreted as a distorted probability. Which of these price candidates is the
global maximizer depends on the Conditions C1 to C7 and the threshold value sˆ defined in
the risk case. Note that it is vital to replace the probability s with s2(α, δ) in Conditions
C2 to C6. The price p
∗
α,δ is the only solution of the optimization problem if one of the
Conditions C1, C2, or C3 is satisfied. The price p
∗∗
α,δ is the only solution of the optimization
problem if Condition C4 or Condition C5 holds. Both p
∗
α,δ and p
∗∗
α,δ are the solution of the
optimization problem if Requirement C6 is met. Every p
∗∗∗
α,δ ∈ [p1,∞] is a solution of the
optimization problem if C7 holds.
Proof. The proof is contained in the last section of this chapter.
Corollary 5.8. In cases where the interior solution p∗α,δ is optimal, the following c.p.
comparative static results hold:
1. A higher degree of optimism yields a higher monopoly price.
2. There exists a threshold value αˆ, which is given by αˆ = 1− s˜, such that an increase
in δ yields a higher monopoly price for α < αˆ and a lower monopoly price for α > αˆ.
In the special case α = αˆ, the monopoly price is independent of δ.
Proof. The proof is contained in the last section of this chapter.
Figure 5.4: Objectives for δ = 0, δ = 0.5, and δ = 1 in Case of Extreme Optimism
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Figure 5.5: Objectives for δ = 0, δ = 0.5, and δ = 1 in Case of Extreme Pessimism
Figure 5.6: Objectives for δ = 0, δ = 0.5, and δ = 1 in the Intermediate Case α = αˆ
The results of Corollary 5.8 can be interpreted in the following way: The fact that a
higher degree of optimism yields a higher monopoly price is in line with the results from
the MMEU and α-MEU example. As the monpolist expects a lower demand, she adjusts
prices downwards. The special feature of the neo-additive model is the parameter δ,
which captures how strongly the monopolist incorporates the expected profit Es[Π] into
the objective function. When δ increases, the monopolist gives a lower decision weight
to the expectation Es[Π]. Whether the monopolist adjusts prices up- or downwards
depends on the optimism parameter α. If the monopolist is extremely optimistic, then
a higher value of δ increases the monopoly price. The converse statement holds if the
monopolist is extremely pessimistic. For an intermediate value α = αˆ the monopoly price
is independent of δ and remains unchanged as δ increases.
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An alternative to the Choquet model is the variational model of preference developed by
Maccheroni et al. [2006], which incorporates the so-called multiplier preferences developed
by Hansen and Sargent [2001], and the MMEU-model as special cases. An important
distinguishing feature of the variational model is that it allows preferences to change
whenever there are either changes in the variability of outcomes, or outcomes are shifted
up- or downwards, see Machina and Siniscalchi [2014], page 32. The variational model
applies to situations where the commitment to a particular probabilistic scenario incurs
a cost to the decision-maker. In the multiplier model, this cost takes a specific form,
which can be interpreted as the cost of deviating from an underlying reference probability
function.
Example 5.6 (Monopoly under Multiplier Preferences). Given multiplier preferences,
the monopolist’s optimization problem is given by
max
p≥0
min
s∈[s,s]
{
Es[Π] + γR(s, s
∗)
}
where R(s, s∗) denotes the relative entropy, or Kullback-Leibler divergence, of s∗ from s;
γ ≥ 0 is a parameter and P = [s, s] is a compact and convex set of priors with 0 ≤ s <
s ≤ 1. In cases where γ equals zero, we obtain the MMEU objective. Consequently, the
solution for this special case is already known. For γ > 0, the monopolist gives positive
weight to the relative entropy. The relative entropy is always non-negative due to Gibb’s
inequality, see Falk [1970] for a proof. Moreover, we can infer that R(s, s∗) = 0 if the
distributions of s and s∗ coincide almost everywhere. The Kullback-Leibler divergence is
a distance measure for probability distributions. Hence, if γ is positive, the monopolist
faces two countervailing effects as he determines his worst-case prior. One of these effects
arises from minimizing the expected profit Es[Π]. As a consequence of Example 5.3, the
worst-case prior of Es[Π] is given by the upper or lower boundary of the interval [s, s],
depending on whether prices are strictly smaller or larger than marginal costs. The second
effect arises from minimizing the relative entropy R(s, s∗). Since R attains the minimum
for s = s∗, the monopolist faces a cost for not selecting a prior close to s∗. Throughout
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this example, I assume that s∗ ∈ [s, s]. This restriction makes sense for the following
reason: The monopolist considers s∗ as a reference probability; if γ is strictly larger than
zero, the monopolist takes into account the distance between the worst-case prior s and
s∗, large distances from s∗ are ”punished” by a larger relative entropy. If that is the case,
why should the monopolist discard s∗ as a possible probabilistic scenario? An exclusion
of s∗ could therefore be considered as logically inconsistent.
In order to solve the optimization problem, I proceed by solving the prior-minimization-
problem first.
Proposition 5.2. The minimizing prior
smin := arg min
s∈[s,s]
{
Es[Π] + γR(s, s
∗)
}
in the monopoly model with multiplier preferences is given by
smin =

sworst for γ = 0
s for γ > 0 ∧ p ∈ A1 = [0,min{c, pˆ1}]
s∗f1
s∗f1+(1−s∗)f2 for γ > 0 ∧ p ∈ A2 =
[
max{0, pˆ1},min{aLb , pˆ2}
]
s for γ > 0 ∧ p ∈ A3 =
[
max{c, pˆ2}, aLb
]
or 0 < γ ≤ γˆ ∧ p ∈ A4 =
[
max{aLb , pˆ3},min{pˆ4, aHb }
]
s∗f3
s∗f3+(1−s∗)f4 for 0 < γ ≤ γˆ ∧ p ∈ A5 =
[
aL
b ,min{pˆ3, aHb }
]
or 0 < γ ≤ γˆ ∧ p ∈ A6 =
[
max{aLb , pˆ4}, aHb
]
or γ > γˆ ∧ p ∈ A7 =
[
aL
b ,
aH
b
]
s∗ for 0 < γ ∧ p ∈ A8 = [aHb ,∞)
or 0 < γ ∧ p ∈ A9 = {c}
where sworst denotes the worst-case prior derived in Corollary 5.2 and
(1) f1 = e
aHc+aLp
γ , f2 = e
aLc+aHp
γ , f3 = e
aHc+bp
2
γ , f4 = e
(aH+bc)p
γ
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(2) h1 =
s(1−s∗)
s∗(1−s) , h2 =
s(1−s∗)
s∗(1−s)
(3) pˆ1 = c− log(h1)γaH−aL
(5) pˆ2 = c− log(h2)γaH−aL
(6) pˆ3 =
aH+bc
2b
−
√
(aH+bc)2
4b2
− aHc+ γ log(h2)
(7) pˆ4 =
aH+bc
2b
+
√
(aH+bc)2
4b2
− aHc+ γ log(h2)
(8) γˆ =
[
aHc− (aH+bc)24b2
]
Proof. The proof is contained in the last section of this chapter.
By making use of Proposition 5.2, we obtain the reduced optimization problem
max
p≥0
{
Esmin [Π] + γR(smin, s
∗)
}
.
Corollary 5.9. The monopoly problem with multiplier preferences has a solution.
Proof. The existence of a solution is guaranteed for γ = 0, since the objective reduces
to the objective of the MMEU case. Hence, we continue by considering cases where
γ > 0. From Proposition 5.2, we can infer that the minimum prior is at least a piecewise
continuous function in p. To be more precise, we observe that the minimum prior smin
is continuous on each of the intervals Ai for i = 1, ..., 9. Since sums and products of
continuous functions are continuous, we can deduce that the restriction of the objective
to Ai is a continuous function. All intervals Ai are compact, except A8. By using
Weierstrass’ theorem, we obtain that there is a nonempty set of maximizers Si 6= ∅ for
each domain restriction of the objective, except for the interval A8. On the interval
A8 = [
aH
b
,∞), the objective is zero. Hence, all p ≥ aH
b
are maximizers on A8. As a
consequence, S8 = A8. Since there is only a finite number of sets Si, and since each set Si
is nonempty, we can conclude that the set of global maximizers is nonempty as well.
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The monopoly problem with multiplier preferences has in general no closed-form solution.
This is because the objective’s first order condition can only be solved numerically.
Corollary 5.10. The minimum prior smin satisfies the subsequent limit property:
lim
γ→∞
smin(γ) = s
∗.
Henceforth, let p(γ) denote the solution of the monopoly problem under multiplier pref-
erence for a given parameter γ. Then,
lim
γ→∞
p(γ) = prisk(s∗)
where prisk(s∗) denotes the solution in the risk case with the prior s = s∗. Moreover, the
following comparative static result holds: If p(γ1) and p(γ1) are two interior solutions,
which satisfy the requirements
1. c ≤ p(γi) ≤ aLb
2. 0 < γˆ < γ1 < γ2 <∞,
we can conclude that p(γ1) ≤ p(γ2). Note that the parameter γˆ denotes the threshold
value defined in Corollary 5.2.
Proof. The proof is contained in the last section of this chapter.
Figure 5.7 displays the monopolist’s objective for different values of γ. The monopoly
model with multiplier preferences incorporates two extreme cases. For γ = 0, we obtain
the MMEU model with a monopolist exhibiting extreme pessimism and a low monopoly
price. For γ →∞, the monopolist increasingly assumes that the reference prior s∗ is the
true underlying distribution. Hence, he or she, adjusts prices upwards. Consequently,
the parameter γ can be considered as a measure for the monopolist’s attitude towards
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Figure 5.7: Objectives for γ = 3, γ = 20, γ = 100, and γ = 1000
ambiguity. The difference to the α-MEU and Choquet model with neo-additive capacities
is that the monopolist compares the worst case with a distance measure for probability
distributions, and not with the best-case distribution. A problem of the multiplier ap-
proach is that, contrary to the Choquet model with neo-additive capacities, there is no
clear separation between the monopolist’s attitude towards ambiguity and his confidence
into the reference probability s∗. In fact, as γ increases, the monopolist’s confidence into
the reference probability s∗ increases. At the same time, the monopolist exhibits a lower
degree of pessimism, since the relative weight of the worst-case scenario decreases. An-
other drawback of the multiplier model is that it does not generate a tractable closed-form
solution for the monopoly price.
A prominent model of decision making under uncertainty is the KMM or Smooth Ambi-
guity Model. From a practical point of view, the Smooth model has the advantage that
it allows for the application of differential calculus, and is therefore frequently considered
as a framework which generates tractable results.11 The KMM model allows for a broad
spectrum of different attitudes towards ambiguity which are condensed in a so-called
distortion or transformation function. One of the most important features of the KMM
11See Machina and Siniscalchi [2014], page 27.
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model lies in the fact that it differentiates between first- and second-order beliefs, and
that it precludes, in general, the reduction of compound lotteries.
Example 5.7 (Monopoly with KMM preferences). Assume that there is a set of first-
stage priors P1, which consists of two elements s and s with 0 ≤ s < s ≤ 1. Hence,
there are two probabilistic scenarios, an optimistic one where the monopolist assumes
that the probability for the high demand scenario is given by s, and a pessimistic one
where probability for the high demand scenario is given by s. Moreover, suppose the
monopolist has a second-stage prior (q, 1 − q). The parameter q is the monopolist’s
subjective probability that the pessimistic scenario s is the true probabilistic scenario.
Similarly, 1−q denotes the monopolist’s subjective probability that the optimistic scenario
s reflects the true underlying distribution. In general, the KMM model allows for more
than one second-stage distribution. For the sake of simplicity, I restrict the analysis to
cases with a single second-stage probability. Under these assumptions, we obtain the
following objective for the monopolist:
ΠKMMΦ = Eq[Φ(Es[Π])] = qΦ(Es[Π]) + (1− q)Φ(Es[Π]) (5.10)
A distinguishing feature of the KMM-model is the distortion function Φ. If Φ equals
the identity, the decision-maker is termed ”ambiguity-neutral”, compare Klibanoff et al.
[2005] page 1862 for a definition. Similarly, an agent is called ”ambiguity-averse” in cases
where Φ is concave and ”ambiguity-loving” in cases where Φ is convex. An ambiguity-
neutral decision-maker is able to reduce compound lotteries to a simple lottery. This
special case can be illustrated by means of the monopolist’s objective. We obtain
ΠKMMId = qEs[Π] + (1− q)Es[Π] = Eqs+(1−q)s[Π].
As a consequence, the solution of the monopolist’s optimization problem can be derived
from Proposition 5.1 by replacing s with the prior qs + (1 − q)s. For the general case,
there is no closed-form solution for the monopoly price. Nevertheless, we can compare the
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monopoly price under ”neutrality” with situations where the monopolist is ambiguity-
averse or ambiguity-loving.
Proposition 5.3. Consider two twice continuously differentiable transformation func-
tions Φ1 and Φ2 where Φ1 is strictly concave and Φ2 is strictly convex. Moreover, I
denote with pΦi the respective monopoly prices under KMM-preferences. Then,
pΦ1 < pId < pΦ2
if both prices are interior solutions with Di(pΦj) > 0 for all i, j = 1, 2. In all other cases,
we can infer that pΦ1 = pΦ2 .
Proof. The proof is contained in the last section of this chapter.
An important class of distortion functions is the so-called class of transformations dis-
playing constant ambiguity aversion, see Klibanoff et al. [2005], which is defined by
Φa(x) =

1−e−ax
1−e−a for a 6= 0
x for a 6= 0.
(5.11)
Obviously, this definition of constant ambiguity aversion is adopted from the constant
absolute risk aversion utility function, see Pratt [1964]. The parameter a captures the
monopolist’s attitude towards ambiguity. If a is negative, the monopolist is called am-
biguity loving, if a = 0, the monopolist is called ambiguity neutral, and if a > 0, the
monopolist is called ambiguity-averse. Surprisingly, it is not true that a higher c.p.
degree of absolute ambiguity aversion translates into a lower monopoly price. This is
demonstrated by means of Table 5.1.
The reason for this behavior lies in the curvature of the constant absolute ambiguity
transformation. It is
∂2Φa(x)
∂x2
= − a
2e−ax
1− e−a .
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Parameter a Optimal Price
0.1 9.06
1.1 5.99
2.1 5.75
3.1 4.72
4.1 4.96
5.1 4.89
6.1 5.69
Table 5.1: Monopoly Price for Different Degrees of Absolute Ambiguity Aversion
Rounded to Two Decimal Places
Taking the derivative of this function with respect to a yields
∂3Φa(x)
∂x2∂a
=
aea−ax (a(−x) + ea(ax− 2) + a+ 2)
(ea − 1)2 .
We can readily see that the sign of this function is dependent on x. In fact, one can
show for positive values of a that there is a threshold value xˆ such that ∂
3Φa(x)
∂x2∂a
is positive
for x > xˆ, zero for x = xˆ, and negative for x < xˆ. This implies that an increase in the
parameter a can reduce or increase the concavity of Φa depending on the value of x. Note
that this observation is a direct consequence of a well-known property of the constant
absolute risk aversion utility, since a decision-maker’s risk attitude is dependent on the
initial wealth level. Naturally, the same holds for the KMM-model under ambiguity where
the initial ”wealth levels” are given by the expectations Es[Π] and Es[Π].
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter provides a comparison of the most prominent models of decision making
under uncertainty by means of a simple baseline model, the monopoly market with lin-
ear demand. The monopolist is assumed to be risk-neutral. Ambiguity is introduced in
the form of demand uncertainty. In particular, I consider a scenario with two possible
demand realizations. Both demand realizations have the same slope but different inter-
cepts. As it turns out, there is a closed form solution for the monopoly price for the MEU
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Figure 5.8: Objective for Different Values of the Absolute Ambiguity Aversion Pa-
rameter a.
model, the α-MEU model and the Choquet model with neo-additive capacities. There
is no-closed-form solution for the multiplier model and the Smooth Ambiguity Model.
Depending on the underlying parameter constellations, three types of solutions can oc-
cur. The first one is that there is a unique monopoly price where demand is positive in
both states of the world. The second class of solutions occurs when the monopoly price
exceeds the threshold value aL
b
but remains smaller than the threshold value aH
b
. In this
case, demand for the low consumer case becomes zero and remains positive for the high
number of consumers case. Again, there is a unique monopoly price. The third class
of solutions emerges if the monopoly price exceeds the threshold value aH
b
. In this case,
demand is zero in both states of the world. Hence, all prices p ≥ aH
b
are optimal.
The monopoly price in the MEU preference specification is smaller than the monopoly
price under certainty. Hence, extreme pessimism yields a lower monopoly price. A com-
mon feature between the α-MEU model and the Choquet model with neo-additive ca-
pacities is that a higher degree of optimism yields a higher monopoly price. Additionally,
the Choquet model with neo-additive capacities allows for a ceteris paribus analysis with
respect to the confidence parameter δ. If the monopolist is sufficiently pessimistic, we can
conclude that a higher degree of confidence (lower value of δ) yields a higher monopoly
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price. On the other hand, if the monopolist is sufficiently optimistic, an increase in con-
fidence translates into a lower monopoly price. For an intermediate pessimism value αˆ,
the monopoly price remains unchanged as δ decreases. In cases where preferences are
modeled within the multiplier framework, we observe that a higher value of γ yields a
higher monopoly price. In contrast to the Choquet model with neo-additive capacities,
the multiplier model cannot clearly differentiate between optimism and confidence. In
particular, an increase in γ can be interpreted as an increase in confidence and optimism
at the same time. We obtain that a higher value of γ yields an increasing monopoly
price. This is in line with the results of the α-MEU model and the Choquet model with
neo-additive capacities. Under the KMM model, we obtain that the monopoly price
under ambiguity aversion is lower than the monopoly price under neutrality. Similarly,
the monopoly price exceeds the monopoly price under neutrality in cases where the mo-
nopolist is ambiguity-loving. A widely-used class of distortion functions for the KMM
model is the class of transformations displaying constant ambiguity aversion. Contrary
to the optimism parameter α of the α-MEU and the Choquet model with neo-additive
capacities, it is not necessarily true that a higher absolute ambiguity aversion parameter
a entails a lower monopoly price under KMM preferences.
5.5 Mathematical Proofs
Proof of Corollary 5.1. The optimization problem is solved in two steps:
(1) Step 1 : Identify the local maxima of Π(p) for 0 ≤ p ≤ p0 and p ≥ p0.
(2) Step 2 : Determine the global maximum.
By solving the first order condition Π′(p) = 0 of the unconstrained profit function Π(p) =
(p− c)(a− bp) for p, we obtain the well-known monopoly price
pM =
a+ bc
2b
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The profit function evaluated at pM yields
Π
(
pM
)
=
(a− bc)2
4
.
As Π is strictly concave Π′′(p) = −2b < 0 and non-negative at the point pM , we can
infer that pM is the unique solution of the firm’s optimization problem if pM ∈ (0, p0).
Since a and b are assumed to be strictly positive, we can deduce that pM > 0. In cases
where pM ≥ p0, we can conclude that the unconstrained profit function is monotonically
increasing in p. This is because (p − c)(a − bp) is a parabola opening downwards with
a unique global maximum at pM . Since pM > p0, the profit function Π(p) is strictly
increasing as long as p ≤ p0, otherwise pM would not be the global maximum of the
unconstrained profit function. Therefore, the local maximum of Π(p) on [0, p0] is attained
for p = p0. The profit function equals zero for p > p0. Thus, Π(p) = 0 for p ≥ p0.
Moreover, due to the fact that Π is strictly increasing for p < p0, we have Π(p) < 0 for
p < p0. To sum up, the monopolist can secure a profit of zero for all prices p ≥ p∗,
which are therefore optimal. Finally, the condition pM < p0 is equivalent to the condition
a > bc.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. The optimization problem is solved in two steps: First, the
local maximizers of the objective are determined for the subsequent cases:
(1) 0 ≤ p ≤ p0
(2) p0 ≤ p ≤ p1
(3) p ≥ p1
Secondly, the overall global optimum is identified by comparing all local optima.
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Case 1: 0 ≤ p ≤ p0
Solving the first order condition for p, we obtain the price
p∗ =
saH + (1− s)aL + bc
2b
.
The profit function evaluated at p = p∗ yields
(aL s− aH s+ b c− aL)2
4 b
The objective function is strictly concave with Es[Π]
′′ = −2b < 0. Therefore, p∗ is a local
maximizer if 0 ≤ p∗ ≤ p0. The case p∗ < 0 is obsolete, since aL > 0, aH > 0, b > 0, and
c > 0 by assumption. It follows that p∗ ≤ p0 if and only if
2aL − saH − (1− s)aL ≥ bc. (5.12)
If p∗ > p0, we can deduce that the objective is strictly increasing for 0 ≤ p ≤ p0. Thus,
the maximum is attained for p∗ = p0. The results of this case can be summarized as
follows:
arg max
0≤p≤p0
Es[Π](p) =

p∗ for 2aL − saH − (1− s)aL ≥ bc
p0 for 2aL − saH − (1− s)aL < bc
Case 2: p0 ≤ p ≤ p1
In the second case, p0 ≤ p ≤ p1, we can infer that D2(p) = 0. The objective reduces to
s(p− c)D1(p).
Solving the first order condition for p yields
p∗∗ =
aH + bc
2b
.
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Since the reduced objective function is strictly concave with Es[Π]
′′ = −2sb < 0, we can
deduce that p∗∗ is the global maximizer of s(p−c)D1(p). In order to fully solve the second
case, we must distinguish between the following subcases:
(2a) p∗∗ < p0
(2b) p∗∗ ∈ [p0, p1]
(2c) p∗∗ > p1
Observe that in Subcase (a), the global maximizer of s(p − c)D1(p) is smaller than p0.
The case defining condition p∗∗ < p0 is equivalent to the condition bc < 2aL − aH . Since
s(p−c)D1(p) is a parabola opening downwards, the local maximum is attained at p = p0.
In Case (b), the interior solution p = p∗∗ is the local maximum. The case defining condi-
tions p∗∗ ≥ p0 and p∗∗ ≤ p1 are equivalent to aH ≥ bc and aH ≥ 2aL − bc. Consequently,
aH ≥ max{bc, aL − bc}.
In Subcase (c), the global maximizer of s(p− c)D1(p) is larger than p1. The case defining
condition p∗∗ > p1 is equivalent to the condition aH < bc. Again, since s(p− c)D1(p) is a
parabola opening downward, we can infer that the maximum is attained at p = p1. The
results for Case 2 can be summarized in the following way:
arg max
p0≤p≤p1
Es[Π](p) =

p0 for bc < 2aL − aH
p∗∗ for aH ≥ max{bc, 2aL − bc}
p1 for aH < bc
Case 3: p ≥ p1
In the third case p ≥ p1, the objective is constantly zero. Hence, all points p ≥ p1 are
optimal.
arg max
p≥p1
Es[Π](p) = [p1,∞)
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Determine the Overall Solution
The second step of the analysis consists in comparing the local optima derived for the
different cases discussed above. The subsequent lemma reduces substantially the number
of cases to be considered.
Lemma 5.2. In the monopoly model under risk the subsequent statements hold:
(I) (2a) implies inequality (5.12).
(II) (2c) implies the negation of inequality (5.12).
Proof of Lemma 5.2. The lemma is verified by proving statements (I) and (III) sepa-
rately.
Statement (I):
The case defining condition of Subcase (2a) is given by 2aL − aH > bc. This implies
2aL − saH − (1− s)aL ≥ bc, since saH + (1− s)aL < aH .
Statement (II):
The case defining condition of Subcase (2c) is given by aH < bc. This implies aL < bc,
since aL < aH by assumption. Hence, 2aL− saH − (1− s)aL < 2aL− aL = aL < bc which
is the negation of (1).
Taking into account the results of Lemma 5.2, we can derive the solution of the monop-
olist’s optimization problem for the Subcases (a) and (c).
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Subcase (2a):
In Subcase (2a), the optimum is given by p∗. The local maximizer on the interval [0, p0] is
p∗. Similarly, we obtain p0 as the local maximizer on the interval [p0, p1]. Besides, the set
of local maximizers on the interval [p1,∞) is given by the complete interval [p1,∞). Since
Es[Π](p) is a continuous function, and since p
∗ is the global maximum of the unconstrained
profit function
(p− c)(s(aH − bp) + (1− s)(aL − bp)),
we can conclude that
Es[Π](p
∗) ≥ Es[Π](p0).
Furthermore, as the profit function evaluated at p∗ is non-negative, we can deduce that
Es[Π](p
∗) ≥ Es[Π](p0) ≥ 0 = max
p≥p1
Es[Π](p).
Hence, p∗ is the global maximizer.
Subcase (2c):
In Subcase (2c), the solution is given by the interval [p1,∞). The local maximum on
[0, p0] is given by p0, on [p0, p1] by p1 and on [p1,∞) by the complete interval [p1,∞).
The objective is strictly increasing on [0, p1], since it is strictly increasing on each of the
sub-intervals [0, p0] and [p0, p1]. Furthermore, by continuity
Es[Π](p1) = 0 = max
p≥p1
Es[Π](p)
for all p > p1. Hence, the solution of the monopoly problem is given by [p1,∞).
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Subcase (2b):
Remember, that the condition aH ≥ max{bc, aL − bc} holds throughout the case. There
are three candidates for the global optimum, p∗, p0, and p∗∗.12 Contrary to the Subcases
(2a) and (2c), we cannot prove or disprove inequality (5.12). Consequently, we must
differentiate between two cases. Under the assumption that (5.12) holds, we can infer
that p∗ ∈ [0, p0]. Hence, p0 can only be a solution of the monopolist’s optimization
problem if p∗ = p0. Thus, we can restrict the analysis to the following instances:
• p∗ is the unique global maximizer
• p∗∗ is the unique global maximizer
• Both p∗ and p∗∗ are global maximizers
The price p∗ is the only solution of the monopolist’s problem if
Es[Π](p
∗) > Es[Π](p∗∗). (5.13)
Both p∗ and p∗∗ are global maximizers if
Es[Π](p
∗) = Es[Π](p∗∗). (5.14)
The price p∗∗ is a unique solution if
Es[Π](p
∗) < Es[Π](p∗∗). (5.15)
Solving the quadratic equation (5.14) for s, we obtain the subsequent pair of solutions:
s1 =
(b c−aL)2
(aL−aH)2 and s2 = 1. Thus, we derived the threshold value sˆ := s1. More specifically,
we can conclude that inequality (5.13) holds for s < s1 < 1. Observe that s < s1 < 1 im-
plies the inequality s < bc−aL
aL−aH , which is equivalent to inequality (5.12). This demonstrates
12The interval [p1,∞) can be excluded, since Es[Π](p1) and Es[Π](p0) are both non-negative.
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that p∗ is the global maximizer. Moreover, inequality (5.15) holds for s1 < s < 1 implying
that p∗∗ is the global maximizer. Besides, we can infer that Es[Π](p∗) = Es[Π](p∗∗) for
s ∈ {s1, 1}, in which case both p∗ and p∗∗ are global maximizers. If the threshold value s1
is larger than one, inequality (5.13) holds for all 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. Moreover, the only solution
of equation (5.14) is given by s = 1.
The case where the negation of inequality (5.12) holds can be analyzed in a similar fash-
ion. Clearly, p∗ can be ruled out as global maximizer, since p∗ 6∈ [0, p0]. Consequently,
there are only two candidates, p0 and p
∗∗, for the global optimum. We can distinguish
the following cases:
• p0 is the unique global maximizer
• Both p∗∗ and p0 are global maximizers
• p∗∗ is the unique global maximizer
The first and the second case can be excluded. By Condition (2b), we can infer that
p∗∗ ∈ [p0, p1]. This implies that Es[Π] is strictly increasing on [p0, p∗∗] Moreover, we
know that Es[Π] is strictly increasing on the interval [0, p0]. Due to the fact that Es[Π]
is continuous, we can conclude that Es[Π](p0) < Es[Π](p
∗∗). Hence, p∗∗ is the only
maximizer when the negation of inequality (5.12) holds.
Proof of Corollary 5.2. Since D1(p) > D2(p) for all c < p <
aH
b
, we can infer that the
monopolist’s profit in scenario aH is always larger than the profit in scenario aL for a
given price c < p < aH
b
. Formally,
Π1(p) = (p− c)D1(p) > Π2(p) = (p− c)D2(p)
for all c < p < aH
b
. Consequently, every prior that gives a smaller weight to the first
scenario induces smaller expected profits. This can be expressed formally in the following
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way. For every 1 ≥ s1 ≥ s2 ≥ 0, we have
(p− c)(s1D1 + (1− s1)D2) ≥ (p− c)(s2D1 + (1− s2)D2),
for all c ≤ p ≤ aH
b
. Thus, the minimizing prior is given by sworst = s. If p is strictly smaller
than c, profits are negative in both scenarios. Hence, Π1(p) < Π2(p) for all 0 ≤ p < c and
the prior inducing minimum expected profits is given by sworst = s. If p = c or p ≥ aHb ,
the objective is zero. Therefore, all priors p ∈ [s, s] are minimizing priors. Taking these
results, we obtain
sworst :=

s for p < c
[s, s] for p = c
s for c < p < aH
b
[s, s] for p ≥ aH
b
.
Proof of Corollary 5.3. The reduced optimization problem (5.2) is structurally the same
problem as the optimization problem in the risk case. This is because a price smaller than
c induces negative profits for every s ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, a price p < c can never be a global
optimum, since the monopolist can secure zero profits for price p ≥ p1. Note furthermore
that
Ψ(p) = Es[Π] = 0
for p ≥ aH
b
. As a consequence, the global optimum remains unchanged if we replace the
objective Ψ(p) with Es[Π]. In formal terms,
max
p≥0
Ψ(p) = max
p≥c
Ψ(p) = max
p≥c
Es[Π] = max
p≥0
Es[Π]
The last equality holds because a price 0 ≤ p < c cannot be a global maximizer of Es[Π]
This is because the monopolist can secure a profit of zero. Thus, we obtain the solution
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under MMEU by replacing the prior s defined in Proposition 5.1 by the worst-case prior
s.
Proof of Corollary 5.4. The proof is similar to the proof of Corollary 5.2. Since D1(p) >
D2(p) for all c < p <
aH
b
, we can conclude that the monopolist’s profit in scenario aH is
always larger than the profit in scenario aL for a given price c < p <
aH
b
. Formally,
Π1(p) = (p− c)D1(p) > Π2(p) = (p− c)D2(p)
for all c < p < aH
b
. Consequently, every prior that gives a larger weight to the first
scenario induces higher expected profits. This can be expressed formally in the following
way. For every 1 ≥ s1 ≥ s2 ≥ 0, we have
(p− c)(s1D1 + (1− s1)D2) ≥ (p− c)(s2D1 + (1− s2)D2),
for all c ≤ p ≤ aH
b
. The maximizing prior is given by sbest = s. If p < c profits are
negative in both scenarios. Hence, Π1(p) < Π2(p) for all 0 ≤ p < c and the prior inducing
maximum expected profits is given by sbest = s. If p = c, or p ≥ aHb , the objective equals
zero. Therefore, all priors p ∈ [s, s] are maximizing priors. Taking these results, we obtain
sbest :=

s for p < c
[s, s] for p = c
s for c < p < aH
b
[s, s] for p ≥ aH
b
.
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Proof of Corollary 5.5. Assume, without loss of generality, that p ≥ c. In this case, the
objective is given by
Ψ(p) = αEs[Π] + (1− α)Es[Π]
= (p− c)α[sD1(p) + (1− s)D2(p)] + (1− α)(p− c)[sD1(p) + (1− s)D2(p)]
= (p− c)
[
α(sD1(p) + (1− s)D2(p)) + (1− α)(sD1(p) + (1− s)D2(p))
]
= (p− c)[(αs+ (1− α)s)D1(p) + (α(1− s) + (1− α)(1− s))D2(p)]
= (p− c)[s2(α)D1(p) + (1− s2(α))D2(p)]
where
s2(α) := αs+ (1− α)s.
The prior s2(α) is non-negative, since s ≥ 0, α ≥ 0, and s ≥ 0. Moreover,
s2(α) ≤ s ≤ 1.
A similar proof holds for 0 ≤ p < c with the difference that Ψ(p) equals
αEs[Π] + (1− α)Es[Π].
In this case, we can rewrite the objective by Ψ(p) = Es1(α)[Π] where
s1(α) := αs+ (1− α)s.
Using the same reasoning as in the case p ≥ c, we can conclude that 0 ≤ s1(α) ≤ 1.
Proof of Corollary 5.6. The simplified objective Es(α)[Π] is structurally equivalent to the
objective of the risk case with the prior s = s2(α). This is the case because the monopolist
can secure a profit of zero for prices p ≥ p1. A price p < c induces negative profits and is
therefore never optimal. Hence, we can rewrite the optimization problem in the following
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way:
max
p≥0
Ψ(p) = max
p≥c
Ψ(p) = max
p≥c
Es2(α)[Π] = max
p≥0
Es2(α)[Π]
The last equality holds since prices smaller than the marginal cost parameter cannot
be optimal for s2(α) ∈ [0, 1]. Consequently, we obtain the solution under α-MEU by
replacing the prior s defined in Proposition 5.1 by the prior s2(α).
Proof of Corollary 5.7. In a first step, I demonstrate that the monopolist’s objective is
equivalent to
Ψα,δ(p) =

Es1(α,δ)[Π] for 0 ≤ p < c
Es2(α,δ)[Π] for p ≥ c
where
s1(α, δ) = (1− δ)s˜+ s1(α)δ and s2(α, δ) = (1− δ)s˜+ s2(α)δ
and
s1(α) = αs+ (1− α)s and s2(α) = αs+ (1− α)s.
By making use of Corollary 5.5, we can rewrite the monopolist’s objective as
Ψα,δ(p) =

(1− δ)Es˜[Π] + δEs1(α)[Π] for 0 ≤ p < c
(1− δ)Es˜[Π] + δEs2(α)[Π] for p ≥ c.
The objective can be further simplified. It is
Ψα,δ(p) = (p− c)[((1− δ)s˜+ s1(α)δ)D1(p)
+ ((1− δ)(1− s˜) + δ(1− s1(α)))D2(p)].
for 0 ≤ p < c. Defining
s1(α, δ) = (1− δ)s˜+ s1(α)δ,
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we obtain
Ψα,δ(p) = (p− c)[s1(α, δ)D1(p) + (1− s1(α, δ))D2(p)]
= Es1(α,δ)[Π]
for 0 ≤ p < c. By a similar line of arguments, we can define
s2(α, δ) = (1− δ)s˜+ s2(α)δ
and obtain
Ψα,δ(p) = (p− c)[s2(α, δ) D1(p) + (1− s2(α, δ)) D2(p)]
= Es2(α,δ)[Π]
for p ≥ c. This demonstrates that
Ψα,δ(p) =

Es1(α,δ)[Π] for 0 ≤ p < c
Es2(α,δ)[Π] for p ≥ c.
The monopolist can secure a profit of zero by setting a price p ≥ p1. Consequently, a
price below marginal costs cannot be a global maximizer, since it would induce strictly
negative profits. Thus, the optimization problem can be rewritten in the following way:
max
p≥0
Ψα,δ(p) = max
p≥c
Ψα,δ(p) = max
p≥c
Es2(α,δ)[Π]
Since the expectation Es2(α,δ)[Π] is negative for prices smaller than marginal costs, it
follows that the global maximizer remains unchanged when the domain of the optimization
problem is increased to all prices p ≥ 0. Thus,
max
p≥0
Ψα,δ(p) = max
p≥c
Es2(α,δ)[Π] = max
p≥c
Es2(α,δ)[Π] = max
p≥0
Es2(α,δ)[Π].
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Since 0 ≤ s2(α, δ) ≤ 1, we can proceed with the analysis of the risk case by replacing the
prior s with s2(α, δ).
Proof of Corollary 5.8. The derivative of p∗α,δ with respect to α is given by
∂p∗α,δ
∂α
=
aL δ − aH δ
2 b
< 0.
The derivative of p∗α,δ with respect to δ is
∂p∗α,δ
∂δ
=
aL (s˜+ α− 1) + aH (−s˜− α + 1)
2 b
=
(aH − aL) (−s˜− α + 1)
2 b
.
Hence, the sign of the derivative depends on the sign of −s˜ − α + 1. Define αˆ := 1 − s˜.
Then,
∂p∗α,δ
∂δ
> 0 for α < αˆ,
∂p∗α,δ
∂δ
= 0 for α = αˆ, and
∂p∗α,δ
∂δ
< 0 for α > αˆ.
Proof of Proposition 5.2. Note first that the objective reduces to the objective of the
MMEU case for γ = 0. Hence, smin = sworst for γ = 0. Let γ > 0 for the rest of the
analysis. By using the definition of the Kullback-Leibler divergence, we can rewrite the
objective in the following way:
Es[Π] + γR(s, s
∗) = (p− c)(sD1(p) + (1− s)D2(p))
+ γ
{
s log
( s
s∗
)
+ (1− s) log
(
1− s
1− s∗
)} (5.16)
The objective function is continuous in s, since sums and products of continuous func-
tions are continuous. Furthermore, the constraint set P is compact. Using Weierstrass’
theorem, we can conclude that a minimum prior smin exists. The objective function is
piecewise continuously differentiable with kinks at p0 :=
aL
b
and p1 :=
aH
b
. Hence, it is
necessary to differentiate between the cases 0 ≤ p ≤ p0, p0 ≤ p ≤ p1, and p ≥ p1.
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Case 1: p ≥ p1
In cases where p ≥ p1, the expected profit part of the objective equals zero for all s ∈ [0, 1].
Consequently, the objective is given by γR(s, s∗). Due to Gibb’s inequality, the Kullback-
Leibler divergence takes the value zero if and only if s = s∗. Thus, we can conclude that
smin = s
∗ is the minimizing prior. The same holds if p = c, since the objective reduces
to γR(s, s∗).
Case 2: 0 ≤ p ≤ p0
In the second case, the objective is twice continuously differentiable in s for given 0 ≤
p ≤ aL
b
. Taking the second-order derivative with respect to s yields
∂2(Es[Π] + γR(s, s
∗))
∂s2
= γ
(
1
1− s +
1
s
)
> 0.
Hence, the objective is strictly convex in s if γ > 0 and s ∈ (0, 1). Two major cases can
occur:
(a) There is a unique interior minimizing prior smin.
(b) The minimizing prior is located at the boundary of [s, s].
In Case (a), there is a closed form solution for smin. This can be seen by looking at the
first order condition. It is
∂(Es[Π] + γR(s, s
∗))
∂s
= (p− c)(aH − aL) + γ ∂R(s, s
∗)
∂s
= (p− c)(aH − aL) + γ
(
log
( s
s∗
)
+ log
(
1− s∗
1− s
))
.
Solving the first order condition for s, we obtain
smin =
s∗f1
s∗f1 + (1− s∗)f2 (5.17)
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where
f1 = e
aHc+aLp
γ and f2 = e
aLc+aHp
γ .
Hence, a unique interior solution exists. Case (b) can only occur if the interior solution
is not located in the interval [s, s]. It is
s∗f1
s∗f1 + (1− s∗)f2 < s
∗ ⇔
s∗f1 < s∗(s∗f1 + (1− s∗)f2) ⇔
f1 < s
∗f1 + (1− s∗)f2 ⇔
f1 < f2.
(5.18)
Plugging the definitions of f1 and f2 into the last inequality, we obtain
e
aHc+aLp
γ < e
aLc+aHp
γ ⇔
aHc+ aLp < aLc+ aHp ⇔
(aH − aL)c < (aH − aL)p ⇔
p > c.
In a similar way, we can conclude that smin > s
∗ for p < c, and smin = s∗ for p = c.
Hence, we know that smin ∈ (s∗, 1] for p < c, smin = s∗ for p = c, and smin ∈ [0, s∗)
for p > c. In order to make smin a valid solution, it is necessary to verify under which
conditions the following statements hold:
(c) smin < s for p < c
(d) smin > s for p > c
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Statement (c):
It is
smin < s ⇔
s∗f1
s∗f1 + (1− s∗)f2 < s ⇔
s∗f1 < s(s∗f1 + (1− s∗)f2) ⇔
s∗f1(1− s) < s(1− s∗)f2 ⇔
f1
f2
<
s(1− s∗)
s∗(1− s) := h1.
Plugging the definitions of f1 and f2 into the last inequality, we obtain
e
aHc+aLp−aLc−aHp
γ < h1 ⇔
e
(aH−aL)(c−p)
γ < h1 ⇔
(aH − aL)(c− p)
γ
< log(h1).
(5.19)
It is a well-known fact that log(h1) > 0 iff h1 > 1.
log(h1) > 0 ⇔
s(1− s∗)
s∗(1− s) > 1⇔
s− ss∗ > s∗ − s∗s⇔
s > s∗
This condition is true by assumption. Solving inequality (5.19) for p, we obtain the
equivalence
smin < s ⇔ p > c− log(h1)γ
aH − aL =: pˆ1.
As a consequence, the minimizing prior is given by smin = s for p ≤ pˆ1 and by
smin =
s∗f1
s∗f1 + (1− s∗)f2
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for p ≥ pˆ1. This case can be summarized as follows:
smin =

s for 0 ≤ p ≤ c ∧ p ≤ pˆ1
s∗f1
s∗f1+(1−s∗)f2 for 0 ≤ p ≤ c ∧ p ≥ pˆ1
This expression can be simplified. It is
smin =

s for p ∈ [0,min{c, pˆ1}]
s∗f1
s∗f1+(1−s∗)f2 for p ∈ [max{0, pˆ1}, c].
Statement (d):
Similar to the previous case, we can show that the condition smin > s is equivalent to the
condition
f1
f2
>
s(1− s∗)
s∗(1− s) := h2. (5.20)
Plugging f1 and f2 into inequality 5.20, we obtain that the initial condition is equivalent
to
(aH − aL)(c− p)
γ
> log(h2).
Moreover,
h2 =
s(1− s∗)
s∗(1− s) < 1 ⇔
s− ss∗ > s∗ − ss∗ ⇔
s∗ > s,
(5.21)
which is an assumption of the case under consideration. Solving inequality 5.20 for p, we
obtain the equivalence
smin > s ⇔ p < c− log(h2)γ
aH − aL =: pˆ2.
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Hence, the minimizing prior is given by smin = s for p ≥ pˆ2 and by
smin =
s∗f1
s∗f1 + (1− s∗)f2
for p < pˆ2.
This case can be summarized as follows:
smin =

s for p ≥ c ∧ p ≥ pˆ2 ∧ p ≤ aLb
s∗f1
s∗f1+(1−s∗)f2 for p ≥ c ∧ p ≤ pˆ2 ∧ p ≤ aLb
The last expression can be simplified. It is
smin =

s for p ∈ [max{c, pˆ2}, aLb ]
s∗f1
s∗f1+(1−s∗)f2 for p ∈ [c,min{aLb , pˆ2}].
Case 3: p0 ≤ p ≤ p1
The objective function reduces to
Πred := s(p− c)D1(p) + γ
{
s log
( s
s∗
)
+ (1− s) log
(
1− s
1− s∗
)}
. (5.22)
The derivative of Πred with respect to s is given by
(p− c)(aH − bp) + γ
(
log
( s
s∗
)
+ log
(
1− s∗
1− s
))
.
Solving the first order condition, we obtain
scand =
s∗f3
s∗f3 + (1− s∗)f4
with
f3 = e
aHc+bp
2
γ and f4 = e
(aH+bc)p
γ
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as a candidate for the solution of the minimization problem. As in the previous case, the
second-order derivative with respect to s is given by
∂2Πred
∂s2
= γ
(
1
1− s +
1
s
)
> 0.
Consequently, the objective is strictly convex. The following cases can occur:
(e) The candidate prior scand is the unique interior minimizer.
(f) The minimizer is either s or s.
In the following, I determine the conditions under which either (e) or (f) holds. The
interior prior is not the minimizer if either scand > s or scand < s. Note that the condition
scand < s
∗ is equivalent to the condition f3 < f4. This can be demonstrated by replacing
f1 by f3 and f2 by f4 in the proof of Statement (d). Hence,
e
aHc+bp
2
γ < e
(aH+bc)p
γ ⇔
aHc+ bp
2 < aHp+ bcp ⇔
bp(p− c) < aH(p− c) ⇔
p <
aH
b
,
which is true by assumption. As a consequence, the case scand > s can be excluded, since
s∗ ∈ [s, s] by assumption. The condition scand < s is equivalent to the condition
f3
f4
< h2.
Then,
scand < s ⇔
e
aHc+bp
2−(aH+bc)p
γ < h2 ⇔
bp2 − (aH + bc)p+ aHc− γ log(h2) < 0.
(5.23)
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The quadratic equation on the left-hand side has the solution
pˆ3/4 =
aH + bc
2b
∓
√
(aH + bc)2
4b2
− aHc+ γ log(h2).
Since the function on the left-hand side of the last inequality is a parabola opening
upwards, we can infer that the inequality holds for pˆ3 < p < pˆ4. Taking all the conditions
of this case together, we obtain that scand is the minimizing prior if one of the following
sets of requirements is satisfied:
(h) p ≥ aL
b
, p ≤ aH
b
, p ≤ pˆ3
(i) p ≥ aL
b
, p ≤ aH
b
, p ≥ pˆ4
The conditions in (h) are equivalent to
p ∈
[aL
b
,min
{
pˆ3,
aH
b
}]
.
The conditions in (i) are equivalent to
p ∈
[
max
{aL
b
, pˆ4
}
,
aH
b
]
.
The condition scand < s holds if
(j) p ≥ aL
b
, p ≤ aH
b
, p ≥ pˆ3, p ≤ pˆ4.
The conditions in (j) are equivalent to
p ∈
[
max
{aL
b
, pˆ3
}
,min
{
pˆ4,
aH
b
}]
.
A solution of the quadratic equation exists as long as
(aH + bc)
2
4b2
− aHc+ γ log(h2) ≥ 0.
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Solving the inequality for γ, we obtain
γ ≤ 1
log(h2)
[
aHc− (aH + bc)
2
4b2
]
:= γˆ.
Thus, scand > s for all γ > γˆ.
Proof of Corollary 5.10. It is
lim
γ→∞
f1(γ) = lim
γ→∞
f2(γ) = lim
γ→∞
f3(γ) = lim
γ→∞
f4(γ) = 1.
Consequently,
lim
γ→∞
s∗f1
s∗f1 + (1− s∗)f2 = limγ→∞
s∗f3
s∗f3 + (1− s∗)f4 = s
∗.
What remains to be shown is that the corner solutions s and s vanish in the limit. It is
• lim
γ→∞
pˆ1 = −∞
• lim
γ→∞
pˆ2 =∞
Besides, the limits lim
γ→∞
pˆ3 and lim
γ→∞
pˆ4 do not exist, since both zeros pˆi for i = 3, 4 are
only defined for γ ≤ γˆ <∞. As a consequence,
lim
γ→∞
A4(γ) = lim
γ→∞
A5(γ) = lim
γ→∞
A6(γ) = ∅.
Moreover,
lim
γ→∞
A1(γ) = lim
γ→∞
A3(γ) = ∅
because of the limiting properties of pˆ1 and pˆ2 and
lim
γ→∞
A2(γ) =
[
0,
aL
b
]
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for the same reason. Hence,
lim
γ→∞
smin(γ) =

lim
γ→∞
s∗f1
s∗f1+(1−s∗)f2 for p ∈ [0, aLb ]
lim
γ→∞
s∗f3
s∗f3+(1−s∗)f4 for p ∈ [aLb , aHb ]
s∗ for p ∈ [aH
b
,∞)
which proves the claim due to the fact that the limit of the component functions is given
by s∗ as well. The property
lim
γ→∞
p(γ) = prisk(s∗)
is an immediate consequence of the limit of the minimizing prior. What remains to be
demonstrated is that p(γ) converges against prisk(s∗) from below for c ≤ p(γ) ≤ aL
b
and
γ > γˆ. The minimum prior function smin(γ) is piecewise continuously differentiable. In
cases where smin(γ) equals s
∗, we can conclude that the minimum prior is independent
of γ and therefore constant. Subsequently, I investigate how the interior solution
h =
s∗f1
s∗f1 + (1− s∗)f2
reacts to an increase in γ. The derivative of h with respect to γ is given by
∂h
∂γ
=
s∗(1− s∗)f1f2(p− c)(aH − aL)
γ2(s∗f1 + (1− s∗)f2)2 . (5.24)
The sign of (5.24) depends on the sign of p − c only. Hence, h is negative for p < c,
zero for p = c, and positive for p > c. This establishes that h is strictly increasing
for p > c. Consequently, we can infer that smin(γ) converges to s
∗ from below. Let
0 < γˆ < γ1 < γ2 <∞. Then, smin(γ1) ≤ smin(γ2) and Esmin(γ1)[Π] ≤ Esmin(γ2)[Π]. Taking
the derivative of h with respect to p yields
∂h
∂p
= −(aH − aL)e
(aH+aL)(c+p)
γ (1− s∗)s∗
γ(s∗f1 + (1− s∗)f2)2 .
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Obviously, this derivative is negative. Consequently, smin(p) moves further away from s
∗
as p increases. Hence, R(smin(p), s
∗) is increasing in p. Thus, the monopolist always has an
incentive to increase prices if the objective was given by the Kullback-Leibler divergence.
What remains to be analyzed is the expected profit part Es[Π] of the objective. As
the minimum prior smin increases with γ, the monopolist expects the high number of
consumers scenario to be more likely. Therefore, he or she, has an incentive to increase
prices, see for instance Example 5.2. Since both effects go the same way, the monopolist
has an overall incentive to raise prices.
Proof of Proposition 5.3. In a first step, I demonstrate that the objective function
g = qEs[Π] + (1− q)Es[Π] (5.25)
yields a lower monopoly price than
qΦ(Es[Π]) + (1− q)Φ(Es[Π]), (5.26)
if Φ is a concave distortion function. The objectives (5.25) and (5.26) are only piecewise
differentiable with kinks at p0 =
aL
b
and p1 =
aH
b
. Therefore, we derive the set of global
maximizers on a case-by-case basis.
Case 1: p ≥ p1
We define D1 = {p : p ≥ p1} and obtain
arg max
p∈D1
{
qΦ(Es[Π]) + (1− q)Φ(Es[Π])
}
= arg max
p∈D1
{
qΦ(0) + (1− q)Φ(0)
}
= arg max
p∈D1
Φ(0) = D1.
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Moreover, we can conclude that
arg max
p∈D1
qEs[Π] + (1− q)Es[Π]
= arg max
p∈D1
0 = D1.
Hence, the set of local maximizers is the same for (5.25) and (5.26).
Case 2: p0 ≤ p ≤ p1
We define D2 = [p0, p1]. This case needs to be subdivided into three subcases.
(a) The maximum of g is located at p = p1. (corner solution 1)
(b) The maximum of g is located at p = p0. (corner solution 2)
(c) The maximum of g is located in the interior of D2. (interior solution)
In Case 2, the first objective (5.25) reads
qEs[Π] + (1− q)Es[Π] = qs(p− c)(aH − bp) + s(1− q)(p− c)(aH − bp)
= (p− c)(aH − bp)(qs+ s(1− q)).
Case (2a):
Since g is quadratic in p, we can conclude that qEs[Π] + (1− q)Es[Π] is strictly increasing
on D2. Moreover, if qEs[Π]+(1−q)Es[Π] is strictly increasing in p, we can infer that both
s(p− c)[aH − bp] and s(p− c)[aH − bp] are strictly increasing in p. This is because multi-
plications with positive constants leave a function’s monotonicity properties unaffected.
Since Φ is a strictly increasing transformation, it follows that Φ(Es) and Φ(Es) are both
strictly increasing in p. This implies that objective (5.26) is also strictly increasing in
p. Consequently, the local maximizer equals p1 for both functions and is therefore not
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affected by the transformation Φ.
Case (2b) and Case (2c):
With the same arguments as in Case (2a), we can establish that both objectives have the
same monotonicity properties, and therefore the same maximizer.
Case 3: p < c
We define D3 = {p : 0 ≤ p < c}. This case can be excluded. A price p ∈ D3 cannot
be a global maximizer of objective (5.25), see Example 5.2. Similarly, p cannot be a
global maximizer of objective (5.26). This is because p cannot be a maximizer of Es[Π].
Similarly, p cannot be a maximizer of Es[Π] as well. This implies that p ∈ D3 is not a
maximizer of Φ(Es[Π]) and Φ(Es[Π]). Hence, p is not a maximizer of objective (5.26).
Case 4: c ≤ p ≤ p0
We define D4 = {p : c ≤ p ≤ aLb }. This case needs to be subdivided into three subcases.
(a) The maximum of g is located in the interior of D3. (interior solution)
(b) The maximum of g is located at the lower boundary p = c. (corner solution 1)
(c) The maximum of g is located at the upper boundary p = p0. (corner solution 2)
Case (4a):
The local maximizers of (5.25) and (5.26) are defined by
pKMM1 := arg max
p∈D4
{qEs[Π] + (1− q)Es[Π]}
pKMM2 := arg max
p∈D4
{qΦ(Es[Π]) + (1− q)Φ(Es[Π])} .
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Since g is quadratic in p, we can infer that objective (5.25) is strictly increasing for
p0 ≤ p < pKMM1 and decreasing for pKMM1 < p < p1. As a next step, I investigate the
monotonicity properties of Es[Π] and Es[Π]. Therefore, I denote with ps the maximizer
of Es[Π], and I denote with ps the maximizer of Es[Π] on D4. From Proposition 5.1, we
can conclude that ps < p
KMM
1 < ps. Table 5.2 summarizes the monotonicity properties
of objective (5.25) on the following partition of D4:
1. I1 := {p : p0 ≤ p ≤ ps},
2. I2 := {p : ps ≤ p ≤ pKMM1 },
3. I3 := {p : pKMM1 ≤ p ≤ ps},
4. I4 := {p : ps ≤ p ≤ p1}.
Interval Objective 1 Es[Π] Es[Π]
I1 ↑ ↑ ↑
I2 ↑ ↓ ↑
I3 ↓ ↓ ↑
I4 ↓ ↓ ↓
Table 5.2: Monotonicity Properties
A direct consequence of Table 5.2 is that pKMM2 is contained in the union I2 ∪ I3, since
objective (5.26) is strictly increasing on I1, and strictly decreasing on I4. This is due
to the monotonicity properties of Es[Π] and Es[Π]. What remains to be shown is that
pKMM2 /∈ I3\{pKMM1 }. In order to prove this statement, we contemplate the partial
derivative of objective (5.26) with respect to p:
qΦ′(Es[Π])Es[Π]′ + (1− q)Φ′(Es)Es[Π]′
Assuming p ∈ I3, we can infer that Es[Π]′ < 0 and Es[Π]′ > 0. Moreover, Es[Π] ≤ Es[Π]
for p ≥ c. Furthermore, since Φ′′ < 0, we can deduce that
Φ′(Es[Π]) ≥ Φ′(Es[Π]).
Chapter 5. Monopoly Pricing Under Ambiguity 222
Consequently,
qΦ′(Es[Π]) · Es[Π]′ + (1− q)Φ′(Es[Π]) · Es[Π]′ ≤ Φ′(Es[Π]) (qEs[Π]′ + (1− q)Es[Π]′) .
Besides, we can infer that
qEs[Π]
′ + (1− q)Es[Π]′ = sq(aH − aL) + s(aH − aL)(1− q) + aL − 2bp+ bc. (5.27)
Expression (5.27) is negative, if and only if,
p >
aH(qs+ (1− q)s) + aL(1− qs+ (1− q)s)
2b
= pKMM1 . (5.28)
Hence, the p-derivative of objective (5.26) is negative for p ∈ I3. As a result, the optimum
is located in I2 and p
KMM
1 > p
KMM
2 .
Case (4b):
In cases where pKMM1 equals the marginal cost parameter c, we can conclude that objec-
tive (5.25) is strictly decreasing on D4. Due to inequality (5.28), objective (5.26) is also
strictly decreasing on D4. Hence, p
KMM
2 = c is the unique local maximizer of (5.26) on
D4. Consequently, both objectives have the same local maximizer, and this maximizer is
unique.
Case (4c):
In cases where pKMM1 equals the upper boundary p0 of the interval D3, we can conclude
that objective (5.25) is strictly increasing on D4. Due to inequality (5.28), objective
(5.26) is also strictly increasing on D4. Hence, p
KMM
2 = p0 is the unique local maximizer
of (5.26) on D4. Consequently, both objectives have the same local maximizer, and this
maximizer is unique.
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Note that pKMM1 = p
KMM
2 in all cases, except in Case (4a). The fact that p
KMM
1 equals
pKMM2 in these instances is independent of the curvature of Φ. Hence, even if Φ is
assumed to be convex, we can conclude that pKMM1 = p
KMM
2 for all cases, except in Case
(4a). As a result, it is sufficient to reexamine Case (4a) under the assumption that Φ is
strictly convex. Remember, that objective (5.26) is strictly increasing on I1 and strictly
decreasing on I4. This excludes the possibility that p
KMM
2 is an element of I1 or I4.
What remains to be shown is that pKMM2 is not an element of I2\{pKMM1 } either. This
is demonstrated by means of a proof by contradiction. Assume that pKMM2 is an element
of I2\{pKMM1 }. Then, Es[Π]′ < 0 and Es[Π]′ > 0. Furthermore, since Φ′′ > 0, we can
deduce that
Φ′(Es[Π]) ≤ Φ′(Es[Π]).
Consequently, we obtain the following estimate for the p-derivative of objective (5.26):
qΦ′(Es[Π]) · Es[Π]′ + (1− q)Φ′(Es[Π]) · Es[Π]′ ≥ Φ′(Es[Π]) (qEs[Π]′ + (1− q)Es[Π]′) .
From Case (4a), we know that qEs[Π]
′ + (1 − q)Es[Π]′ is positive for p < pKMM1 and
negative for p > pKMM1 . Consequently, the p-derivative of objective (5.26) is positive
on I2\{pKMM1 }. Hence, pKMM2 cannot be located in the interval I2. This proves the
claim.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis applies the concept of ambiguity to different fields of research in economics
with a focus on Industrial Organization and Health Economics. In the first chapter, I
provide a basic overview on the development of decision-theoretic models under uncer-
tainty.
The second chapter focuses on a Hotelling location-then-price duopoly game under de-
mand ambiguity. Using a Choquet model with neo-additive capacities, this chapter pro-
vides a unifying framework for the Hotelling model under risk developed by Meagher and
Zauner [2004], and the Hotelling model under ambiguity with α-MEU preferences devel-
oped by Kro´l [2012]. It turns out that there is a unique subgame-perfect pure strategy
Nash equilibrium for firms’ location choices in this general framework. Moreover, this
equilibrium features interesting comparative static results with respect to the confidence
and optimism parameter of the underlying capacity. One obtains the result that a higher
degree of pessimism decreases equilibrium differentiation. A higher degree of confidence
decreases equilibrium differentiation if firms are rather pessimistic and increases equi-
librium differentiation if firms are sufficiently optimistic. For an intermediate optimism
value αˆ equilibrium differentiation is independent of δ. More important than these com-
parative static results is that the neo-additive approach provides an additional source of
explanation for a variety of observed product design choices. In this sense, we reinterpret
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the real-world examples provided by Kro´l [2012] within the neo-additive framework. An
important example relates to the mutual funds market. The observation here is that fund
managers tend to differentiate their products less after the financial crisis. The explana-
tion put forward by Kro´l [2012] is that the ambiguity attitude parameter α has changed
due to the financial crisis. Hence, fund managers have become increasingly pessimistic
after the financial crisis. In our view, this conclusion is problematic, since it is not clear
whether managers became more pessimistic (change in α), or whether they perceived
the market environment to be less reliable (change in δ). If fund managers are rather
ambiguity-averse, one can conclude with the neo-additive approach that decreasing con-
fidence lowers product differentiation.
The third chapter of this thesis considers ambiguity in the context of Health Economics,
and more specifically in the context of primary prevention. The underlying research
question of this project is to examine how patients adjust preventive activities in the
light of new information when the relationship between effort and disease probabilities
is characterized by Knightian uncertainty. Information is modeled by a random signal.
After receiving the signal, patients update their prior beliefs and select an optimal level
of effort.1
In a first step, I present the primitives of the model and proceed by analyzing the un-
derlying optimization problem. In this context, I specify conditions for the existence
and uniqueness of interior and corner solutions. Subsequently, I conduct a comparative
static analysis with respect to the optimism parameter α and the confidence parameter
δ. It turns out that the effect of optimism on prevention is determined by two concurrent
effects, which are denoted as ”perceived efficacy effect” and ”expected marginal utility
effect”. The perceived efficacy effect captures the fact that optimists and pessimists might
differ in their assessment of the preventive regime’s capability to reduce the underlying
probability of disease. The expected marginal utility effect takes into account that a shift
in the perceived disease probability might increase or decrease marginal gains or losses
from additional units of prevention. The overall effect of optimism on prevention is the
1Effort is interpreted as level of adherence to a preventive regime.
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sum of both effects and can be positive, negative or zero. A similar analysis applies to
the confidence parameter δ.
Having explored the connection between optimism, confidence and prevention, I continue
by looking at the relationship between prevention and information. By using the three
updating rules for neo-additive capacities discussed in Eichberger et al. [2010], I derive
patients’ ex-post optimization problem. The following section analyzes the effect of in-
formation on prevention. Therefore, I introduce two benchmark measures for preventive
behavior under Knightian uncertainty. The first benchmark is a Bayesian patient whose
prior belief is represented by a unique subjective probability. An interesting finding re-
sults from the comparison of Bayesian and Non-Bayesian patients when the prior belief of
the Bayesian patient corresponds to the reference prior in the Non-Bayesian case. Non-
Bayesian patients exhibit a higher ex-post level of prevention, relative to the Bayesian
benchmark patient, under the pessimistic updating rule when the worst case relationship
pimin is less effective than the updated Bayesian relations piqBayes . Similarly, Bayesian
patients feature a lower level of ex-post prevention under the optimistic updating rule
if pimax is less effective than piqBayes . Under more restrictive requirements, one can show
that the generalized Bayesian updating rule induces lower (higher) ex-post preventive
activities than the Bayesian benchmark patients when patients are sufficiently optimistic
(pessimistic). More interestingly, information does not necessarily close the gap in preven-
tive activities between Bayesian and Non-Bayesian patients. On the contrary, information
has the potential to render extreme patients even more extreme. The second benchmark
is a Bayesian patient that is aware of the true underlying preventive relationship. In this
context, I introduce the terms ”excessive preventive behavior” and ”preventive inertia”.
Patients exhibit excessive preventive behavior when their level of effort under Knightian
uncertainty exceeds the optimal level of prevention under perfect information. Similarly,
patients display preventive inertia when they exert less effort under Knightian uncertainty
than in a situation where they know the relationship between effort and the probability
of disease. One can show that excessive preventive behavior and preventive inertia vanish
for the Bayesian benchmark patient when the correct preventive relationship piθ can be
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perfectly inferred.2 Surprisingly, this is not true for Knightian patients. In the general
case, excessive preventive behavior and preventive inertia persist even for the Bayesian
benchmark patient. Moreover, one cannot conclude that excessive behavior is attenu-
ated even if the correct signal is observed. Clearly, if the correct signal is sent, patients
update their prior belief such that the posterior probability gives a larger weight to the
true underlying relationship. When the signal structure is such that this increase of the
posterior is strong enough, one obtains that excessive preventive behavior or preventive
inertia is reduced. In cases where the posterior of the correct relationship increases only
slightly, the result depends on the posterior probabilities for the remaining relationships.
For instance, in a situation where patients feature preventive inertia before observing the
signal, preventive inertia can be reinforced if the posterior for those preventive relation-
ships increases strongly enough which would ”by themselves” induce preventive inertia.
The fourth chapter relates to the contribution made by C¸elen [2012], who extends the
well-known Blackwell’s theorem to MEU-preferences. We observe that the value of infor-
mation defined in C¸elen [2012] entails dynamically inconsistent behavior. The reason is
that it is not defined according to the principle of recursively defined utility. In order to
account for this observation, we propose an alternative definition for the value of infor-
mation under MEU-preferences which is, by construction, consistent with the backward
induction principle.
The fifth chapter of this thesis should be understood as a guide for those interested in
implementing models of decision making under ambiguity to address research problems
in economics. By means of a simple baseline model, a static monopoly market with
linear demand, I explain which arguments can be used to justify a modeling approach
that prescribes models of decision making under ambiguity. In order to do so, I outline
the philosophical discussion on probabilities to clearly define the notions of objective and
subjective probabilities. In the end, the justification for ambiguity boils down to two
necessary requirements. The first one is to provide a rationale why probabilities are not
2This is for instance the case when there is a signal s such that the conditional probability to receive
this signal given the true parameter is a Dirac measure.
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objectively given in the choice situation under consideration. If this claim can be un-
derpinned with credible arguments, one knows that probabilities are either subjective or
that decision-makers hold beliefs that violate the notion of subjective probabilities. The
second requirement is to refute subjective probabilities. This can be done by referring
to Ellsberg’s paradox, see Ellsberg [1961], which has been experimentally confirmed by
Camerer and Weber [1992]. Since there is a variety of decision theoretic models consistent
with Ellsberg’s paradox, I demonstrate the implications of the most prominent models of
decision-making under ambiguity for the monopoly pricing problem. I assume a simple
scenario with two states of the world and a monopolist facing demand ambiguity. The
demand functions are assumed to be linear with the same slope parameter but different
intercepts. Contrary to the existing literature on monopoly pricing under Knightian un-
certainty, I can demonstrate that ambiguity might increase or decrease optimal prices.
Besides, in special cases where corner solutions occur, ambiguity has no influence on
optimal pricing. Depending on the underlying parameter constellations, three types of
solutions can occur: a unique interior solution where demand is positive in both states of
the world, a corner solution where demand is only positive in one of the two states, and a
third scenario where demand is zero in both states of the world. It follows that extreme
pessimism induces lower monopoly prices throughout all model specifications. In particu-
lar, one can conclude that a higher degree of pessimism in the α-MEU or Choquet model
with neo-additive capacities yields a lower monopoly price in cases where the interior
solution is optimal. 3 A comparable statement does not hold for the KMM model with
a constant absolute ambiguity transformation function. One can observe that a higher
degree of absolute ambiguity aversion does not necessarily translate into lower monopoly
prices.
3In cases where corner solutions apply, the monopoly price is independent of α.
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